

BREAKING UP THE UNION CAMP AT FALMOUTH. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

HOOVER'S APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL.

BY CHARLES F. BENJAMIN. †

WHEN, after the Mud March ‡ that succeeded the disaster of Fredericksburg, General Burnside, in a fit of humiliation, telegraphed to Washington requesting, for the second time, to be relieved, the question of his successor was already being considered as a probability. Though stung by the loud call that went up for McClellan from the army that had twice met disaster after parting with him, the cabinet were not shaken in the conclusion that McClellan must not be restored, for the jocund Seward, equally with the patient Lincoln, drew the line at a military dictatorship, such as would be virtually implied by a second restoration, under such pressure. But while firm, the authorities were circumspect, and concluded that it would not be prudent to increase the tension between themselves and a possible prætorian camp by sending an outsider to take the command from Burnside. Subject to this conclusion, General Halleck and Secretary Stanton favored the transfer of Rosecrans, for whom McClellan might

be expected to say a good word to supplement his inherent strength as a repeatedly victorious commander; but it was then thought injudicious to put another Western man in command.

The choice being narrowed to the Army of the Potomac, a process of exclusion began. Franklin was under a cloud [see note, p. 216] and was considered out of the question; Sumner had many qualifications, but his age and growing feebleness were beyond remedy; Couch was a possible second, and still more likely third choice; and, briefly, the selection was found to lie among Hooker, Reynolds, and Meade. § The first-named had a strong popular lead, but General Halleck, backed by the Secretary of War, contended that there were reasons of an imperative character why he should not be intrusted with an independent command of so high a degree of responsibility. Stress was laid upon the fact that in the dispositions for the attack on Marye's Heights, General Burnside, who at that time could have had no valid motive for jealousy

† The writer of this paper occupied responsible and confidential positions at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac and in the War Department.—EDITORS.

‡ In his official report of the Rappahannock campaign, General Burnside says: "I made four distinct attempts, between November 9th, 1862, and January 25th, 1863. The first failed for want of pontoons; the second was the battle of Fredericksburg; the third was stopped by the President; and the fourth was defeated by the elements or other causes. After the last attempt to move I was, on January 25th, 1863, relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac." The fourth attempt mentioned by General Burnside has passed into history as the "Mud March." The plan was to move Franklin's two corps, or the Left Grand Division, to Banks's Ford, where Franklin was to cross and seize the heights on the river road north of the Orange Turnpike. Franklin was to be supported by Hooker and Sumner, with the Center and Right Grand Divisions. Franklin and Hooker marched from their camps and bivouacked near Banks's Ford on January 20th; but a rain storm set

in that evening making the roads impassable for pontoon wagons, and after several attempts to haul the boats to the river by hand the movement was abandoned. The artillery and wagons became mired, and the army, with all of its necessary material, was in fact foot-fast in the soft, clayey soil that abounds in that region. In a dejected mood the army splashed back to its old camps around Falmouth. See also p. 118.—EDITORS.

§ I have been told recently, on hearsay testimony, that Sedgwick was sounded and said he ought not to be appointed because he was a McClellan man. I never heard that Sedgwick was ever proposed as successor to Burnside, and I cannot believe it, knowing the *limited* though warm regard of Secretary Stanton for him. Stanton always spoke of Sedgwick as a brave, thorough-going soldier, who staid in camp, gave Washington a wide berth, and did not intrigue against his superiors; but I never heard him attribute to Sedgwick such high qualities for a great command as he imputed to some other officers of that army.—C. F. B.

of Hooker, had intrusted him with no important part, although he was present on the field and of equal rank with Sumner and Franklin, to whom the active duties of the battle were assigned. President Lincoln apparently yielded to the views of those in charge of the military department of affairs, and thereupon Halleck confidentially inquired of Reynolds if he was prepared to accept the command. Reynolds replied that he expected to obey all lawful orders coming to his hands, but as the communication seemed to imply the possession of an option in himself, he deemed it his duty to say frankly that he could not accept the command in a voluntary sense, unless a liberty of action should be guaranteed to him considerably beyond any which he had reason to expect. He was thereupon dropped, and the choice further and finally restricted to Hooker and Meade, with the chances a hundred to one in favor of the latter by reason of the fixed conviction of the Secretary of War that the former ought not to be chosen in any contingency. Stanton knew that there were two Hookers in the same man. He knew one as an excellent officer, mentally strong, clever and tireless, and charming (almost magnetic) in address. It was the other Hooker on whom he wished to take no chances.

Hooker and Meade were in camp, attending to such military duties as the lull of action gave occasion for, neither having taste nor talent for intrigue, each aware that "something" was afoot, but both supposing that the ferment concerned Hooker and Reynolds, and, possibly, some third man beyond the lines of the army. But there were men about Hooker who believed in, and hoped to rise with him, and who, at all events, could afford to take the chances of success or failure with him; and these men were rich in personal and external resources of the kinds needed for the combination of political, financial, and social forces to a common end. By their exertions, such influences had been busy for Hooker ever since the recent battle, greatly aided by the unselfish labor of earnest men who believed that Hooker's military reputation (the pugnacious disposition implied in his popular cognomen of "Fighting Joe") and his freedom from suspicion of undue attachment to the fortunes of General McClellan, pointed him out as the man for the occasion by the unerring processes of natural selection. The attitude and character of the Secretary of War, however, justified nothing but despair until connection was made with a powerful faction which had for its object the elevation of Mr. Chase to the Presidency at the end of Mr. Lincoln's term. Making every allowance for the strength and availability of Mr. Chase, as against Mr. Lincoln or any other civilian candidate, his friends did not conceal from themselves that the general who should conquer the rebellion would have the disposal of the next Presidency, and they were on the lookout for the right military alliance when they came into communication with Hooker's friends and received their assurances that, if it should be his good fortune to bring the war to a successful close, nothing could possibly induce him to accept other than military honors in recognition of his services. General

Hooker thereupon became the candidate of Mr. Chase's friends. Hooker probably knew of these dickeringings. Certainly Stanton did, through a friend in Chase's own circle.

As soon as Burnside's tenure of the command had become a question rather of hours than of days, new efforts were made to win over the Secretary of War, but necessarily without avail, because, apart from any personal considerations that may have had place in his mind, he had certain convictions on the subject of a kind that strong men never abandon when once formed. At this critical moment the needed impulse in the direction of Hooker was supplied by a person of commanding influence in the councils of the Administration, and Mr. Lincoln directed the appointment to be made. [See Lincoln's letter to Hooker, p. 216.]

Mr. Stanton's first conclusion was that he should resign; his second, that duty to his chief and the public forbade his doing so; his third, that Hooker must be loyally supported so long as there was the least chance of his doing anything with the army placed in his keeping. This latter resolution he faithfully kept, and General Hooker, who soon had occasion to know the facts connected with his appointment, was both surprised and touched by the generous conduct of his lately implacable opponent.

Mr. Chase found his situation as sponsor for the new commander embarrassing. As a member of the cabinet he could freely express his views with reference to any military question coming up for cabinet discussion, and upon any matter introduced to him by the President he had fair opportunity of making a desired impression; but further than this he could not directly go without disclosing a personal interest inconsistent with his place and duty. Yet the circumstances connected with the appointment of Hooker made it imperatively necessary that the influence of Mr. Chase should be exerted in respect of matters that could not formally come to him for consideration, although, on the other hand, they could not safely be intrusted wholly to the keeping of a suspicious, and probably hostile War Department. Fortunately for the perplexed statesman, the influence that had proved sovereign when the balance had hung in suspense between Hooker and Meade was safely and wholly at his service, and, being again resorted to, provided a *modus vivendi* so long as one was needed. Out of all these anomalies a correspondence resulted between Mr. Chase and General Hooker, the publication of which is historically indispensable to the saying of the final word on the leading events of Mr. Lincoln's administration.

When General Hooker telegraphed to Washington that he had brought his army back to the north side of the river, because he could not find room for it to fight at Chancellorsville, President Lincoln grasped General Halleck and started for the front post-haste. He would likewise have taken the Secretary of War, in his anxiety, but for the obvious indelicacy of the latter's appearance before Hooker at such a moment. Mr. Lincoln went back to Washington that night, enjoining upon Halleck to remain till he knew "everything." Halleck

was a keen lawyer, and the reluctant generals and staff-officers had but poor success in stopping anywhere short of the whole truth. When he got back to his post, a conference of the President and Secretary of War with himself was held at the War Department, whereat it was concluded that both the check at Chancellorsville and the retreat were inexcusable, and that Hooker must not be intrusted with the conduct of another battle. Halleck had brought a message from Hooker to the effect that as he had never sought the command, he could resign it without embarrassment, and would be only too happy if, in the new arrangement, he could have the command of his old division and so keep in active service.

The friends of Mr. Chase considered that the fortunes of their leader were too much bound up with Hooker to permit of the latter's ignominious removal and, although the President had learned much that he did not dream of at the time he parted company with the War Department in the matter of appointing a successor to Burnside, the Treasury faction had grown so powerful that he could not consent to a rupture with it, and a temporizing policy was adopted all around, which General Couch, commander of the Second Corps, all unconsciously, nearly spoiled by contemptuously refusing to serve any longer under Hooker, despite an abject appeal to him by Hooker not to leave the army. ¶

General Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania broke up the nearly intolerable situation, and Hooker's diligent and skillful management of his army rapidly brought matters back to the hopeful state

they were in before the late battle. ¶ But Mr. Stanton was determined that the deliberate decision of the council of war, held after Halleck's return from the front, should not be set aside, and he was now the master of the situation. Hooker was so full of hope and energy that severe measures had to be resorted to in order to wring from him that tender of resignation deemed to be necessary to enable his supporters at Washington to keep on outward terms with the Administration. When it did come, the impending battle was evidently so close at hand that the Secretary of War was seized with the fear that, either by accident or design, the change of command to General Meade would not be effected in time to avoid the very contingency aimed at by the change. At the last moment, the President too became alarmed, and there was another conference at the Department to settle the means of insuring the transfer.

Duplicate copies of the President's order, changing the command, were made, authenticated by the signature of the adjutant-general and addressed, severally, to Generals Hooker and Meade. General James A. Hardie, chief of the staff of the Secretary of War, and a personal friend of both the officers concerned, was then called into the conference room and directed to start at once for Frederick City and, without disclosing his presence or business, make his way to General Meade and give him to understand that the order for him to assume the command of the army immediately was intended to be as unquestionable and peremptory as any that a soldier could receive. He was then, as the representative of the President, to

¶ General F. A. Walker says in his "History of the Second Army Corps" (pp. 253-255):

"One of the results of the Chancellorsville campaign was a change in the command of the Second Corps. General Couch had felt outraged in every nerve and fiber of his being by the conduct of General Hooker from the 1st to the 5th of May. . . .

"Not that General Couch was alone in this feeling, which was shared by nearly all the commanders of the army; but at once his nature as a man and his position as the senior corps commander made him peculiarly the spokesman in the representations and remonstrances addressed to General Hooker, . . . and when consulted by President Lincoln on the 22d of May he advised that General Meade should be placed in command, stating that he himself would have great pleasure in serving under that officer, though senior to him. To the suggestion of his own succession to the command General Couch returned a firm and sincere negative. . . .

"In this spirit [having lost confidence in Hooker], with pain inexpressible, General Couch asked to be relieved from further service with the Army of the Potomac."—EDITORS.


¶ On the 5th of June General Hooker sent to the President a long dispatch, to which Mr. Lincoln replied on the same day. These communications throw an interesting light on Hooker's relations with the Administration. After stating his suspicion that Lee was about to undertake an aggressive movement, Hooker says:

"As I am liable to be called on to make a movement with the utmost promptitude, I desire that I may be informed as early as practicable of the views of the Government concerning this army. Under instructions from the major-general commanding the army, dated January 31st, I am instructed to 'keep in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, either directly or by so operating as to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent against them.' In the event the enemy should move, as I almost anticipate he will, the head of his column will probably be headed toward the Potomac, *via* Gordonsville or Culpeper, while

the rear will rest on Fredericksburg. After giving the subject my best reflection, I am of opinion that it is my duty to pitch into his rear, although in so doing the head of his column may reach Warrenton before I can return. Will it be within the spirit of my instructions to do so? In view of these contemplated movements of the enemy, I cannot too forcibly impress upon the mind of His Excellency, the President, the necessity of having one commander for all of the troops whose operations can have an influence on those of Lee's army. Under the present system, all independent commanders are in ignorance of the movements of the others; at least such is my situation. I trust that I may not be considered in the way to this arrangement, as it is a position I do not desire, and only suggest it, as I feel the necessity for concert as well as vigorous action. It is necessary for me to say this much that my motives may not be misunderstood. JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General."

President Lincoln's reply is as follows:

"WASHINGTON, June 5th, 1863, 4 P. M.—MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER: Yours of to-day was received an hour ago. So much of professional military skill is requisite to answer it that I have turned the task over to General Halleck. He promises to perform it with his utmost care. I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in intrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other. If Lee would come to my side of the river, I would keep on the same side and fight him or act on the defense, according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own. But these are mere suggestions, which I desire to be controlled by the judgment of yourself and General Halleck. A. LINCOLN."—EDITORS.



MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

take General Meade to the headquarters of General Hooker and transfer the command from the latter to the former. General Hardie manifested some reluctance to doing his appointed task in the prescribed manner, but Mr. Stanton sententiously remarked that in this case the manner was of the substance of the matter, to which Mr. Lincoln added that he would take the responsibility upon himself for any wound to the feelings of the two generals, or of the bearer of the order. General Hardie was supplied with passes and orders to facilitate his progress, and with money to buy his way through to his destination if delayed or obstructed on the road. If compelled by the imminency of capture by Stuart's raiders to destroy his papers, and he could still make his way through, he was to deliver verbally the order for the changing of the command and supervise its execution.

General Hardie, in civilian's dress, reached Frederick in safety, and by diligent inquiry ascertained the whereabouts of General Meade's headquarters, several miles from town. By some oversight at headquarters, no governor or provost-marshal had been appointed for the town, and the streets and all the roads leading to the camps were thronged with boisterous soldiers, more or less filled with Maryland whisky, and many of them ripe for rudeness or mischief. By liberal use of money he at last obtained a buggy and a driver who knew the roads; but his progress through straggling parties of soldiers and trains of wagons was so slow, and he was so often obliged to appeal to officers to secure passage and safety from one stage to another, that the night was far spent when he reached General Meade's headquarters and, after some wrangling, penetrated to his tent.

Meade was asleep, and when awakened was confounded by the sight of an officer from the War Department standing over him. He afterward said that, in his semi-stupor, his first thought was that he was to be taken to Washington in arrest, though no reason occurred to him why he should be. When he realized the state of affairs he became much agitated, protesting against being placed in command of an army that was looking toward Reynolds as the successor, if Hooker should be displaced; referring to the personal friendship between Reynolds and himself, which would make the President's order an instrument of injustice to both; urging the heaviness of the responsibility so suddenly placed upon him in presence of the enemy and when he was totally ignorant of the positions and dispositions of the army he was to take in charge; and strenuously objecting to the requirement that he should go to Hooker's headquarters to take over the command without being sent for by the commanding general, as McClellan had sent for Burnside and Burnside for Hooker. Meade proposed to Hardie that he should telegraph to Stanton to be relieved from taking the command, but Hardie told him that in the council it had been assumed that he would wish to be excused, that he would prefer Reynolds first and anybody else but himself afterward, and that he might even deem it too late to displace Hooker; but that, notwithstanding, it had been determined that Hooker should be relieved, and by Meade alone, and that it should be done immediately upon Hardie's arrival. It was a mental relief to the stern Secretary of War, when General Meade's spontaneous utterances were reported to him, to note that he had uttered no protest against Hooker's being relieved of the command, even in what might almost be called the presence of the enemy. This silence on the part of a man so regardless of himself, so regardful of others, Mr. Stanton accepted as being, in itself, his complete vindication.

After taking General Hardie's opinion, as a professional soldier, that he had no lawful discretion to vary from the orders given, horses and an escort were ordered out and the party proceeded to general headquarters, some miles distant. Hardie undertook to break the news to Hooker, who did not need to be told anything after seeing who his visitors were. It was a bitter moment to all, for Hooker had construed favorably the delay in responding to his tender of resignation, and could not wholly mask the revulsion of feeling. General Butterfield, the chief of staff, between whom and General Meade much coldness existed, was called in, and the four officers set themselves earnestly to work to do the state some service by honestly transferring the command and all that could help

to make it available for good. During the interview Meade unguardedly expressed himself as shocked at the scattered condition of the army, and Hooker retorted with feeling. Tension was somewhat eased by Meade's insisting upon being regarded as a guest at headquarters while General Hooker was present, and by his requesting General Butterfield, upon public grounds, not to exercise his privilege of withdrawing with his chief; but Hooker's chagrin and Meade's overstrung nerves made the lengthy but indispensable conference rather trying to the whole party.

When Reynolds heard the news, he dressed himself with scrupulous care and, handsomely attended, rode to headquarters to pay his respects to the new commander. Meade, who looked like a wagon-master in the marching clothes he had hurriedly slipped on when awakened in his tent, understood the motive of the act, and after the exchange of salutations all around, he took Reynolds by the arm, and, leading him aside, told him how surprising, imperative, and unwelcome were the orders he had received; how much he would have preferred the choice to have fallen on Reynolds; how anxious he had been to see Reynolds and tell him these things, and how helpless he should hold himself to be did he not feel that Reynolds would give him the earnest support that he would have given to Reynolds in a like situation. Reynolds answered that, in his opinion, the command had fallen where it belonged, that he was glad that such a weight of responsibility had not come upon him, and that Meade might count upon the best support he could give him. Meade then communicated to Reynolds all that he had learned from Hooker and Butterfield concerning the movements and positions of the two armies, and hastily concerted with him a plan of coöperation which resulted in the fighting of the battle of Gettysburg upon ground selected by Reynolds.

During the afternoon the consultations were ended, and, with the aid of the representative of the War Department, the two generals drew up the orders that were to announce formally the change of command. In the evening, standing in front of the commanding general's tent, General Hooker took leave of the officers, soldiers, and civilians attached to headquarters, and, amid many a "God bless you, General!" got into the spring wagon that was to convey him and General Hardie to the railroad station, the former *en route* to Baltimore, the latter to Washington. When all was ready for the start, the throng about the vehicle respectfully drew back as Meade approached with uncovered head; the two men took each other by the hand, some words passed between them in a low tone, the wagon moved off, and Meade walked silently into the tent just vacated by his predecessor.

☆ Meade was mistaken in thinking that McClellan had sent for Burnside when the command was turned over to him.—C. F. B.

Hardie told me that Meade at last said, half playfully, "Well, I've been tried and condemned without a hearing, and I suppose I shall have to go to execution."—C. F. B.



UNION CAVALRY SCOUTING IN FRONT OF THE CONFEDERATE ADVANCE.

LEE'S INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA.

BY JAMES LONGSTREET, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. S. A.

ONE night in the spring of 1863 I was sitting in my tent opposite Suffolk, Virginia, when there came in a slender, wiry fellow about five feet eight, with hazel eyes, dark hair and complexion, and brown beard. He wore a citizen's suit of dark material, and except for his stooping shoulders was well formed and evidently a man of great activity. He handed me a note from Mr. Seddon, Secretary of War. That was my first meeting with the famous scout, Harrison, who in his unpretending citizen's dress passed unmolested from right to left through the Federal army, visited Washington City, ate and drank with the Federal officers, and joined me at Chambersburg with information more accurate than a force of cavalry could have secured.

While my command was at Suffolk, engaged in collecting supplies from the eastern coasts of Virginia and North Carolina, General Burnside was relieved and General Hooker put in command of the Federal Army of the Potomac. General Lee was not expecting Hooker to move so early, and gave me no warning until the Federals moved out to turn his left by Chancellorsville. He then sent urgent demand for me, but it so happened that all my trains were down on the eastern coasts, and I could not move my troops without leaving the trains to the enemy. I made haste to get them back as quickly as possible, and the moment we got them within our lines I pulled up from around Suffolk, and, recrossing the Blackwater, started back on my march to join General Lee at Fredericksburg. Before we got to Richmond, however, we received dispatches announcing the Confederate success. But with these tidings of victory came the sad intelligence that General Stonewall Jackson was seriously wounded, a piece of news that cast a deep gloom over the army.

On the 9th of May I joined General Lee at his headquarters at Fredericksburg. At our first meeting we had very little conversation; General Lee merely stated that he had had a severe battle, and the army had been very much broken up. He regarded the wound accidentally inflicted on Jackson as

a terrible calamity. Although we felt the immediate loss of Jackson's services, it was supposed he would rally and get well. He lingered for several days, one day reported better and the next worse, until at last he was taken from us to the shades of Paradise. The shock was a very severe one to men and officers, but the full extent of our loss was not felt until the remains of the beloved general had been sent home. The dark clouds of the future then began to lower above the Confederates.

General Lee at that time was confronted by two problems: one, the finding a successor for Jackson, another, the future movements of the Army of Northern Virginia. After considering the matter fully he decided to reorganize his army, making three corps instead of two. I was in command of the First Corps, and he seemed anxious to have a second and third corps under the command of Virginians. To do so was to overlook the claims of other generals who had been active and very efficient in the service. He selected General Ewell to command the Second, and General A. P. Hill for the Third Corps. General Ewell was entitled to command by reason of his rank, services, and ability. Next in rank was a North Carolinian, General D. H. Hill, and next a Georgian, General Lafayette McLaws, against whom was the objection that they were not Virginians.†

In reorganizing his army, General Lee impaired to some extent the *morale* of his troops, but the First Corps, dismembered as it was, still considered itself, with fair opportunities, invincible, and was ready for any move warranted by good judgment.


While General Lee was reorganizing his army he was also arranging the new campaign. Grant had laid siege to Vicksburg, and Johnston was concentrating at Jackson to drive him away. Rosecrans was in Tennessee and Bragg was in front of him. The force Johnston was concentrating at Jackson gave us no hope that he would have sufficient strength to make any impression upon Grant, and even if he could, Grant was in position to reënforce rapidly and could supply his army with greater facility. Vicksburg was doomed unless we could offer relief by strategic move. I proposed to send a force through east Tennessee to join Bragg and also to have Johnston sent to join him, thus concentrating a large force to move against Rosecrans, crush out his

†General D. H. Hill was the superior of General A. P. Hill in rank, skill, judgment, and distinguished services. He had served with the army in Virginia, on the Peninsula in the battles of Williamsburg, Seven Pines, and the Seven Days' battles around Richmond. In the Maryland campaign he made the battle of South Mountain alone from morning till late in the afternoon, with five thousand against a large part of McClellan's army. [See foot-note, Vol. II., p. 578.] He also bore the brunt of the battle of Sharpsburg. He came, however, not from Virginia but from North Carolina, and had just been detailed for service in that State.

Next in rank after General D. H. Hill was General Lafayette McLaws, who had served with us continuously from the Peninsular campaign. His attack on Maryland Heights in the campaign

of 1862 was the crowning point in the capture of Harper's Ferry with its garrison and supplies. With Maryland Heights in our hands Harper's Ferry was untenable. Without Maryland Heights in our possession Jackson's forces on the south side of the Potomac could not have taken the post. At Fredericksburg McLaws held the ground at Marye's Hill with 5000 men (his own and Ransom's division) against 40,000, and put more than double his defending forces *hors de combat*, thus making, for his numbers, the best battle of the war. General McLaws was not in vigorous health, however, and was left to command his division in the campaign. He called on General Lee to know why his claims had been overlooked, but I do not know that Lee gave him satisfactory reasons.—J. L.

See Colonel William Allan's comments, to follow.—EDITORS.



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN AFTER THE WAR.

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE.

Potomac—adding that we might have an opportunity to cross the Rappahannock near Culpeper Court House and make a battle there. I made this suggestion in order to bring about a discussion which I thought would give Ewell a better idea of the plan of operations. My remark had the desired effect and we talked over the possibilities of a battle south of the Potomac. The enemy would be on our right flank while we were moving north. Ewell's corps was to move in advance to Culpeper Court House, mine to follow, and the cavalry was to move along on our right flank to the east of us. Thus, by threatening his rear we could draw Hooker from his position on Stafford Heights opposite Fredericksburg. Our movements at the beginning of the campaign were necessarily slow in order that we might be sure of having the proper effect on Hooker.

Ewell was started off to the valley of Virginia to cross the mountains and move in the direction of Winchester, which was occupied by considerable forces under Milroy. I was moving at the same time east of the Blue Ridge with Stuart's cavalry on my right so as to occupy the gaps from Ashby on to Harper's Ferry. Ewell, moving on through the valley, captured troops and supplies at Winchester, and passed through Martinsburg and Williamsport into Maryland. As I moved along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge we heard from day to day of the movements of Hooker's army, and that he had finally abandoned his position on Stafford Heights, and was moving up the Potomac in the direction of Washington. Upon receipt of that information, A. P. Hill was ordered to draw off from Fredericksburg and follow the movements of General Ewell, but to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown. When Hill with his troops and well-supplied trains had passed my rear, I was ordered to withdraw from the Blue Ridge, pass over to the west of the Shenandoah and follow the movements of the other troops, only to cross the Potomac at Williamsport. I ordered General Stuart, whom I considered under my command, to occupy the gaps with a part of his cavalry and to follow with his main force on my right, to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown, and move on my right flank. Upon giving him this order, he informed me that he had authority from General Lee to occupy the gaps with a part of his cavalry, and to follow the Federal army with the remainder. At the same time he expressed his purpose of crossing the river east of the Blue Ridge and trying to make way around the right of the Federal army; so I moved my troops independent of the cavalry, and, following my orders, crossed at Williamsport, came up with A. P. Hill in Maryland, and moved on thence to Chambersburg.

Before we left Fredericksburg for the campaign into Maryland and Pennsylvania, I called up my scout, Harrison, and, giving him all the gold he thought he would need, told him to go to Washington City and remain there until he was in possession of information which he knew would be of value to us, and directed that he should then make his way back to me and report. As he was leaving, he asked where he would find me. That was information I did not care to impart to a man who was going directly to the Federal capital. I answered that my command was large enough to be found without



CONFEDERATES AT A FORD.

difficulty. We had reached Chambersburg on the 27th of June and were remaining there to give the troops rest, when my scout straggled into the lines on the night of June 28th. He told me he had been to Washington and had spent his gold freely, drinking in the saloons and getting upon confidential terms with army officers. In that way he had formed a pretty good idea of the general movements of the Federal army and the preparation to give us battle. The moment he heard Hooker had started across the Potomac he set out to find me. He fell in with the Federal army before reaching Frederick—his plan being to walk at night and stop during the day in the neighborhood of the troops. He said there were three corps near Frederick when he passed there, one to the right and one to the left, but he did not succeed in getting the position of the other. This information proved more accurate than we could have expected if we had been relying upon our cavalry. I sent the scout to report to General Lee, who was near, and suggested in my note that it might be well for us to begin to look to the east of the Blue Ridge. Meade was then in command of the Federal army, Hooker having been relieved.

The two armies were then near each other, the Confederates being north and west of Gettysburg, and the Federals south and south-east of that memorable field. On the 30th of June we turned our faces toward our enemy and marched upon Gettysburg. The Third Corps, under Hill, moved out first

and my command followed. We then found ourselves in a very unusual condition: we were almost in the immediate presence of the enemy with our cavalry gone. Stuart was undertaking another wild ride around the Federal army. We knew nothing of Meade's movements further than the report my scout had made. We did not know, except by surmise, when or where to expect to find Meade, nor whether he was lying in wait or advancing. The Confederates moved down the Gettysburg road on June 30th, encountered the Federals on July 1st, and a severe engagement followed. The Federals were driven entirely from the field and forced back through the streets of Gettysburg to Cemetery Hill, which had been previously selected as a Federal rallying-point and was occupied by a reserve force of the Eleventh Corps.

THE CONFEDERATE CAVALRY IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.

I. BY JOHN S. MOSBY, COLONEL, C. S. A.

IT is generally agreed by Southern writers that the battle of Gettysburg was the result of an accidental collision of armies. General Lee in effect says in his report of the campaign that his failure was due to his ignorance of the movements of the enemy; and the absence of a portion of the cavalry under Stuart, or rather its separation from the army, is assigned as the primary cause of its failure by General Long, the biographer of Lee, and by General Longstreet. Both ignore the fact that Stuart left with General Lee, under command of General Beverly H. Robertson, a larger body of cavalry than he took with him. General Long charges that Stuart's expedition around Hooker was made either from "a misapprehension of orders or love of the *éclat* of a bold raid" (which, of course, implies disobedience); and General Longstreet, while admitting that Stuart may have acted by authority of Lee, says that it was undertaken against his own orders, which were to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown, west of the Blue Ridge.

That General Lee was greatly embarrassed by want of intelligence of the movements of the enemy was not due to the lack of cavalry; and Stuart is not responsible for the inefficient manner in which Lee was served.

When it was determined that Stuart should take three brigades of cavalry to join Ewell on the Susquehanna and leave his other two to perform outpost duty for the army in Virginia, General Lee

was in the Shenandoah Valley with the corps of Hill and Longstreet. The latter was holding the gaps and Stuart was guarding the approaches to them east of the ridge. Hence Stuart came under Longstreet's orders. Hooker's headquarters were in Fairfax, with his army spread out like a fan—his left being at Thoroughfare Gap and his right on the Potomac at Leesburg. On returning from a scout, I reported to Stuart the scattered condition of Hooker's corps, and he determined, with the approval of General Lee, to pass around, or rather through, them, as the shortest route to Ewell. There was an opportunity besides to inflict much damage and to cut off communication between Washington and the North.

I have lately discovered documents in the archives of the War Department that set at rest the question of Stuart's alleged disobedience of orders, and show that General Longstreet then approved a plan which he now condemns as "a wild ride around the Federal army." He directed Stuart to pass around *the rear of the enemy* in preference to crossing west of the ridge, in order to prevent disclosing our designs. ☆

Under date of June 22d, 7:30 P. M., he writes to General Lee: "I have forwarded your letter to General Stuart, with the suggestion that he *pass by the enemy's rear* if he thinks he may get through."

Up to the morning of June 25th it was perfectly practicable for Stuart to have done so. In accordance with Lee's and Longstreet's instruc-

☆ "HEADQUARTERS, MILLWOOD, June 22d, 1863, 7 P. M. MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, Commanding Cavalry. GENERAL: General Lee has inclosed to me this letter for you to be forwarded to you provided you can be spared from my front, and provided I think you can move across the Potomac without disclosing our plans. He speaks of your leaving *via* Hopewell Gap and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route, I think that you will be less likely to indicate what our plans are than if you should cross by passing to our rear. I forward the letter of instructions with these suggestions. Please advise me of the condition of affairs before you leave, and order General Hampton—whom I suppose you will leave here in command—to report to me at Millwood either by letter or in person, as may be

most agreeable to him. Most respectfully, J. LONGSTREET, Lieutenant-General.—N. B. I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present moment will in a measure disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed route in rear of the enemy. J. LONGSTREET, Lieutenant-General."

"HEADQUARTERS, 22d June, 1863. MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, Commanding Cavalry. GENERAL: I have just received your note of 7:45 this morning to General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us and get across the Potomac before we are aware.

tions Stuart withdrew from the front on the evening of the 24th to pass around Hooker, leaving Robertson about Middleburg with 3000 cavalry and 2 batteries of artillery to observe the enemy. Stuart's success depended upon preserving the *status quo* of the Federal army until he could get through it. *Hooker was on the defensive waiting for his adversary to move.* It did not seem to occur to General Longstreet that the march of the infantry down the Shenandoah Valley would disclose all to the enemy that the cavalry would have done. It was no fault of Stuart's that he was foiled by events which he could not control. When on the morning of the 25th he reached Hooker's rear, he found his whole army moving to the Potomac and all the roads occupied by his troops. This compelled a wide *détour*, and instead of crossing the river in advance of the enemy, as he had expected, he was two days behind him. Thus all communication was broken with Generals Lee and Ewell. The march of Hill's and Longstreet's corps on the day before had been in full view of the signal stations on Maryland Heights and was telegraphed to Hooker, who made a corresponding movement.

On the morning of June 26th the enemy disappeared from Robertson's front and crossed the Potomac. In that event his instructions from Stuart were, "to watch the enemy and harass his rear—to cross the Potomac and follow the army, keeping on its right and rear," and to "report anything of importance to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, with whose position you will communicate by relays through Charlestown."

Robertson retired to the mountain gaps and remained until the afternoon of the 29th, when he was recalled to the army by a courier from General Lee. At night on the 28th General Lee heard, through a scout at Chambersburg, of Hooker's advance. As no information of it had come from the cavalry he had left in Hooker's front in Virginia, he thought that Hooker was still there. He

immediately issued an order for the concentration at Gettysburg, and sent for Robertson's command, that had been left, he says, to hold the mountain passes, "*as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac.*" It had staid there three days after they had gone. As Stuart had been ordered to Ewell on the Susquehanna, it could not have been expected that he should also watch Hooker on the Potomac. Stuart's instructions to divide the cavalry and take three brigades with him to Ewell, on the Susquehanna, were peremptory; he was only given discretion as to *the point of crossing the Potomac.* It was therefore immaterial, so far as giving information to Lee was concerned, whether he crossed east or west of the ridge. In either event they would have been separated and out of communication with each other. Lee must then have relied on Robertson or nobody to watch Hooker.

Instead of keeping on the right of the army and in close contact with the enemy, as Stuart had ordered, Robertson's command marched *on the left* by Martinsburg and did not reach the battle-field. The rear-guard of the Federal army moving into Pennsylvania crossed the Potomac on June 26th, east of the Blue Ridge; Robertson crossed at Williamsport, about twenty-five miles to the west of it, on July 1st, the day the fighting began at Gettysburg. When General Lee crossed the Potomac, he left General Robertson between him and the enemy. By July 3d Robertson had so manoeuvred that Lee was between him and the enemy. Stuart had ridden around General Hooker while Robertson was riding around General Lee. If, in accordance with Stuart's instructions, Robertson had promptly followed on the right of the army when the enemy left, Lee's forces would have been concentrated and ready for attack; a defensive battle would have been fought, and Gettysburg might have been to Southern hearts something more than a

"Glorious field of grief."

WASHINGTON, Feb. 9th, 1887.

If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank and keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell's army will probably move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route, another by Chambersburg. Accounts from him last night state that there was no enemy west of Fredericktown. A cavalry force (about one hundred) guarded the Monocacy bridge, which was barricaded. You will, of course, take charge of Jenkins's brigade and give him necessary instructions. All supplies taken in Maryland must be by authorized staff-officers for their respective departments, by no one else. They will be paid for or receipts for the same given to the owners. I will send you a general order on this subject, which I wish you to see is strictly complied with. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, R. E. LEE, General."

On the following day General Lee wrote as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, June 23d, 1863, 5 P. M. MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, Commanding Cavalry. GENERAL: Your notes of 9 and 10:30 A. M. to-day have just been received. . . . If General

Hooker's army remains inactive you can leave two brigades to watch him and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain to-morrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Fredericktown. You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, etc. Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind to watch the flank and rear of the army and (in event of the enemy leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing everything clean along the valley, closing upon the rear of the army. As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving toward Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left in the mountains must do what he can to counteract them; but I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the better. The movements of Ewell's corps are as stated in my former letter. Hill's first division will reach the Potomac to-day, and Longstreet will follow to-morrow. Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements. I am very respectfully and truly yours, R. E. LEE, General."—J. S. M.

II. BY BEVERLY H. ROBERTSON, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A.

COLONEL JOHN S. MOSBY has seen proper to make mention of my command in the cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia during the Gettysburg campaign, and as a means of defending General J. E. B. Stuart from an imaginary attack, has misrepresented a portion of General Stuart's cavalry. Colonel Mosby knows very little of Stuart's character if he supposes that so true a soldier would have silently passed over such disobedience of orders as Colonel Mosby imputes to me. The fact that Colonel Mosby has "lately discovered documents in the archives" at Washington, which are to "set at rest" something that has not been set in motion, will not excuse him for attempting in 1887 to prove by argument that in 1863 Stuart did not know whether I had obeyed his orders in the Gettysburg campaign.

The orders left with me by General Stuart, dated June 24th, were exactly obeyed by me, to his entire satisfaction as well as to that of General R. E. Lee. These orders embraced the duty of holding Ashby's and Snicker's gaps, to prevent Hooker from interrupting the march of Lee's army; and "in case of a move by the enemy on Warrenton," to counteract it if possible. I was also ordered when I withdrew from the gaps to "withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah," to cross the Potomac where Lee crossed, and to "follow the army, keeping on its right and rear." The full text of my orders was as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, CAVALRY DIVISION, ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA, June 24th, 1863. BRIGADIER-GENERAL B. H. ROBERTSON, Commanding Cavalry. GENERAL: Your own and General Jones's brigades will cover the front of Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, yourself, as senior officer, being in command.

"Your object will be to watch the enemy, deceive him as to our designs, and harass his rear if you find he is retiring. Be always on the alert; let nothing escape your observation, and miss no opportunity which offers to damage the enemy.

"After the enemy has moved beyond your reach, leave sufficient pickets in the mountains and withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah and place a strong and reliable picket to watch the enemy at Harper's Ferry, cross the Potomac and follow the army, keeping on its right and rear.

"As long as the enemy remains in your front, in force, unless otherwise ordered by General R. E. Lee, Lieutenant-General Longstreet, or myself, hold the gaps with a line of pickets reaching across the Shenandoah by Charlestown to the Potomac.

"If, in the contingency mentioned, you withdraw, sweep the valley clear of what pertains to the army and cross the Potomac at the different points crossed by it.

"You will instruct General Jones from time to time as the movements progress, or events may require, and report anything of importance to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, with whose position you will communicate by relays through Charlestown.

"I send instructions for General Jones, which please read. Avail yourself of every means in your power to

increase the efficiency of your command and keep it up to the highest number possible. Particular attention will be paid to shoeing horses, and to marching off of the turnpikes.

"In case of an advance of the enemy you will offer such resistance as will be justifiable to check him and discover his intentions, and if possible you will prevent him from gaining possession of the gaps. In case of a move by the enemy upon Warrenton, you will counteract it as much as you can, compatible with previous instructions.

"You will have with the two brigades two batteries of horse-artillery. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. E. B. STUART, Major-General Commanding.


"Do not change your present line of pickets until daylight to-morrow morning unless compelled to do so."

The only road by which the orders (which particularly specified the avoidance of "turnpikes" on account of the difficulty and delay of shoeing horses) could be complied with, carried my command to Martinsburg; at which place, and *not in the gaps of the mountains*, as Colonel Mosby insinuates, a courier from General Lee met me. My command was hurried from there to Chambersburg, and thence by forced march, on the night of July 2d, to Cashtown, where it arrived at about 10 A. M. on July 3d. Ascertaining at Cashtown that General Pleasonton was moving from Emmitsburg directly on the baggage and ammunition trains of General Lee's army, which were exposed to his attack without defense of any kind, I pressed forward with my command and intercepted the advance of General Pleasonton, under the command of Major Samuel H. Starr. A severe and gallant fight was made at Fairfield, in which Major Starr of the 6th United States Regular Cavalry was wounded and captured with a large portion of his staff, while his regiment was severely damaged. Adjutant John Allan and three others of the 6th Virginia Cavalry were killed, 19 were wounded, and 5 were reported missing.


That fight at Fairfield, on the last day of the fighting at Gettysburg, refutes the imputation intended by Colonel Mosby to be conveyed in his remark that my command "did not reach the battle-field."

From that fight at Fairfield I was ordered by General R. E. Lee to cover his wagon trains, and in obeying the same my command was engaged in repeated skirmishes, particularly at Funkstown and Hagerstown, after which it returned to Virginia—the last command that recrossed the Potomac.

If there existed the least ground for Colonel Mosby's statements, there would be found among the reports of general officers some reference to the imputed dereliction of duty on my part. As no such reference is made, and no imputation of disobedience of orders is there intimated, it may be assumed that neither Stuart nor Lee had any reason to complain of my command.



James Longstreet



BUFORD'S CAVALRY OPPOSING THE
CONFEDERATE ADVANCE UPON GETTYSBURG.

THE FIRST DAY AT GETTYSBURG.

BY HENRY J. HUNT, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A., CHIEF OF ARTILLERY OF THE
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

THE battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville raised the confidence of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia to such a height as to cause its subordinate officers and soldiers to believe that, as opposed to the Army of the Potomac, they were equal to any demand that could be made upon them. Their belief in the superiority of the Southerner to the Northerner as a fighter was no longer, as at the beginning of the war, a mere provincial conceit, for it was now supported by signal successes in the field. On each of these two occasions the Army of the Potomac had been recently reorganized under a new general, presumably abler than his predecessor and possessing the confidence of the War Department, and the results were crowning victories for the Confederates. Yet at Fredericksburg defeat was not owing to any lack of fighting qualities on the part of the Federal soldiers, but rather to defective leadership.

At Chancellorsville both qualities were called in question. In none of the previous battles between these armies had the disparity of numbers been so great. The Federal general had taken the initiative, his plan of operations was excellent, and his troops were eager for battle. The Confederates could at first oppose but a portion of their inferior force to the attack of greatly superior numbers, and the boast of the Federal commander, that "the Army of Northern Virginia was the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac," seemed in a fair way to be justified, when at first contact the advantages already gained were thrown away by the assumption of a timid, defensive attitude. Lee's bold offensive, which followed immediately on this exhibition of weakness, the consequent rout of a Federal army-corps, and the subsequent retreat of the whole army, a large portion of which had not been engaged, confirmed the exultant Confederates in their conviction—which now became an article of faith—that both in combat and in generalship the superiority of the Southerner was fully established. The Federal soldiers

returned from Chancellorsville to their camps on the northern bank of the Rappahannock, mortified and incensed at finding themselves, through no fault of their own, in the condition of having in an offensive campaign lost the battle without fighting, except when the enemy forced it upon them.

Yet in this battle the Northern soldier fought well. Under the circumstances no men could have withstood such a sudden attack as that made by "Stonewall" Jackson on the flank and rear of the Eleventh Corps; but as soon as Jackson encountered troops in condition for action, his pursuit was checked and he was brought to a stand. The panic did not extend beyond the routed corps, nor to all of that, for its artillery and so much of its infantry as could form a proper line did their duty, and the army, far from being "demoralized" by this mishap, simply ridiculed the corps which, from its supposed want of vigilance, had allowed itself to be surprised in a position in which it could not fight. The surprise itself was not the fault of the troops, and in subsequent battles the corps redeemed its reputation. Both armies were composed in the main of Americans, and there was little more difference between their men than might be found between those of either army at different periods, or under varying circumstances; for although high bounties had already brought into the Federal ranks an inferior element which swelled the muster-rolls and the number of stragglers, "bounty jumping" had not as yet become a regular business.

The morale of the Confederate army was, however, much higher at this time than that of its adversary. It was composed of men not less patriotic, many of whom had gone into the war with reluctance, but who now felt that they were defending their homes. They were by this time nearly all veterans, led by officers having the confidence of their Government, which took pains to inspire its soldiers with the same feeling. Their successes were extolled and magnified, their reverses palliated or ignored. Exaggerations as to the relative numbers of the troops had been common enough on both sides, but those indulged in at the South had been echoed, sometimes suggested, in the North by a portion of the press and people, so that friends and enemies united in inspiring in the Confederate soldier a belief in himself and a contempt for his enemy. In the Army of the Potomac it was different; the proportion of veterans was much smaller; a cessation of recruiting at the very beginning of active operations, when men were easily obtainable to supply losses in existing regiments, had been followed, as emergencies arose, by new levies, for short periods of service, and in new organizations which could not readily be assimilated by older troops. Moreover, there were special difficulties. The Army of the Potomac was not in favor at the War Department. Rarely, if ever, had it heard a word of official commendation after a success, or of sympathy or encouragement after a defeat. From the very beginning its camps had been filled with imputations and charges against its leaders, who were accused on the streets, by the press, in Congress, and even in the War Department itself, and after victories as well as after defeats, not only of incapacity or miscon-

¹ This term was applied to the practice of enlisting and securing bounty money, and then, either deserting outright, or shirking the serious work of the field.—EDITORS.



GENERAL MEADE IN THE FIELD.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

duct, but sometimes of "disloyalty" to their superiors, civil and military, and even to the cause for which they fought. These accusations were followed or accompanied by frequent changes of commanders of the army, of army-corps, and even of divisions. Under such circumstances, but little confidence could be felt by the troops, either in the wisdom of a war office which seemed to change its favorites with the caprice of a coquette, or in the capacity of new generals who followed each other in such rapid succession. But it is due to that patient and sorely tried army, to say that the spirit of both officers and men was of the best, and their devotion to duty unconquerable. The army itself had originally been so admirably disciplined and tempered, that there always remained to it a firm self-reliance and a stern sense of duty and of honor that was proof against its many discouragements. In battle it always acquitted itself well and displayed the highest soldierly qualities, no matter who commanded it or whence he came. Chancellorsville furnishes no exception to this assertion, nor evidence of inferiority of the Northern to the Southern soldier, but it does furnish striking illustrations of Napoleon's well-known

saying, "In war *men* are nothing, *a man* is everything."

General Lee, who felt great confidence in his own troops, and overrated the effects of successive reverses on the Federal soldiers, now resolved to assume the offensive, for he knew that to remain on the defensive would in the end force him back on Richmond. He determined, therefore, in case the Army of the Potomac could not be brought to action under favorable circumstances in Virginia, to transfer, if permitted, the field of operations to Northern soil, where a victory promptly followed up might give him possession of Baltimore or Washington, and perhaps lead to the recognition of the Confederacy by foreign powers. The valley of the Shenandoah offered a safe line of operations; the Federal troops occupying it were rather a bait than an obstacle, and to capture or destroy them seemed quite practicable to one who controlled absolutely all Confederate troops within the sphere of his operations. The

sharp lesson he had administered the previous year had not been heeded by the Federal War Office; an opportunity now offered to repeat it, and he took his measures accordingly. In case his Government would not consent to a bolder offensive, he could at least clear the valley of Virginia of the enemy,—a distinct operation, yet a necessary preliminary to an invasion of the North. This work was assigned to Lieutenant-General Ewell, an able officer, in every way qualified for such an enterprise.

In anticipation of the new campaign, Lee's army was strengthened and reorganized into three army-corps of three divisions each. Each division consisted of four brigades, except Rodes's and Anderson's, which had five each, and Pickett's, which had three at Gettysburg,—in all, thirty-seven infantry brigades. The cavalry were the select troops of the Confederacy. Officers and men had been accustomed all their lives to the use of horses and arms, "and to the very end the best blood in the land rode after Stuart, Hampton, and the Lees." They were now organized as a division, under Major-General J. E. B. Stuart, consisting of the six brigades of Hampton, Robertson, Fitzhugh Lee, Jenkins, W. E. Jones, and W. H. F. Lee, and six batteries of horse-artillery under Major R. F. Beckham. To these should be added Imboden's command, a strong brigade of over 2000 effective horsemen and a battery of horse-artillery, which had been operating in the mountain country and was now near Staunton, awaiting orders. The artillery had recently received an excellent organization under its commandant-in-chief, General Pendleton. It consisted, besides the horse-artillery, of fifteen so-called "battalions," each of four batteries, with one lieutenant-colonel and a major. To each army-corps were attached five battalions, one for each division and two as a reserve, the whole under a colonel as chief of artillery. The total number of batteries was 69, of guns 287, of which 30 were with the cavalry. With few exceptions the batteries were of four guns each. The army was commanded by a full general, each army-corps, except the artillery, by a lieutenant-general, each division by a major-general, each brigade, except two, by brigadier-generals. Nearly all these officers were veterans of proved ability and many had served in the Mexican war.

In the Army of the Potomac the discharge of 58 regiments had reduced its strength since Chancellorsville by 25,000 effectives, partly replaced by 5 brigades numbering less than 12,000 men. At the battle of Gettysburg the 7 army-corps consisted of 19 infantry divisions, 7 of which had 2 brigades, 11 had 3, and 1 had 4; in all 51 brigades. [See lists of organizations and commanders in "The Opposing Forces in the Gettysburg Campaign," to follow.] The army and army-corps were commanded by major-generals, the divisions by 3 major-generals and 16 brigadier-generals, the infantry brigades by 22 brigadier-generals and 29 colonels. The average strength of army-corps and divisions was about half that of the Confederates, a fact that should be kept in mind, or the terms will be misleading. The cavalry had been raised under disadvantages. Men accustomed to the use of both horses and arms were comparatively few in the North and required training in everything that was necessary to make a trooper. The theater of war was not considered favorable for cavalry, and it was distributed to the various headquarters for

escort duty, guards, and orderlies. It was not until 1863 that it was united under General Pleasonton in a corps consisting of three weak divisions, Buford's, D. McM. Gregg's, and Duffié's, afterward consolidated into two, Stahel's cavalry, which joined at Frederick, June 28th, becoming the third division. The corps was then organized as follows: First Division, Buford: brigades, Gamble, Devin, Merritt; Second Division, Gregg: brigades, McIntosh, Huey, J. Irvin Gregg; Third Division, Kilpatrick: brigades, Farnsworth, Custer. The divisions and three of the brigades were commanded by brigadier-generals, the other five brigades by colonels. To the cavalry were attached Robertson's and Tidball's brigades of horse-artillery. Under excellent chiefs and the spirit created by its new organization, the Federal cavalry soon rivaled that of the Confederates.

The field-artillery was in an unsatisfactory condition. The high reputation it had gained in Mexico was followed by the active and persistent hostility of the War Department, which almost immediately dismounted three-fourths of its authorized batteries. Congress in 1853 made special provision for remounting them as schools of instruction for the whole arm, a duty which the War Department on shallow pretexts evaded. Again in 1861 Congress amply provided for the proper organization and command of the artillery in the field, but as there was no chief nor special administration for the arm, and no regulations for its government, its organization, control, and direction were left to the fancies of the various army commanders. General officers were practically denied it, and in 1862 the War Department announced in orders that field-officers of artillery were an unnecessary expense and their muster into service forbidden. Promotion necessarily ceased, and such able artillerists as Hays, DeRussy, Getty, Gibbon, Griffin, and Ayres could only receive promotion by transfer to the infantry or cavalry. No adequate measures were taken for the supply of recruits, and the batteries were frequently dependent on the troops to which they were attached for men enough to work their guns in battle. For battery-draft they were often glad to get the refuse horses after the ambulance and quartermasters' trains were supplied. Still, many of the batteries attained a high degree of excellence, due mainly to the self-sacrifice, courage, and intelligence of their own officers and men.

On taking command of the army, General Hooker had transferred the military command of the artillery to his own headquarters, to be resumed by the chief of artillery only under specific orders and for special occasions, which resulted in such mismanagement and confusion at Chancellorsville that he consented to organize the artillery into brigades. This was a decided improvement, which would have been greater if the brigade commanders had held adequate rank. As it was, there was no artillery commandant-in-chief for months before the battle of Gettysburg, and of the 14 brigades 4 were commanded by field-officers, 9 by captains, and 1 by a lieutenant, taken from their batteries for the purpose. The number of field-batteries at Gettysburg was 65, of guns 370, of which 212 were with the infantry, 50 with the cavalry, 108 in the reserve. The disadvantages under which the artillery labored all through the war, from want of proper regulations, supervision, and command



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN F. REYNOLDS.


The uniform is that of a field-officer in the regular infantry. Early in the war General Reynolds was Lieutenant-Colonel of the 14th United States Infantry, and was made Brigadier-General of Volunteers in September, 1861.—EDITORS.

were simply disgraceful to our army administration from the close of the Mexican to that of the Civil war, and caused an unnecessary expenditure of both blood and treasure.

It will be perceived by comparison that the organization of the Army of the Potomac was at this period in every way inferior to that of its adversary. The army-corps and divisions were too numerous and too weak. They required too many commanders and staffs, and this imposed unnecessary burdens on the general-in-chief, who was often compelled to place several army-corps under the commander of one of them, thus reproducing the much-abused "grand divisions" of Burnside, under every possible disadvantage. Had the number of infantry corps been reduced to four at most, and the divisions to twelve, the army would have been more manageable and better commanded, and the artillery, without any loss, but rather a gain of efficiency, would have been reduced by a dozen or fifteen batteries.

EARLY in June Lee's army began to move, and by the 8th Longstreet's and Ewell's corps had joined Stuart's cavalry at Culpeper. A. P. Hill's corps was left in observation at Fredericksburg; and so skillfully were the changes concealed that Hooker, believing that all the enemy's infantry were still near that town, ordered Pleasonton to beat up Stuart's camps at Culpeper, and get information as to the enemy's position and proposed movements. For these purposes he gave Pleasonton two small brigades of infantry, 3000 men under Generals Ames and Russell, which carried his total force to 10,981. They were echeloned along the railroad, which crosses the river at Rappahannock Station, and runs thence ten miles to Culpeper. [See map, p. 55.] About midway is Brandy Station a few hundred yards north of which is Fleetwood Hill. Dividing his force equally, Pleasonton ordered Buford and Ames to cross at Beverly Ford, and Gregg, Duffié, and Russell at Kelly's Ford. All were to march to Brandy Station, Duffié being thrown out to Stevensburg, seven miles east of Culpeper, to watch the Fredericksburg road. Then the whole force was to move on Culpeper. On the 8th, General Lee, having sent Jenkins's brigade as Ewell's advance into the valley, reviewed the other 5 brigades of Stuart, 10,292 combatants, on the plains near Brandy Station. After the review they were distributed in the neighborhood with a view to crossing the Rappahannock on the 9th, Stuart establishing his headquarters at Fleetwood. Accident had thus disposed his forces in the most favorable manner to meet Pleasonton's converging movements.

At daybreak Buford crossed and drove the enemy's pickets from the ford back to the main body, near St. James's church. Stuart, on the first report of the crossing, sent Robertson's brigade toward Kelly's to watch that ford, and Colonel M. C. Butler's 2d South Carolina to Brandy Station. He himself took the command at the church, where he was attacked by Buford. At Brandy Station W. H. F. Lee was wounded, and Colonel Chambliss took command of his brigade. Meantime Gregg had crossed at Kelly's Ford, and Duffié, leading, took a southerly road, by which he missed Robertson's brigade. Learning that Duffié's advance had reached Stevensburg and that Buford



These maps and the others relating to the campaign and battle of Gettysburg are compilations by Abner Doubleday, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A., from the official reports of the commanders on both sides, and from the maps of Colonel John B. Bachelder, which were purchased by Congress for the War Department.—EDITORS.



was heavily engaged, Gregg pushed direct for Brandy Station, sending orders to Duffié to follow his movement. Stuart, notified of his approach, had sent in haste some artillery and two of Jones's regiments to Fleetwood, and Colonel Butler started at once for Stevensburg, followed soon after by Wickham's 4th Virginia. On their approach two squadrons of the 6th Ohio, in

occupation of the place, fell back skirmishing. Duffié sent two regiments to their aid, and after a severe action, mainly with the 2d South Carolina, reoccupied the village. In this action Colonel Butler lost a leg, and his lieutenant-colonel, Hampton, was killed.

On Gregg's arrival near Brandy Station the enemy appeared to be in large force, with artillery, on and about Fleetwood Hill. He promptly ordered an attack; the hill was carried, and the two regiments sent by Stuart were driven back. Buford now attacked vigorously and gained ground steadily, for Stuart had to reënforce his troops at Fleetwood from the church. In the struggles that followed, the hill several times changed masters; but as Duffié did not make his appearance, Gregg was finally overmatched and withdrew, leaving three of his guns, two of them disabled, in the enemy's hands, nearly all of their horses being killed and most of their cannoneers *hors de combat*. There were some demonstrations of pursuit, but the approach of Buford's reserve brigade stopped them. Duffié finally came up and Gregg reported to Pleasonton, informing him of the approach of Confederate infantry from Culpeper. Pleasonton, who had captured some important dispatches and orders, now considered his mission accomplished, and ordered a withdrawal of his whole command. This was effected leisurely and without molestation. Gregg recrossed at Rappahannock Station, Buford at Beverly Ford, and at sunset the river again flowed between the opposing forces. Stuart reports his losses at 485, of whom 301 were killed or wounded. Pleasonton reports an aggregate loss (exclusive of Duffié's, which would not exceed 25) of 907, of whom 421 were killed or wounded. In nearly all the previous so-called "cavalry" actions, the troops had fought as dismounted dragoons. This was in the main a true cavalry battle, and enabled the Federals to dispute the superiority hitherto claimed by, and conceded to, the Confederate cavalry. In this respect the affair was an important one. It did not, however, delay Lee's designs on the valley; he had already sent Imboden toward Cumberland to destroy the railroad and canal from that place to Martinsburg.

Milroy's Federal division, about 9000 strong, occupied Winchester, with McReynolds's brigade in observation at Berryville. Kelley's division of about 10,000 men was at Harper's Ferry, with a detachment of 1200 infantry and a battery under Colonel B. F. Smith at Martinsburg. On the night of June 11th, Milroy received instructions to join Kelley, but, reporting that he could hold Winchester, was authorized to remain there. Ewell, leaving Brandy Station June 10th, reached Cedarville *via* Chester Gap on the evening of the 12th, whence he detached Jenkins and Rodes to capture McReynolds, who, discovering their approach, withdrew to Winchester. They then pushed on to Martinsburg, and on the 14th drove out the garrison. Smith's infantry crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown, and made its way to Maryland Heights; his artillery retreated by the Williamsport road, was pursued, and lost five guns.

Meanwhile Ewell, with Early's and Edward Johnson's divisions, marched direct on Winchester. Arriving in the neighborhood on the evening of the 13th, he ordered Early on the 14th to leave a brigade in observation on the south of the town, move his main force under cover of the hills to the north-



western side, and seize the outworks which commanded the main fort. He also ordered Johnson to deploy his division on the east of the town, so as to divert attention from Early. This was so successfully done that the latter placed, unperceived, twenty guns and an assaulting column in position, and at 6 P. M., by a sudden attack, carried the outworks, driving the garrisons into the body of the place. This capture was a complete surprise, and Milroy called a council of war, which decided on an immediate retreat, abandoning the artillery and wagons. Ewell had anticipated this, and ordered Johnson to occupy with a brigade a position on the Martinsburg pike, north of Winchester. The retreat commenced at

2 A. M. of the 15th, and after proceeding three or four miles, the advance encountered Johnson's troops, attacked vigorously, and at first successfully, but, the enemy receiving reinforcements, a hard fight ensued in which the Federals lost heavily. The retreat was then continued; the troops separated in the darkness, one portion reaching Harper's Ferry, another crossing the Potomac at Hancock. On the 15th Ewell crossed the river, occupied Hagerstown and Sharpsburg, and sent Jenkins's cavalry to Chambersburg to collect supplies. On the 17th the garrison of Harper's Ferry was removed to Maryland Heights, and the valley of the Shenandoah was cleared of Federal troops. In these brilliant operations General Lee claims for Ewell the capture of 4000 prisoners and small-arms, 28 pieces of artillery, 11 colors, 300 loaded wagons, as many horses, and a considerable quantity of stores of all descriptions, the entire Confederate loss, killed, wounded, and missing, being 269.

These operations indicate on the part of General Lee either contempt for his opponent, or a belief that the chronic terror of the War Department for the safety of Washington could be safely relied upon to paralyze his movements,—or both. On no other reasonable hypothesis can we account for his stretching his army from Fredericksburg to Williamsport, with his enemy concentrated on one flank, and on the shortest road to Richmond.



General Hooker's instructions were to keep always in view the safety of Washington and Harper's Ferry, and this necessarily subordinated his operations to those of the enemy. On June 5th he reported that in case Lee moved via Culpeper toward the Potomac with his main body, leaving a corps at Fredericksburg, he should consider it his duty to attack the latter, and asked if that would be within the spirit of his instructions. In reply he was warned against such a course, and its dangers to Washington and Harper's Ferry were pointed out. On June 10th, learning that Lee was in motion, and that there were but few troops in Richmond, he proposed an immediate march on that place, from which, after capturing it, he could send the disposable part of his force to any threatened point north of the Potomac, and was informed that Lee's army, and not Richmond, was his true objective. Had he taken Richmond, Peck's large force at Suffolk and Keyes's 10,000 men ¹ in the Peninsula might have been utilized, and Hooker's whole army set free for operations against Lee.

As yet an invasion of the North had not been definitely fixed upon. On June 8th, the day before the engagement at Brandy Station, Lee, in a confidential letter to Mr. Seddon, Confederate Secretary of War, stated that he was aware of the hazard of taking the aggressive, yet nothing was to be gained by remaining on the defensive; still, if the department thought it better to do so, he would adopt that course. Mr. Seddon replied, June 10th, the date of Hooker's proposal to march on Richmond, concurring in General Lee's views.

¹ The forces referred to consisted (January 1st, 1863) of three brigades and some unassigned commands at Suffolk, under General John J. Peck, and two brigades, and three cavalry commands—also unassigned, stationed at Yorktown, Gloucester Point, and Williamsburg, under General E. D. Keyes. The troops under Peck belonged to the Seventh Corps. Keyes's command was known as

the Fourth Corps. Both were included in the Department of Virginia, commanded by General John A. Dix, with headquarters at Fort Monroe.

While Lee was invading the North an expedition was sent by General Dix from White House to the South Anna River and Bottom's Bridge to destroy Lee's communications and threaten Richmond.—EDITORS.




NOTE.—In considering the comparative value of Gettysburg and Westminster (behind Pipe Creek) to Lee and Meade, the maps, above, should make more of the mountain ridge, west of the Monocacy, and defined in

general by Point of Rocks, Fairfield, and Cashtown; and there should be represented on the maps the lesser range called Parr's Ridge, east of Pipe Creek, at the foot of which lie Westminster and Manchester.—EDITORS.

He considered aggressive action indispensable, that "all attendant risks and sacrifices must be incurred," and adds, "I have not hesitated, in coöperating with your plans, to leave this city almost defenseless." General Lee now had full liberty of action, with the assured support of his Government,—an immense advantage over an opponent who had neither.

As soon as Hooker learned from Pleasonton that a large infantry force was at Culpeper, he extended his right up the Rappahannock, and when informed of Ewell's move toward the valley, being forbidden to attack A. P. Hill at Fredericksburg or to spoil Lee's plans by marching to Richmond, he moved his army, on the night of June 13th, toward the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and occupied Thoroughfare Gap in advance of it. On the 15th Longstreet left Culpeper, keeping east of the Blue Ridge and so covering its gaps. Hill left Fredericksburg on the 14th, and reached Shepherdstown via Chester Gap on the 23d. Stuart's cavalry had been thrown out on Longstreet's right to occupy the passes of the Bull Run mountains and watch Hooker's army. On the 17th he encountered, near Aldie, a portion of Pleasonton's command; a fierce fight ensued, which left the Federals in possession of the field. During the four following days there was a succession of cavalry combats; those of the 19th near Middleburg, and of the 21st near Upperville, were especially well contested, and resulted in the retreat of Stuart through Ashby's Gap. Longstreet had already withdrawn through the gaps and followed Hill



PENNSYLVANIA COLLEGE, GETTYSBURG. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.


The cupola was first used by Union officers, and then by Confederate, as a station for observation and signals. During the withdrawal of the First and Eleventh corps through the town to Cemetery Hill, there was hard fighting in the college grounds.—EDITORS.

to the Potomac. Imboden, his work of destruction completed, had taken post at Hancock. Longstreet and Hill crossed the Potomac on the 24th and 25th and directed their march on Chambersburg and Fayetteville, arriving on the 27th. Stuart had been directed to guard the mountain passes until the Federal army crossed the river, and, according to General Lee's report, "to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our [Confederate] column as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northward," in order to watch and report his movements. According to Stuart's report, he was authorized to cross between the Federal army and Washington, and directed after crossing to proceed with all dispatch to join Early in Pennsylvania.

General Lee so far had been completely successful; his army was exultant, and he lost no time in availing himself of his advantages. On the 21st he ordered Ewell to take possession of Harrisburg; and on the 22d Ewell's whole

corps was on the march, Rodes's and Johnson's divisions via Chambersburg to Carlisle, which they reached on the 27th, and Early via Greenwood and Gettysburg to York, with orders from Ewell to break up the Northern Central Railroad, destroy the bridge across the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, and then rejoin the main body at Carlisle. Early entered York on the 28th, and sent Gordon's brigade, not to destroy but to secure possession of the bridge, which would enable him to operate upon Harrisburg from the rear; but a small militia force under Colonel Frick, retreating from Wrightsville across the bridge, after an unsuccessful attempt to destroy one of its spans, set fire to and entirely destroyed that fine structure, Gordon's troops giving their aid to the citizens to save the town from the flames. On the 29th Ewell received orders from General Lee to rejoin the army at Cashtown; the next evening,

30th, his reserve artillery and trains, with Johnson's division as an escort, were near Chambersburg, and Ewell with Early's and Rodes's, near Heidlersburg. Thus suddenly ended Ewell's Harris-



THE LUTHERAN SEMINARY. THE UPPER PICTURE FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

Both pictures show the face of the seminary toward the town, and in the right-hand view is seen the Chambersburg Pike. On the first day, Buford and Reynolds used the cupola for observations; thereafter it was the chief signal-station and observatory for the Confederates — EDITORS.

burg expedition. One object was to collect supplies, and contributions were accordingly levied. Much damage was done to roads and bridges, but the prompt advance of the Army of the Potomac made this useless to the Confederates.

Before committing his army to an invasion of the North, General Lee recommended the proper steps to cover and support it. In a letter of June 23d, addressed to President Davis, he states that the season was so far advanced as to stop further Federal operations on the Southern coast, and that Confederate troops in that country and elsewhere were now disposable. He proposed, therefore, that an army should as soon as possible be organized at Culpeper, as "the well-known anxiety of the Northern Government for the safety of its capital would induce it to retain a large force for its defense, and thus relieve the opposition to our advance"; and suggested that General Beauregard be placed in command, "as his presence would give magnitude



GETTYSBURG FROM OAK HILL. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.


Oak Hill is a mile north-west of Gettysburg, and the view here is south-east, showing Stevens Hall (named after Thaddeus Stevens), the preparatory department of the Pennsylvania College on the left; then Culp's Hill; then Pennsylvania College, and, to the right of its cupola, the observatory on Cemetery Hill.

even to a small demonstration." On the 25th he wrote twice to Mr. Davis urging the same views. The proposition embarrassed Mr. Davis, who could not see how, with the few troops under his hand, it could be carried out. In fact, although General Lee had pointed out the means, the proposition came too late, as the decisive battle took place much earlier than was expected. This correspondence, however, with that between Lee and Mr. Seddon, shows that Hooker's project to capture Richmond by a *coup-de-main* was feasible. It was not now a question of "swapping queens." Washington was safe, being well fortified and sufficiently garrisoned, or with available troops within reach, without drawing on Hooker; and to take Richmond and scatter the Confederate Government was the surest way to ruin Lee's army — "his true objective."

On the first appearance of danger of invasion, Pennsylvania's vigilant governor, Curtin, warned the people of the State and called out the militia. General Couch was sent to Harrisburg to organize and command them, but disbelief in the danger — due to previous false alarms — caused delays until the fugitives from Milroy's command, followed by Jenkins's cavalry, roused the country. Defensive works were then thrown up at Harrisburg and elsewhere, and local forces were raised and moved toward the enemy.

Early in June Hooker represented in strong terms the necessity of having one commander for all the troops whose operations would have an influence on those of Lee's army, and in reply was informed by Halleck that any movements he might suggest for other commands than his own would be ordered *if practicable*. Misunderstandings and confusion naturally resulted, and authority was given Hooker from time to time to exercise control over the troops of Heintzelman, commanding the Department of Washington, and of Schenck, commanding the Middle Department, followed, June 24th, by orders specifically placing the troops in Harper's Ferry and its vicinity at his disposal.

Disregarding Ewell's movements, Hooker conformed his own to those of the enemy's main body, and crossed the Potomac at Edwards's Ferry on the 25th and 26th of June. On the 27th three army-corps under Reynolds occupied Middletown and the South Mountain passes. The Twelfth Corps was near Harper's Ferry, and the three other corps at or near Frederick. Hooker now ordered the Twelfth Corps to march early on the 28th to Harper's Ferry,



GENERAL LEE'S HEADQUARTERS ON THE CHAMBERSBURG PIKE.
FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.


there to be joined by its garrison from Maryland Heights, in order to cut Lee's communications with Virginia, and in conjunction with Reynolds to operate on his rear. General Halleck, however, objected to the abandonment of the Heights, notwithstanding Hooker's representations that the position was utterly useless for any purpose; whereupon Hooker abandoned his project, and finding now that he was

"not allowed to manœuvre his own army in the presence of the enemy," asked to be relieved from his command. He had encountered some of the difficulties which had beset a predecessor whom he had himself mercilessly criticised, and promptly succumbed to them. His request was complied with, and Major-General George G. Meade was appointed his successor, this being the fifth change of commanders of the army in front of Washington in ten months. Meade was an excellent officer of long service, who had always proved equal to his position, whether as a specialist or a commander of troops. Many welcomed his advent—some regretted Hooker's departure. All thought the time for the change unfortunate, but accepted loyally, as that army ever did, the leader designated by the President, and gave Meade their hearty support. He was succeeded in the command of the Fifth Corps by Major-General George Sykes, a veteran of the Mexican war and a distinguished soldier.

When General Meade assumed command, June 28th, the best information placed Longstreet at Chambersburg, A. P. Hill between that place and Cash-town, and Ewell in occupation of Carlisle, York, and the country between them, threatening Harrisburg. Unacquainted with Hooker's plans and views [see p. 243], he determined at once to move on the main line from Frederick to Harrisburg, extending his wings as far as compatible with a ready concentration, in order to force Lee to battle before he could cross the Susquehanna. With this view he spent the day in ascertaining the position of his army, and brought up his cavalry, Buford to his left, Gregg to his right, and Kilpatrick to the front. Directing French to occupy Frederick with seven thousand men of the garrison of Harper's Ferry, he put his army in motion early on the morning of the 29th. Kilpatrick reached Littlestown that night; and on the morning of the 30th the rear of his division, while passing through Hanover, was attacked by a portion of Stuart's cavalry. Stuart, availing himself of the discretion allowed him, had left Robertson's and Jones's brigades to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, and on the night of the 24th, with those of Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and Chambliss, had started to move


round the Army of the Potomac, pass between it and Centreville into Maryland, and so rejoin Lee; but the movements of that army forced him so far east that he was compelled to ford the Potomac near Seneca [20 miles above Washington], on the night of the 27th. Next morning, learning that Hooker had already crossed the river, he marched north by Rockville, where he captured a wagon train. Paroling his prisoners and taking the train with him, he pushed on—through Westminster, where he had a sharp action with a squadron of Delaware horse—to Union Mills, and encamped there on the 29th. During the night, he learned that the Federal army was still between him and Lee on its march north, and his scouts reported its cavalry in strong force at Littlestown, barring his direct road to Gettysburg; wherefore, on the morning of the 30th he moved across country to Hanover, Chambliss in front and Hampton in rear of his long train of two hundred wagons, with Fitzhugh Lee well out on his left flank. About 10 A. M. Chambliss, reaching Hanover, found Kilpatrick passing through the town and attacked him, but was driven out before Hampton or Lee could come to his support. Stuart's men and horses were now nearly worn out; he was encumbered with a large captured train; a junction with some part of Lee's army was a necessity, and he made a night march for York, only to learn that Early had left the day before. Pushing on to Carlisle, he found that Ewell was gone, and the place occupied by a militia force under General W. F. Smith. † His demand of a surrender was refused; he threw a few shells into the town and burned the Government barracks. That night he learned that Lee's army was concentrating at Gettysburg, and left for that place next day. Thus ended a raid which greatly embarrassed Lee, and by which the services of three cavalry brigades were, in the critical period of the campaign, exchanged for a few hundred prisoners and a wagon train.

Hearing nothing from Stuart, and therefore believing that Hooker was still south of the Potomac, Lee, on the afternoon of the 28th, ordered Longstreet and A. P. Hill to join Ewell at Harrisburg; but late that night one of Longstreet's scouts came in and reported that the Federal army had crossed the river, that Meade had relieved Hooker and was at Frederick. Lee thereupon changed the rendezvous of his army to Cashtown, which place Heth reached on the 29th. Next day Heth sent Pettigrew's brigade on to Gettysburg, nine miles, to procure a supply of shoes. Nearing this place, Pettigrew



NORTH-EAST CORNER OF THE McPHERSON WOODS,
WHERE GENERAL REYNOLDS WAS KILLED.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

† General Smith commanded the First Division, Department of the Susquehanna, and was charged with the protection of Harrisburg.—EDITORS.




discovered the advance of a large Federal force and returned to Cashtown. Hill immediately notified Generals Lee and Ewell, informing the latter that he would advance next morning on Gettysburg.

Buford, sending Merritt's brigade to Mechanicstown as guard to his trains, had early on the morning of the 29th crossed into and moved up the Cumberland valley via Boonsboro' and Fairfield with those of Gamble and Devin, and on the afternoon of Tuesday, June 30th, under instructions from Pleasonton, entered Gettysburg, Pettigrew's brigade withdrawing on his approach.

From Gettysburg, near the eastern base of the Green Ridge, and covering all the upper passes into the Cumberland valley, good roads lead to all important points between the Susquehanna and the Potomac. It is therefore an important strategic position. On the west of the town, distant nearly half a mile, there is a somewhat elevated ridge running north and south, on which stands the "Lutheran Seminary." This ridge is covered with open woods through its whole length, and is terminated nearly a mile and a half north of the seminary by a commanding knoll, bare on its southern side, called Oak Hill. From this ridge the ground slopes gradually to the west, and again rising forms another ridge about 500 yards from the first, upon which, nearly opposite the seminary, stand McPherson's farm buildings. The second ridge is wider, smoother, and lower than the first, and Oak Hill, their intersection,

has a clear view of the slopes of both ridges and of the valley between them. West of McPherson's ridge Willoughby Run flows south into Marsh Creek. South of the farm buildings and directly opposite the seminary, a wood borders the run for about 300 yards, and stretches back to the summit of McPherson's ridge. From the town two roads run: one south-west to Hagers-town via Fairfield, the other north-westerly to Chambersburg via Cashtown. The seminary is midway between them, about 300 yards from each. Parallel to and 150 yards north of the Chambersburg pike, is the bed of an unfinished railroad, with deep cuttings through the two ridges. Directly north of the town the country is comparatively flat and open; on the east of it, Rock Creek flows south.

On the south, and overlooking it, is a ridge of bold, high ground, terminated on the west by Cemetery Hill and on the east by Culp's Hill, which, bending to the south, extends half a mile or more and terminates in low grounds near Spangler's Spring. Culp's Hill is steep toward the east, is well wooded, and its eastern base is washed by Rock Creek.




CONFEDERATE DEAD ON THE FIELD OF THE FIRST DAY.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

Impressed by the importance of the position, Buford, expecting the early return of the enemy in force, assigned to Devin's brigade the country north, and to Gamble's that west of the town; sent out scouting parties on all the roads to collect information, and reported the condition of affairs to Reynolds. His pickets extended from below the Fairfield road, along the eastern bank of Willoughby Run, to the railroad cut, then easterly some 1500 yards north of the town, to a wooded hillock near Rock Creek.

On the night of June 30th Meade's headquarters and the Artillery Reserve were at Taneytown; the First Corps at Marsh Run, the Eleventh at Emmitsburg, Third at Bridgeport, Twelfth at Littlestown, Second at Uniontown, Fifth at Union Mills, Sixth and Gregg's cavalry at Manchester, Kilpatrick's at Hanover. A glance at the map [p. 266] will show at what disadvantage Meade's army was now placed. Lee's whole army was nearing Gettysburg, while Meade's was scattered over a wide region to the east and south of that town.

Meade was now convinced that all designs on the Susquehanna had been abandoned; but as Lee's corps were reported as occupying the country from



UNION DEAD WEST OF THE SEMINARY. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

Chambersburg to Carlisle, he ordered, for the next day's moves, the First and Eleventh corps to Gettysburg, under Reynolds, the Third to Emmitsburg, the Second to Taneytown, the Fifth to Hanover, and the Twelfth to Two Taverns, directing Slocum to take command of the Fifth in addition to his own. The Sixth Corps was left at Manchester, thirty-four miles from Gettysburg, to await orders. But Meade, while conforming to the current of Lee's movement, was not merely drifting. The same afternoon he directed the chiefs of engineers and artillery to select a field of battle on which his army might be concentrated, whatever Lee's lines of approach, whether by Harrisburg or Gettysburg,—indicating the general line of Pipe Creek as a suitable locality. Carefully drawn instructions were sent to the corps commanders as to the occupation of this line, should it be ordered; but it was added that developments might cause the offensive to be assumed from present positions. These orders were afterward cited as indicating General Meade's intention not to fight at Gettysburg. They were, under any circumstances, wise and proper orders, and it would probably have been better had he concentrated his army behind Pipe Creek rather than at Gettysburg; but events finally controlled the actions of both leaders.

At 8 A. M., July 1st, Buford's scouts reported Heth's advance on the Cash-town road,† when Gamble's brigade formed on McPherson's Ridge, from the

† The opening of the battle on the Chambersburg road, on July 1st, is thus described by Captain Newel Cheney, of the 9th N. Y. Cavalry, in a paper prepared for the Gettysburg Monument Commission of New York:

"Colonel William Sackett, commanding the 9th N. Y. Cavalry, was brigade officer of the day and in charge of

the brigade picket-line made up of details from each regiment of Devin's brigade (9th N. Y., 6th N. Y., 4th N. Y., and 17th Pa.) the night of June 30th, and extending from the south side of the Chambersburg road, on the east side of Willoughby Run, northerly and eastwardly across the Mummasburg, Carlisle, and Harrisburg roads. He had his headquarters on the Chambersburg road, near the Lutheran Seminary. The advanced picket put on the Chambersburg road near Willoughby

Fairfield road to the railroad cut; one section of Calef's battery A, 2d United States, near the left of his line, the other two across the Chambersburg or Cashtown pike. Devin formed his disposable squadrons from Gamble's right toward Oak Hill, from which he had afterward to transfer them to the north of the town to meet Ewell. As Heth advanced, he threw Archer's brigade to the right, Davis's to the left of the Cashtown pike, with Pettigrew's and Brockenbrough's brigades in support. The Confederates advanced skirmish-



UNION DEAD NEAR McPHERSON'S WOODS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

Run consisted of a corporal and three men, relieved every two hours, with orders not to fire on any one approaching from the front, but to notify the pickets in each direction and the reserve. No one approached from the front until daylight next morning, July 1st, when Corporal Alphonse Hodges, of Company F, 9th N. Y. Cavalry, was on this post with three men. At daylight he saw men approaching along the road, nearly a mile away, across Willoughby Run. Acting on his orders, he immediately sent his men to notify the line and the reserve, while he advanced across the Run till near enough to see that those approaching were the enemy, when he turned back, and as he did so the enemy fired at him. He retired to the Run, and from behind the abutments of the bridge fired several shots back at the enemy. These are supposed to be the first shots fired from our side on the morning of July 1st at Gettysburg, and occurred about 5:30 A. M., as near as Hodges can remember. When he fell back from the bridge to the higher ground, he found Colonel Sackett had formed a skirmish-line of the whole of his picket force, which, as I have said, consisted of detachments from the different regiments of the (Devin's) brigade. Here the advance of the enemy was first seriously disputed by this skirmish-line, which they held till after Hall's battery (2d Maine) came up and took position on the right of the Chambersburg road in rear of this skirmish-line and fired. . . . The First Brigade of Buford's division (Colonel Gamble's) coming up on the left of the road, the line of the Second Brigade, still under command of Colonel Sackett, moved farther to the right and occupied the line from the Chambersburg road to the Mummasburg road. That portion of the 9th Cavalry which

had remained in camp received orders to water their horses by squadrons in Rock Creek about 7 A. M. As soon as they had watered, they saddled up and proceeded out on the Mummasburg road to the skirmish-line on Oak Ridge. The first squadron, under Captain Hanley (afterward Lieutenant-Colonel), was the first to reach the line, and he immediately ordered Lieutenant A. C. Robertson (afterward Captain) with twenty men to advance down the road into the woods, where he found the enemy's line near the residence of N. Hoffman. Finding the enemy had a strong line, he retired to a position a little back of the residence of J. Forney, from behind which some of the enemy were firing at him. He dismounted his men and drove the enemy from behind Forney's buildings, then fell back to the stone wall on the ridge, where the balance of the regiment were formed dismounted. Here the regiment held their ground for some time while the enemy approached on their hands and knees through the wheat-field in front. Daniel Cornish, of Company F, getting sight of a rebel not far away in the field, fired and killed him. The regiment cheered, and the enemy, evidently thinking our men would charge on them, hastily withdrew out of the wheat-field. As they fell back one man stopped behind a tree in the field near the road, and Perry Nichols, of Company F, advanced and captured him. This is said to be the first prisoner captured. He was immediately taken to Buford's headquarters, and gave the first information we received from the enemy's side. It was during this skirmish that Cyrus W. James, Company G, 9th N. Y. Cavalry, was killed by a rebel bullet, and he is said to have been the first man killed that morning on our side."—EDITORS.



ASSAULT OF BROCKENBROUGH'S CONFEDERATE BRIGADE (HETH'S DIVISION) UPON THE STONE BARN OF THE McPHERSON FARM.

The line of the stone barn was held by Stone's brigade, Pennsylvania Bucktails (Doubleday's division), its right resting on the Chambersburg pike (the left of the picture) and its left on the McPherson woods, where a part of Archer's Confederate brigade of Heth's division was captured by Meredith's brigade.—EDITORS.

arrived. Rowley's division was thrown forward, Stone's brigade to the interval between Meredith and Cutler, and Biddle's with Cooper's battery to occupy the ridge between the wood and the Fairfield road. Reynolds's battery replaced Hall's, and Calef's rejoined Gamble's cavalry, now in reserve. Robinson's division was halted near the base of Seminary Ridge. By this time, near noon, General Howard arrived, assumed command, and directed General Schurz, commanding the Eleventh Corps, to prolong Doubleday's line toward Oak Hill with Schimmelfennig's and Barlow's divisions and three batteries, and to post Steinwehr's division and two batteries on Cemetery Hill, as a rallying-point. By 1 o'clock, when this corps was arriving, Buford had reported Ewell's approach by the Heidlersburg road, and Howard called on Sickles at Emmitsburg and Slocum at Two Taverns for aid, to which both these officers promptly responded. It was now no longer a question of prolonging Doubleday's line, but of protecting it against Ewell whilst engaged in front with Hill. Schurz's two divisions, hardly 6000 effectives, accordingly formed line on the open plain half a mile north of the town. They were too weak to cover the ground, and a wide interval was left between the two corps, covered only by the fire of Dilger's and Wheeler's batteries (ten guns) posted behind it.

That morning, whilst on the march to Cashtown, Ewell received Hill's notice that his corps was advancing to Gettysburg, upon which he turned

the heads of his own columns to that point. Reporting the change by a staff-officer to General Lee, Ewell was instructed that if the Federals were in force at Gettysburg a general battle was not to be brought on until the rest of the army was up. Approaching Gettysburg, Rodes, guided by the sounds of battle, followed the prolongation of Seminary Ridge; Iverson's, Daniel's, and Ramseur's brigades on the western, O'Neal's and Doles's on the eastern slope. Ewell, recognizing the importance of Oak Hill, ordered it to be occupied by Carter's artillery battalion, which immediately opened on both the Federal corps, enfilading Doubleday's line. This caused Wadsworth again to

withdraw Cutler to Seminary Ridge, and Reynolds's battery was posted near McPherson's house, under partial cover. Stone therefore placed two of his three regiments on the Cashtown pike, so as to face Oak Hill. This left an interval between Stone and Cutler, through which Cooper and Reynolds could fire with effect, and gave to these lines a cross-fire on troops entering




CONFEDERATE DEAD GATHERED FOR BURIAL NEAR THE MCPHERSON WOODS. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.

the angle between them. Robinson now sent his two brigades to strengthen Cutler's right. They took post behind the stone walls of a field, Paul's brigade facing west, Baxter's north. Rodes, regarding this advance as a menace, gave orders at 2:30 p. m. to attack. Iverson, sweeping round to his left,




engaged Paul, who prolonged Cutler's line, and O'Neal attacked Baxter. The repulse of O'Neal soon enabled Baxter to turn upon Iverson. Cutler also attacked him in flank, and after losing 500 men killed and wounded, 3 of Iverson's regiments surrendered. General Robinson reports the capture of 1000 prisoners and 3 colors; General Paul was severely wounded, losing both eyes. Meanwhile Daniel's brigade advanced directly on Stone, who maintained his lines against this attack and also Brockenbrough's, of Hill's corps,



NOTE.—Edward Johnson's Confederate division (upper right-hand corner) did not reach the position assigned them on this map until after sunset or about dusk of July 1st. See p. 284.—EDITORS.

foot of Seminary Ridge, where Colonel Wainwright, commanding the corps artillery, had planted twelve guns south of the Cashtown pike, with Stewart's battery, manned in part by men of the Iron Brigade, north of it. Buford had already thrown half of Gamble's dismounted men south of the Fairfield road. Heth's division had suffered so severely that Pender's had passed to its front, thus bringing fresh troops to bear on the exhausted Federal line.

It was about 4 P. M. when the whole Confederate line advanced to the final attack. On their right Gamble held Lane's brigade for some time in check, Perrin's and Scales's suffered severely, and Scales's was broken up, for Stewart, swinging half his guns, under Lieutenant Davison, upon the Cashtown pike, raked it. The whole corps being now heavily pressed and its right uncovered, Doubleday gave the order to fall back to Cemetery Hill, which was effected in



THE LINE OF DEFENSE AT THE CEMETERY GATE-HOUSE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

comparatively good order, the rear, covered by the 7th Wisconsin, turning when necessary to check pursuit. Colonel Wainwright, mistaking the order, had clung with his artillery to Seminary Hill, until, seeing the infantry retreating to the town, he moved his batteries down the Cashtown pike until lapped on both sides by the enemy's skirmishers, at close range, when they were compelled to abandon one gun on the road, all its horses being killed. The Eleventh Corps also left a disabled gun on the field. Of the troops who passed through the town, many, principally men of the Eleventh Corps, got entangled in the streets, lost their way, and were captured.

On ascending Cemetery Hill, the retreating troops found Steinwehr's division in position covered by stone fences on the slopes, and occupying by their skirmishers the houses in front of their line. As they arrived they were formed, the Eleventh Corps on the right, the First Corps on the left of Steinwehr. As the batteries came up, they were well posted by Colonels Wainwright and Osborn, and soon a formidable array of artillery was ready to cover with its fire all the approaches. Buford assembled his command on the plain west of Cemetery Hill, covering the left flank and presenting a firm front to any attempt at pursuit. The First Corps found a small reinforcement awaiting it, in the 7th Indiana, part of the train escort, which brought up nearly five hundred fresh men. Wadsworth met them and led them to Culp's Hill, where, under direction of Captain Pattison of that regiment, a defensive line was marked out. Their brigade (Cutler's) soon joined them; wood and stone were plentiful, and soon the right of the line was solidly established.

Nor was there wanting other assurance to the men who had fought so long that their sacrifices had not been in vain. As they reached the hill they were received by General Hancock, who arrived just as they were coming up from the town, under orders from General Meade to assume the command. His person was well known; his presence inspired confidence, and it implied also the near approach of his army-corps. He ordered Wadsworth at once to

Culp's Hill to secure that important position, and aided by Howard, by Warren who had also just arrived from headquarters, and by others, a strong line, well flanked, was soon formed.

General Lee, who from Seminary Hill had witnessed the final attack, sent Colonel Long, of his staff, a competent officer of sound judgment, to examine the position, and directed Ewell to carry it if practicable, renewing, however, his previous warning to avoid bringing on a general engagement until the army was all up. Both Ewell, who was making some preparations with a view to attack, and Long found the position a formidable one, strongly occupied and not accessible to artillery fire. Ewell's men were indeed in no condition for an immediate assault. Of Rodes's eight thousand, nearly three thousand were *hors de combat*. Early had lost over five hundred, and had but two brigades disposable, the other two having been sent on the report of the advance of Federal troops, probably the Twelfth Corps, then near by, to watch the York road. Hill's two divisions had been very roughly handled, and had lost heavily, and he withdrew them to Seminary Hill as Ewell entered the town, leaving the latter with not more than eight thousand men to secure the town and the prisoners. Ewell's absent division (Edward Johnson's) was expected soon, but it did not arrive until near sunset, when the Twelfth Corps and Stannard's Vermont brigade were also up, and the Third Corps was arriving. In fact an assault by the Confederates was not practicable before 5:30 P. M., and after that the position was perfectly secure. For the first time that day the Federals had the advantage of position, and sufficient troops and artillery to occupy it, and Ewell would not have been justified in attacking without the positive orders of Lee, who was present, and wisely abstained from giving them. [Continuation on page 290.]

INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST DAY AT GETTYSBURG. †

BY E. P. HALSTEAD, BREVET-MAJOR AND ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. V.



COUNTING THE SCARS IN THE COLORS.

SOON after daylight on July 1st, General Reynolds, then at Marsh Run, gave orders to move with all possible dispatch to Gettysburg,

where General Buford, with a small division of cavalry, was contending against Heth's division of infantry and vastly superior numbers.

The First Corps moved promptly, covered a distance of nearly eight miles, and the First Division, commanded by General Wadsworth, reached the field about 10 o'clock in the forenoon.

In returning for the Second and Third divisions I met John Burns in the field east of the Seminary, with an old musket on his shoulder and a powder-horn in his pocket, hurrying to the front, looking terribly earnest. When near me he inquired, "Which way are the rebels? Where are our troops?" I informed him that they were just in front, that he would soon overtake them. He then said, with much enthusiasm, "I know how to fight, I have fit before!"

Wadsworth's division was immediately engaged, except the Sixth Wisconsin, held in reserve by General Doubleday's orders. General Robinson and General Rowley were soon up with their divi-

† From a paper read before the District of Columbia Commandery of the Loyal Legion, March 2d, 1887.—EDITORS.

sions and hotly engaged, the former on the right of the line, extending to near the Mummasburg road, and the latter in the center between Meredith's and Cutler's brigades of Wadsworth's division.

The advantages of position were, perhaps, favorable to us, but in numbers the enemy was vastly superior. We had 6 brigades, numbering, with the artillery assigned to duty with us, 8200 men, and we maintained our position for six hours and a half against General A. P. Hill's corps of 13 brigades. General Archer and most of his brigade were captured early in the day by Meredith's "Iron Brigade." He evidently had expected an easy "walk over," judging from his disappointed manner after he was captured. A guard brought him back to General Doubleday, who, in a very cordial manner,—they having been cadets at West Point together,—said: "Good-morning, Archer! How are you? I am glad to see you!" General Archer replied: "Well, I am *not* glad to see *you*, by a — sight!" Very soon after this episode the 6th Wisconsin, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dawes, made a successful charge, resulting in the capture of a force of the enemy in the railroad cut north of the Cashtown road, and a little later General Baxter captured nearly all of Iverson's [Confederate] brigade.

About 2 o'clock in the afternoon the Eleventh Corps reached the field and formed in line of battle at about a right angle to the general line of the First Corps, but did not connect with its right by several hundred yards, so that both flanks were in the air. When Ewell's troops approached from Carlisle and York they struck the Eleventh Corps in front and on both flanks almost simultaneously. The result was an easy victory to the enemy, giving them possession of Gettysburg before the First Corps had ceased fighting or had left its position west of the Seminary. Thus the First Corps was enveloped on its right and rear and was contending against vastly superior numbers in its front.


About 4 o'clock in the afternoon General Doubleday sent me to General Howard for reinforcements and orders. I found the latter in the cemetery near the gate. He looked the picture of despair. On receipt of the message he replied: "Tell General Doubleday that I have no reinforcements to send him. I have only one regiment in reserve." I then asked if he had any orders to give, and called his attention to the enemy then advancing in line of battle overlapping our left by nearly half a mile. He looked in that direction and replied rather sharply: "Those are nothing but rail fences, sir!" I said: "I beg your pardon, General; if you will take my glass you will see something besides rail fences." Turning to a staff-officer, he bade him take the glass and see what it was. The officer looked, and in an instant lowered the glass, saying: "General, those are long lines of the enemy!" General Howard then turned to me and said: "Go to General Buford, give him my compliments, and tell him to go to General Doubleday's support." When asked where General Bu-

ford could be found, he replied: "I don't know! I think he is over this way," pointing toward the east.

After riding in that direction as far as I deemed it wise or prudent, I returned to where General Howard sat, just as General Hancock approached at a swinging gallop. When near General Howard, who was then alone, he saluted, and with great animation, as if there was no time for ceremony, said General Meade had sent him forward to take command of the three corps. General Howard replied that he was the senior. General Hancock said: "I am aware of that, General, but I have written orders in my pocket from General Meade, which I will show you if you wish to see them." General Howard said: "No; I do not doubt your word, General Hancock, but you can give no orders here while I am here." Hancock replied: "Very well, General Howard, I will second any order that you have to give, but General Meade has also directed me to select a field on which to fight this battle in rear of Pipe Creek." Then, casting one glance from Culp's Hill to Round Top, he continued: "But I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw, and if it meets your approbation I will select this as the battle-field." General Howard responded: "I think it a very strong position, General Hancock; a very strong position!" "Very well, sir, I select this as the battle-field." General Hancock immediately turned away to rectify our lines.

There was no person present besides myself when the conversation took place between Howard and Hancock. A number of years since I reminded General Hancock of that fact and what I had heard pass between them. He said that what I have repeated here was true, and requested a written statement, which I subsequently furnished him.

When I left General Howard to return to the front, I discovered General Buford's cavalry only a little to the west of the cemetery and delivered the order I had received from General Howard. Buford rose in his stirrups upon his tiptoes and exclaimed: "What does he think I can do against those long lines of the enemy out there?" "I don't know anything about that, General; those are General Howard's orders." "Very well," said he, "I will see what I can do," and, like the true soldier that he was, he moved his command out in plain view of the enemy and formed for the charge. The enemy, seeing the movement, formed squares in echelon, which delayed them and materially aided in the escape of the First Corps, if it did not save a large portion of the remnant from capture. The formation of squares by the enemy that day has been doubted by nearly every one with whom I have conversed upon the subject, and not until the meeting of the survivors of the First Corps at Gettysburg, in May, 1885, was I able to satisfy Colonel Bachelder, who has made a study of that battle, of the correctness of my statement, and only then after it had been corroborated by two of Buford's officers who were in the engagement.



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN DURING THE WAR OR SOON AFTER.

Major T. Hancock

HANCOCK AND HOWARD IN THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT.

I. FROM GENERAL HANCOCK'S OFFICIAL REPORT.

GENERAL HANCOCK's report bears no date except 1863, but a supplemental report, by way of correction, dated October 24th, shows that the paper was written prior to that time, and during his convalescence from the wound received near the end of the battle. There are passages in the report which show a determination on the part of Meade to fight at Pipe Creek. General Hancock says:

"On the morning of July 1st the command marched to Taneytown, going into bivouac about 11 A. M. I then proceeded in person to General Meade's headquarters, and, on reporting to him, was informed as to his intention with reference to giving battle to the enemy, the orders for preparatory movements being then ready for issue. A few minutes before 1 P. M. I received orders to proceed in person to the front and assume command of the First, Third, and Eleventh corps, in consequence of the death of Major-General Reynolds. Having been fully informed by the major-general commanding as to his intentions, I was instructed by him to give the necessary directions upon my arrival at the front for the movement of troops and trains to the rear toward the line of battle he had selected, should I deem it expedient to do so. If the ground was suitable, and circumstances made it wise, I was directed to establish the line of battle at Gettysburg. . . . At 3 P. M. I arrived at Gettysburg and assumed the command. At this time the First and Eleventh corps were retiring through the town, closely pursued by the enemy. The cavalry of General Buford was occupying a firm position on the plain to the left of Gettysburg, covering the rear of the retreating corps. The Third Corps had not yet arrived from Emmitsburg. Orders were at once given to establish a line of battle on Cemetery Hill, with skirmishers occupying that part of the town immediately in our front. The position just on the southern edge of Gettysburg, overlooking the town and commanding the

Emmitsburg and Taneytown roads and the Baltimore turnpike, was already partially occupied on my arrival by direction of Major-General Howard. Some difficulty was experienced in forming the troops of the Eleventh Corps, but by vigorous efforts a sufficiently formidable line was established to deter the enemy from any serious assault on the position. They pushed forward a line of battle for a short distance east of the Baltimore turnpike, but it was easily checked by the fire of our artillery. In forming the lines, I received material assistance from Major-General Howard, Brigadier-Generals Warren and Buford, and officers of General Howard's command. . . . The trains of all the troops under my command were ordered to the rear, that they might not interfere with any movement of troops that might be directed by the major-general commanding. My aide, Major Mitchell, was then sent to General Meade to inform him of the state of affairs, and to say that I would hold the position until night. Shortly after, I addressed a communication to the major-general commanding, sending it by Captain Parker, of my staff, giving in detail the information in my possession, and informing him that the position at Gettysburg was a very strong one, having for its disadvantage that it might be easily turned, and leaving to him the responsibility whether the battle should be fought at Gettysburg or at a place first selected by him. Between 5 and 6 o'clock, my dispositions having been completed, Major-General Slocum arrived on the field, and, considering that my functions had ceased, I transferred the command to him. The head of the Third Corps appeared in sight shortly afterward, on the Emmitsburg road.

"About dark I started for the headquarters of the army, still at Taneytown, thirteen miles distant, and reported in person to General Meade. I then ascertained that he had already given orders for the corps in the rear to advance at once to Gettysburg, and was about proceeding there in person."

II. FROM GENERAL HOWARD'S OFFICIAL REPORT.

GENERAL HOWARD's detailed report is dated August 31st, 1863, and speaks specifically of the course of events after he took command on the morning of the First Day's battle. He says:

"Just at sunset [June 30th] I received a request from General Reynolds, commanding First Corps, to meet him at his headquarters [at Marsh Run, midway between Emmitsburg and Gettysburg]. He then showed me the orders from your headquarters placing him in command of the First, Eleventh, and Third corps; also the circulars of the commanding general dated June 30th, together with a confidential communication. The purport of these papers was that a general engagement was imminent, the issues involved immense, and all commanders urged to extraordinary exertions. General Reynolds and I consulted together, comparing notes and information until a late hour. I then returned to Emmitsburg. A circular from your headquarters, of June 30th, required corps commanders to hold their commands in readiness to move at a moment's notice. . . . At 8 A. M. [July 1st] orders were received from him [Reynolds] directing the corps to march to Gettysburg. . . . As soon as the corps was set in motion, I pushed on with my staff by the direct road, and when within two miles of Gettysburg received word from General Reynolds, pointing out the place where I was to encamp; but, on approaching the town, heavy artillery firing was heard. For some little time I endeavored, by sending in different directions, to find General Reynolds, in order to report to him in person. In the meantime I went to the top of a high building in Gettysburg facing westward. I saw firing beyond Seminary

Ridge and not far from the seminary. Toward the right masses of cavalry were drawn up in order, to the east of the ridge and to the north-east of the town. A portion of the First Corps, of General Wadsworth's command, was between me and the seminary, taking position near the railroad. Another division of this corps was moving by the flank with considerable rapidity, along the ridge and in a north-easterly direction. I had studied the position a few moments, when a report reached me that General Reynolds was wounded. At first I hoped his wound might be slight, and that he would continue to command; but in a short time I was undeceived. His aide-de-camp, Major [William] Riddle, brought the sad tidings of his death. This was about 11:30 A. M. Prior to this the general had sent me orders to move up at double-quick, for he was severely engaged. On hearing of the death of General Reynolds, I assumed command of the left wing, instructing General Schurz to take command of the Eleventh Corps. After an examination of the general features of the country, I came to the conclusion that the only tenable position for my limited force was the ridge to the south-east of Gettysburg, now so well known as Cemetery Ridge. The highest point at the cemetery commanded every eminence within easy range. The slopes toward the west and south were gradual, and could be completely swept by artillery. To the north, the ridge was broken by a ravine running transversely. I at once established my headquarters near the cemetery and on the highest point north of the Baltimore pike. Here General Schurz joined me before 12 M., when I instructed him to make the following dispositions of the Eleventh Corps. Learning from General Doubleday, commanding the First Corps, that his

right was hard pressed, and receiving continued assurance that his left was safe and pushing the enemy back, I ordered the First and Third divisions of the Eleventh Corps to seize and hold a prominent height [Oak Hill], which they did not reach—the Confederates getting there first.—EDITORS] on the right of the Cashtown road and on the prolongation of Seminary Ridge, each division to have a battery of artillery, the other three batteries, supported by General Steinwehr's division (Second), to be put in position near me on Cemetery Hill.

"About 12:30 [P. M.] General Buford sent me word that the enemy was massing between the York and Harrisburg roads, to the north of Gettysburg, some three or four miles from the town. Quite a large number of prisoners had already been taken by the First Corps. They reported that we were engaging Hill's corps, or a portion of it, and that an aide of General Longstreet had arrived, stating that he would be up with one division in a short time. About this time the head of column of the Eleventh Corps entered and passed through the town, moving forward rapidly toward the position ordered. The news of Ewell's advance from the direction of York was confirmed by reports from General Schurz, General Buford, and Major Charles H. Howard, my aide-de-camp, who had been sent in that direction to reconnoiter. I therefore ordered General Schurz to halt his command, to prevent his right flank being turned, but to push forward a thick line of skirmishers to seize the point first indicated [Oak Hill], as a relief and support to the First Corps. Meanwhile word was sent to General Sickles, commanding Third Corps, and General Slocum, commanding Twelfth, informing them of the situation of affairs, with a request that General Sickles forward my dispatch to General Meade. General Sickles was at that time, about 1 P. M., near Emmitsburg, and General Slocum reported to be near Two Taverns, distant between four and five miles from Gettysburg. At 2 P. M. a report of the state of things as then existing was sent to General Meade directly. About this time I left my chief-of-staff to execute orders, and went to the First Corps. I found General Doubleday about a quarter of a mile beyond the seminary. His Third Division was drawn up to his front and left, facing toward the north-west, making a large angle with the ridge. The artillery of this division was engaging the enemy at this time. His First Division (Wadsworth's) was located a little to the right of the railroad, and his Second Division (Robinson's) on Wadsworth's right. The First Corps, in this position, made a right angle with the Eleventh Corps, the vertex being near the Mummasburg road. The cavalry of General Buford was located mainly upon the flanks. After inspecting the position of the First Corps, and examining the topography of that part of the field, I returned to my former position at the cemetery. About this time (2:45 P. M.) the enemy showed himself in force in front of the Eleventh Corps. His batteries could be distinctly seen on a prominent slope between the Mummasburg and the Harrisburg roads. From this point he opened fire upon the Eleventh Corps, and also more or less enfilading Robinson's division of the First Corps. The batteries attached to the First and Third divisions, Eleventh Corps, immediately replied, and with evident effect. One battery of the enemy, a little more than a mile north from the cemetery, near the Harrisburg road, could be distinctly seen, and as I had a battery of 3-inch rifled guns, under Wiedrich, near my position, I directed him to fire, provided he could reach the enemy. He did so, but his shells for the most part fell short. Soon after complaint came that they reached no farther than our own cavalry; however, I never heard that any of our own men were killed or wounded by this fire. The reason of this irregularity was the poor quality of the ammunition there used. Subsequently these guns did most excellent service.

"I now sent again to General Slocum, stating that my right flank was attacked and asking him if he was moving up, and stating that I was in danger of being turned and driven back. Before this my aide-de-camp, Captain [Edward P.] Pearson, had been sent to General Sickles,

requesting him to move up to Gettysburg as rapidly as possible. Owing to difficulty in finding General Sickles's headquarters, this message was not delivered until 3:30 P. M.

At 3:20 P. M. the enemy renewed his attack upon the First Corps, hotly pressing the First and Second divisions. Earnest requests were made upon me for reinforcements, and General Schurz, who was engaged with a force of the enemy much larger than his own, asked for a brigade to be placed *en échelon* on his right. I had then only two small brigades in reserve, and had already located three regiments from these in the edge of the town and to the north, and I felt sure that I must hold the point where I was as an ultimate resort. Therefore I at first replied that I could not spare any troops, but did afterward permit General Steinwehr to push out Colonel Coster's brigade beyond the town, to cover the retreat. General Buford was requested to support the center, near the right of the First Corps, as well as he could with his cavalry. A third battery was sent to the front, and put in position near the Third Division, Eleventh Corps. At 3:45 P. M. Generals Doubleday and Wadsworth besought me for reinforcements. I directed General Schurz, if he could spare one regiment or more, to send it to reinforce General Wadsworth, and several times sent urgent requests to General Slocum to come to my assistance. To every application for reinforcements, I replied, "Hold out, if possible, a while longer, for I am expecting General Slocum every moment." At this time General Doubleday's left was turned, and troops of the enemy appeared far outflanking him, and the enemy were also extending beyond my right flank. About 4 P. M. I sent word to General Doubleday that, if he could not hold out longer, he must fall back, fighting, to Cemetery Hill and on the left of the Baltimore pike; also a request to General Buford to make a show of force opposite the enemy's right, which he immediately did. I now dispatched Major Howard, my aide-de-camp, to General Slocum, to inform him of the state of affairs, requesting him to send one of his divisions to the left, the other to the right of Gettysburg, and that he would come in person to Cemetery Hill. He met the general on the Baltimore pike, about a mile from Gettysburg, who replied that he had already ordered a division to the right, and that he would send another to cover the left, as requested, but that he did not wish to come up in person to the front and take the responsibility of that fight. In justice to General Slocum, I desire to say that he afterward expressed the opinion that it was against the wish of the commanding general to bring on a general engagement at that point.

"At 4:10 P. M., finding that I could hold out no longer, and that the troops were already giving way, I sent a positive order to the commanders of the First and Eleventh corps to fall back gradually, disputing every inch of ground, and to form near my position, the Eleventh Corps on the right and the First Corps on the left of the Baltimore pike. General Steinwehr's division of the Eleventh Corps and the batteries which he was supporting were so disposed as to check the enemy attempting to come through the town, or to approach upon the right or left of Gettysburg. The movement ordered was executed, though with considerable confusion, on account of the First and Eleventh corps coming together in the town.

"At 4:30 P. M. the columns reached Cemetery Hill, the enemy pressing hard. He made a single attempt to turn our right, ascending the slope north-east of Gettysburg, but his line was instantly broken by Wiedrich's battery, in position on the heights. General Hancock came to me about this time and said General Meade had sent him on hearing the state of affairs; that he had given him his instructions while under the impression that he was my senior. We agreed at once that that was no time for talking, and that General Hancock should further arrange the troops and place the batteries upon the left of the Baltimore pike, while I should take the right of the same. In a very short time we put the troops in position, as I had previously directed, excepting that

General Wadsworth's division was sent to occupy a height to the right and rear of our position. In passing through the town we lost many prisoners, but the enemy, perceiving the strength of our position on the heights, made no further attempts to renew the engagement that evening.

"About 7 P. M. Generals Slocum and Sickles arrived at the cemetery. A formal order was at the same time put into my hands placing General Hancock in command of the left wing. But General Slocum being present, and senior, I turned the command over to him, and resumed the direct command of the Eleventh Corps, whereupon General Hancock repaired to the headquarters of General Meade. The eventful day was over. The First and Eleventh corps, numbering less than eighteen thousand men, nobly aided by Buford's division of cavalry, had engaged and held in check nearly double their numbers from 10 in the morning until 7 in the evening. They gave way, it is true, after hard fighting, yet they secured and held the remarkable position which, under the able generalship of the commander of this army, contributed to the grand results of July 2d and 3d."

In a letter to President Lincoln, dated Near Berlin, July 18th, 1863 ("Official Records," Vol. XXVII., p. 700), General Howard says:

"The successful issue of the battle of Gettysburg was due mainly to the energetic operations of our present

commanding general prior to the engagement, and to the manner in which he handled his troops on the field. The reserves have never before during this war been thrown in at just the right moment. In many cases when points were just being carried by the enemy, a regiment or brigade appeared to stop his progress and hurl him back. Moreover, I have never seen a more hearty coöperation on the part of general officers as since General Meade took command."

In a resolution dated January 28th, 1864, the thanks of Congress were tendered to General Joseph Hooker and his army for the movement covering Washington and Baltimore; "and to Major-General George G. Meade, Major-General Oliver O. Howard, and the officers and soldiers of that army, for the skill and heroic valor which, at Gettysburg, repulsed, defeated, and drove back, broken and dispirited, beyond the Rappahannock, the veteran army of the Rebellion." On May 30th, 1866, the thanks of Congress were given to Major-General W. S. Hancock, "for his gallant, meritorious, and conspicuous share in that great and decisive victory"—meaning Gettysburg. EDITORS.

CITIZENS OF GETTYSBURG IN THE UNION ARMY.

BY H. M. M. RICHARDS, COMPANY A, 26TH PENNSYLVANIA MILITIA.

FOR twenty-three years we have heard it asserted that the people of Gettysburg were lacking in patriotism because they did not spring to arms *en masse*, and assist in repelling the invaders. I am glad to see young Weakley cited, in addition to old John Burns, as one who volunteered in the defense of his home during the battle; but these are not all.

Upon the first indication of an invasion of Pennsylvania, the 26th Regiment, P. V. M., was organized and mustered into the United States service at Harrisburg, under the command of Colonel W. W. Jennings of that city. Company A of this regiment, to which I belonged, was composed of students from the Lutheran Theological Seminary and the Pennsylvania College of Gettysburg, and of citizens of the town; one other company came from Hanover, but a few miles distant.

On June 23d we left Harrisburg for Gettysburg, to be used, I believe, as riflemen among the hills near Cashtown. A railroad accident prevented this plan from being carried into effect, and kept us from reaching Gettysburg until the 26th, by which time General Early had reached Cashtown. In accordance with orders received from Major Granville O. Haller, † in command of the post, we were marched out on the Chambersburg pike at 10 A. M., June 26th, for a distance of about three and a half miles, accompanied by Major Robert Bell, who commanded a troop of horse, also raised, I understand, in Gettysburg. Having halted, our colonel, accompanied by Major Bell, rode to the brow of an elevation distant several hundred yards,

and there saw General Early's troops a few miles distant. Early says in his report: "I sent General Gordon with his brigade and White's battalion of cavalry on the pike through Cashtown toward Gettysburg, and moved with the rest of the command to the left through Hilltown to Mummasburg. The object of this movement was for Gordon to amuse and skirmish with the enemy while I should get on his flank and rear so as to capture his whole force." We, a few hundred men at the most, were in the toils; what should be done? We would gladly have marched to join the Army of the Potomac, under Meade, but where was it? Our colonel, left to his own resources, wisely decided to make an effort to return to Harrisburg, and immediately struck off from the pike, the Confederates capturing many of our rear-guard after a sharp skirmish, and sending their cavalry in pursuit of us. These latter overtook us in the afternoon at Witmer's house, about four and a half miles from Gettysburg on the Carlisle road, where after an engagement they were repulsed with some loss. After many vicissitudes, we finally reached Harrisburg, having marched 54 out of 60 consecutive hours, with a loss of some 200 men.

It should be added that Gettysburg, small town as it was, had already furnished its quota to the army. Moreover, on the first day of the battle hundreds of the unfortunate men of Reynolds's gallant corps were secreted, sheltered, fed, and aided in every way by the men and women of the town.

READING, PA., November 2d, 1886.

† Acting aide-de-camp to General Couch, commanding the Department of the Susquehanna.—EDITORS.



HALL'S BATTERY ON THE FIRST DAY RESISTING THE CONFEDERATE ADVANCE ON THE CHAMBERSBURG ROAD.

THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG.†

BY HENRY J. HUNT, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A., CHIEF OF ARTILLERY A. P.

ON June 30th, at Taneytown, General Meade received information that the enemy was advancing on Gettysburg, and corps commanders were at once instructed to hold their commands in readiness to march against him. The next day, July 1st, Meade wrote to Reynolds that telegraphic intelligence from Couch, and the movements reported by Buford, indicated a concentration of the enemy's army either at Chambersburg or at some point on a line drawn from that place through Heidlersburg to York. Under these circumstances, Meade informed Reynolds that he had not yet decided whether it was his best policy to move to attack before he knew more definitely Lee's point of concentration. He seems, however, soon to have determined not to advance until the movements or position of the enemy gave strong assurance of success, and if the enemy took the offensive, to withdraw his own army from its actual positions and form line of battle behind Pipe Creek, between Middleburg and Manchester. The considerations probably moving him to this are not difficult to divine. Examination of the maps [see page 266] will show that such a line would cover Baltimore and Washington in all directions from which Lee could advance, and that Westminster, his base, would be immediately behind him, with short railroad communication to Baltimore. It would, moreover, save much hard marching, and restore to the ranks the thousands of stragglers who did not reach Gettysburg in time for the battle.

From Westminster—which is in Parr's Ridge, the eastern boundary of the valley of the Monocacy—good roads led in all directions, and gave the place the same strategic value for Meade that Gettysburg had for Lee. The new line could not be turned by Lee without imminent danger to his own army, nor could he afford to advance upon Baltimore or Washington, leaving the Army of the Potomac intact behind and so near him;—that would be to invite the fate of Burgoyne. Meade, then, could safely select a good "offensive-defensive line" behind Pipe Creek and establish himself there, with perfect liberty of action in all directions. Without magazines or assured

† Continued from page 284.

communications, Lee would have to scatter his army more or less in order to subsist it, and so expose it to Meade; or else keep it united, and so starve it, a course which Meade could compel by simple demonstrations. There would then be but two courses for Lee,—either to attack Meade in his chosen position or to retreat without a battle. The latter, neither the temper of his army nor that of his Government would probably permit. In case of a defeat Meade's line of retreat would be comparatively short, and easily covered, whilst Lee's would be for two marches through an open country before he could gain the mountain passes. As Meade believed Lee's army to be at least equal to his own, all the elements of the problem were in favor of the Pipe Creek line. But Meade's orders for July 1st, drawing his corps toward the threatened flank, carried Reynolds to Gettysburg, and Buford's report hastened this movement. Reynolds, who probably never received the Pipe Creek circular, was eager for the conflict, and his collision with Heth assuming the dimensions of a battle, caused an immediate concentration of both armies at Gettysburg. Prior to this, the assembling of Meade's army behind Pipe Creek would have been easy, and all fears of injuring thereby the *morale* of his troops were idle; the Army of the Potomac was of "sterner stuff" than that implies. The battle of July 1st changed the situation. Overpowered by numbers, the First and Eleventh corps had, after hard fighting and inflicting as well as incurring heavy losses, been forced back to their reserve, on Cemetery Hill, which they still held. To have withdrawn them now would have been a retreat, and might have discouraged the Federal, as it certainly would have elated the Confederate troops; especially as injurious reports unjust to both the corps named had been circulated. It would have been to acknowledge a defeat when there was no defeat. Meade therefore resolved to fight at Gettysburg. An ominous dispatch from General Halleck to Meade, that afternoon, suggesting that whilst his tactical arrangements were good, his strategy was at fault, that he was too far east, that Lee might attempt to turn his left, and that Frederick was preferable as a base to Westminster, may have confirmed Meade in this decision.

In pursuance of his instructions, I had that morning (July 1st) reconnoitered the country behind Pipe Creek for a battle-ground. On my return I found General Hancock at General Meade's tent. He informed me that Reynolds was killed, that a battle was going on at Gettysburg, and that he was under orders to proceed to that place. His instructions were to examine it and the intermediate country for a suitable field, and if his report was favorable the troops would be ordered forward. Before the receipt that evening of Hancock's written report from Cemetery Hill, which was not very encouraging, General Meade received from others information as to the state of affairs at the front, set his troops in motion toward Gettysburg, afterward urged them to forced marches, and under his orders I gave the necessary instructions to the Artillery Reserve and Park for a battle there. The move was, under the circumstances, a bold one, and Meade, as we shall see, took great risks. We left Taneytown toward 11 p. m., and reached Gettysburg after midnight. Soon after, General Meade, accompanied by General Howard and myself, inspected



RELIEF MAP OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF GETTYSBURG, LOOKING SOUTH. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH OF A RELIEF MAP BY AMBROSE E. LEHMAN, C. E.

1. Chambersburg pike bridge over Willoughby Creek — beginning of the battle of the first day. 2. McPherson's farm and woods. 3. Railway cuts. 4. Seminary. 5. Oak Hill. 6. Carlisle Road. 7. Harrisburg Road bridge over

Rock Creek. 8. Hanover Road. 9. Wolf Hill. 10. Culp's Hill. 11. East Cemetery Hill. 12. Cemetery Hill. 13. Ziegler's Grove. 14. Meade's headquarters on the Taneytown Road. 15. Slocum's headquarters on Power's Hill.


16. Codori's. 17. Cemetery Ridge. 18. Little Round Top. 19. Round Top. 20. Devil's Den. 21. Wheat-field. 22. Trostle's farm. 23. Peach Orchard. 24. Seminary Ridge. 19 to 25. About extreme right of Longstreet's line.

our lines so far as then occupied, after which he directed me to examine them again in the morning, and to see that the artillery was properly posted. He had thus recognized my "command" of the artillery; indeed, he did not know it had been suspended. I resumed it, therefore, and continued it to the end of the battle.

At the close of July 1st Johnson's and Anderson's divisions of the Confederate army were up. Ewell's corps now covered our front from Benner's Hill to the Seminary, his line passing through the town—Johnson on the left, Early in the center, Rodes on the right. Hill's corps occupied Seminary Ridge, and during the next morning extended its line from the Seminary south nearly to the Peach Orchard on the Emmitsburg road; Trimble—*vice* Pender, wounded—on the left; Anderson on the right; Pettigrew—*vice* Heth, wounded—in reserve. Of Longstreet's corps, McLaws's division and Hood's—except Law's brigade not yet up—camped that night on Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg. His Reserve Artillery did not reach Gettysburg until 9 A. M. of the 2d. Pickett's division had been left at Chambersburg as rear-guard, and joined the corps on the night of the 2d.

It had not been General Lee's intention to deliver a general battle whilst so far from his base, unless attacked, but he now found himself by the mere force of circumstances committed to one. If it must take place, the sooner the better. His army was now nearly all on the ground, and delay, whilst it could not improve his own position, would certainly better that of his antagonist. Longstreet, indeed, urged General Lee instead of attacking to turn Meade's left, and by interposing between him and Washington and threatening his communications, to force him to attack the Confederate army in position; but General Lee probably saw that Meade would be under no such necessity; would have no great difficulty in obtaining supplies, and—disregarding the clamor from Washington—could play a waiting game, which it would be impossible for Lee to maintain in the open country. He could not advance on Baltimore or Washington with Meade in his rear, nor could his army subsist itself in a hostile region which would soon swarm with additional enemies. His communications could be cut off, for his recommendation to assemble even a small army at Culpeper to cover them and aid him had not been complied with.

A battle was a necessity to Lee, and a defeat would be more disastrous to Meade, and less so to himself, at Gettysburg than at any point east of it. With the defiles of the South Mountain range close in his rear, which could be easily held by a small force, a safe retreat through the Cumberland Valley was assured, so that his army, once through these passes, would be practically on the banks of the Potomac, at a point already prepared for crossing. Any position east of Gettysburg would deprive him of these advantages. It is more probable that General Lee was influenced by cool calculation of this nature than by hot blood, or that the opening success of a chance battle had thrown him off his balance. Whatever his reasons, he decided to accept the gage of battle offered by Meade, and to attack as soon as practicable. Ewell had made arrangements to take possession of Culp's Hill in the early morn-



GENERAL MEADE'S HEADQUARTERS ON THE TANEYTOWN ROAD. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

General Meade arrived at Cemetery Hill at one o'clock in the morning of July 2d, and after daylight established his headquarters in a small farm-house on the Taneytown road, little more than an eighth of a mile east of Hancock's line of battle, which was the Union center. In the afternoon of July 2d, headquarters be-

came the target of a heavy artillery fire which caused a scattering of officers and staffs and the headquarters signal corps. During the terrific cannonade which preceded Pickett's charge on July 3d, Meade's headquarters received a still greater storm of shot and shell, with the same result.—EDITORS.


ing, and his troops were under arms for the purpose by the time General Meade had finished the moonlight inspection of his lines, when it was ascertained by a reconnoitering party sent out by Johnson, that the hill was occupied, and its defenders on the alert; and further, from a captured dispatch from General Sykes to General Slocum, that the Fifth Corps was on the Hanover road only four miles off, and would march at 4 A. M. for Culp's Hill. Johnson thereupon deferred his attack and awaited Ewell's instructions.

General Lee had, however, during the night determined to attack the Federal left with Longstreet's corps, and now instructed Ewell, as soon as he heard Longstreet's guns, to make a diversion in his favor, to be converted, if opportunity offered, into a real attack.

Early on the morning of July 2d, when nearly all the Confederate army had reached Gettysburg or its immediate vicinity, a large portion of the Army of the Potomac was still on the road. The Second Corps and Sykes, with two divisions of the Fifth, arrived about 7 A. M., Crawford's division not joining until noon; Lockwood's brigade—two regiments from Baltimore—at 8; De Trobriand's and Burling's brigades of the Third Corps, from Emmitsburg, at 9, and the Artillery Reserve and its large ammunition trains from Taneytown at 10:30 A. M. Sedgwick's Sixth Corps, the largest in the army, after a long night march from Manchester, thirty-four miles distant, reached Rock Creek at 4 P. M. The rapidity with which the army was assembled was creditable to it and to its commander. The heat was oppressive, the long

marches, especially the night marches, were trying and had caused much straggling.

All this morning Meade was busily engaged personally or by his staff in rectifying his lines, assigning positions to the commands as they came up, watching the enemy, and studying the field, parts of which we have described in general terms. We now refer the reader to the map [p. 299] to aid our further description of some necessary even if tedious details. Near the western base of Cemetery Hill is Ziegler's Grove. From this grove the distance nearly due south to the base of Little Round Top is a mile and a half. A well-defined ridge known as Cemetery Ridge follows this line from Ziegler's for 900 yards to another small grove, or clump of trees, where it turns sharply to the east for 200 yards, then turns south again, and continues in a direct line toward Round Top, for 700 yards, to George Weikert's. So far the ridge is smooth and open, in full view of Seminary Ridge opposite, and distant from 1400 to 1600 yards. At Weikert's, this ridge is lost in a large body of rocks, hills, and woods, lying athwart the direct line to Round Top, and forcing a bend to the east in the Taneytown road. This rough space also stretches for a quarter of a mile or more *west* of this direct line, toward Plum Run. Toward the south it sinks into low marshy ground which reaches to the base of Little Round Top, half a mile or more from George Weikert's. The west side of this broken ground was wooded through its whole extent from north to south. Between this wood and Plum Run is an open cleared space 300 yards wide—a continuation of the open country in front of Cemetery Ridge; Plum Run flows south-easterly toward Little Round Top, then makes a bend to the south-west, where it receives a small stream or "branch" from Seminary Ridge. In the angle between these streams is Devil's Den, a bold, rocky height, steep on its eastern face, and prolonged as a ridge to the west. It is 500 yards due west of Little Round Top, and 100 feet lower. The northern extremity is composed of huge rocks and boulders, forming innumerable crevices and holes, from the largest of which the hill derives its name. Plum Run valley is here marshy but strewn with similar boulders, and the slopes of the Round Tops are covered with them. These afforded lurking-places for a multitude of Confederate sharp-shooters whom, from the difficulties of the ground, it was impossible to dislodge, and who were opposed by similar methods on our part; so that at the close of the battle these hiding-places, and especially the "Den" itself, were filled with dead and wounded men. This kind of warfare was specially destructive to Hazlett's battery on Round Top, as the cannoneers had to expose themselves in firing, and in one case three were shot in quick succession, before the fourth succeeded in discharging the piece. A cross-road connecting the Taneytown and Emmitsburg roads runs along the northern base of Devil's Den. From its Plum Run crossing to the Peach Orchard is 1100 yards. For the first 400 yards of this distance, there is a wood on the north and a wheat-field on the south of the road, beyond which the road continues for 700 yards to the Emmitsburg road along Devil's Den ridge, which slopes on the north to Plum Run, on the south to Plum Branch. From Ziegler's Grove the Emmitsburg road runs diago-



MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL E. SICKLES. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

nally across the interval between Cemetery and Seminary ridges, crossing the latter two miles from Ziegler's Grove. From Peach Orchard to Ziegler's is nearly a mile and a half. For half a mile the road runs along a ridge at right angles to that of Devil's Den, which slopes back to Plum Run. The angle at the Peach Orchard is thus formed by the intersection of two bold ridges, one from Devil's Den, the other along the Emmitsburg road. It is distant about 600 yards from the wood which skirts the whole length of Seminary Ridge and covers the movement of troops between it and Willoughby Run, half a mile beyond. South of

the Round Top and Devil's Den ridge the country is open, and the principal obstacles to free movement are the fences — generally of stone — which surround the numerous fields.

As our troops came up they were assigned to places on the line: the Twelfth Corps, General A. S. Williams, — *vice* Slocum, commanding the right wing, — to Culp's Hill, on Wadsworth's right; Second Corps to Cemetery Ridge — Hays's and Gibbon's divisions, from Ziegler's to the clump of trees, Caldwell's to the short ridge to its left and rear. This ridge had been occupied by the Third Corps, which was now directed to prolong Caldwell's line to Round Top, relieving Geary's division, which had been stationed during the night on the extreme left, with two regiments at the base of Little Round Top. The Fifth Corps was placed in reserve near the Rock Creek crossing of the Baltimore pike; the Artillery Reserve and its large trains were parked in a central position on a cross-road from the Baltimore pike to the Taneytown road; Buford's cavalry, except Merritt's brigade (then at Emmitsburg), was near Round Top, from which point it was ordered that morning to Westminster, thus uncovering our left flank; Kilpatrick's and Gregg's divisions

were well out on the right flank, from which, after a brush with Stuart on the evening of the 2d, Kilpatrick was sent next morning to replace Buford, Merritt being also ordered up to our left.

The morning was a busy and in some respects an anxious one; it was believed that the whole Confederate army was assembled, that it was equal if not superior to our own in numbers, and that the battle would commence before our troops were up. There was a gap in Slocum's line awaiting a division of infantry, and as some demonstrations of Ewell about daylight indicated an immediate attack at that point, I had to draw batteries from other parts of the line—for the Artillery Reserve was just then starting from Taneytown—to cover it until it could be properly filled. Still there was no hostile movement of the enemy, and General Meade directed Slocum to hold himself in readiness to attack Ewell with the Fifth and Twelfth, so soon as the Sixth Corps should arrive. After an examination Slocum reported the ground as unfavorable, in which Warren concurred and advised against an attack there. The project was then abandoned, and Meade postponed all offensive operations until the enemy's intentions should be more clearly developed. In the meantime he took precautionary measures. It was clearly now to his advantage to fight the battle where he was, and he had some apprehension that Lee would attempt to turn his flank and threaten his communications,—just what Longstreet had been advising. In this case it might be necessary to fall back to the Pipe Creek line, if possible, or else to follow Lee's movement into the open country. In either case, or in that of a forced withdrawal, prudence dictated that arrangements should be made in advance, and General Meade gave instructions for examining the roads and communications, and to draw up an order of movement, which General Butterfield, the chief-of-staff, seems to have considered an order absolute for the withdrawal of the army without a battle.

These instructions must have been given early in the morning, for General Butterfield states that it was on his arrival from Taneytown, which place he left at daylight. An order was drawn up accordingly, given to the adjutant-general, and perhaps prepared for issue in case of necessity to corps commanders; but it was not recorded nor issued, nor even a copy of it preserved. General Meade declared that he never contemplated the issue of such an order unless contingencies made it necessary; and his acts and dispatches during the day were in accordance with his statement. There is one circumstance pertaining to my own duties which to my mind is conclusive, and I relate it because it may have contributed to the idea that General Meade intended to withdraw from Gettysburg. He came to me that morning before the Artillery Reserve had arrived, and, therefore, about the time that the order was in course of preparation, and informed me that one of the army corps had left its whole artillery ammunition train behind it, and that others were also deficient, notwithstanding his orders on that subject. He was very much disturbed, and feared that, taking into account the large expenditure of the preceding day by the First and Eleventh corps, there would not be sufficient to carry us through the battle. This was not the first nor the last

PEACH ORCHARD
(BACKGROUND).

WHEAT-FIELD
(MIDDLE-GROUND).


TROSTLE'S
(MIDDLE-GROUND).

ROGERS'S
(BACKGROUND).

CODORI'S
(BACKGROUND).

CEMETERY HILL
(BACKGROUND).


DEVIL'S DEN.



Looking across the valley of death,
from Little Round-Top.

VIEW FROM THE POSITION OF HAZLETT'S BATTERY ON LITTLE ROUND TOP. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.

The monument marks the position of the 91st Pennsylvania of Weed's brigade [see p. 315]. The Emmitsburg road passes the Peach Orchard, Rogers's, and Codori's; the latter's buildings broke the center of Pickett's lines as they charged upon the ridge between Cemetery Hill and Little Round Top.—EDITORS.




time that I was called upon to meet deficiencies under such circumstances, and I was, therefore, prepared for this, having directed General Tyler, commanding the Artillery Reserve, whatever else he might leave behind, to bring up every round of ammunition in his trains, and I knew he would not fail me. Moreover, I had previously, on my own responsibility, and unknown to General Hooker, formed a special ammunition column attached to the Artillery Reserve, carrying twenty rounds per gun, over and above the authorized

amount, for every gun in the army, in order to meet such emergencies. I was, therefore, able to assure General Meade that there would be enough ammunition for the battle, but none for idle cannonades, the besetting sin of some of our commanders. He was much relieved, and expressed his satisfaction. Now, had he had at this time any intention of withdrawing the army, the first thing to get rid of would have been this Artillery Reserve and its large trains, which were then blocking the roads in our rear; and he would surely have told me of it.

Still, with the exception of occasional cannonading, and some skirmishing near the Peach Orchard, the quiet remained unbroken, although Lee had

determined upon an early attack on our left. He says in his detailed report that our line extended "upon the high ground along the Emmitsburg road, with a steep ridge



[Cemetery] in rear, which was also occupied"; and in a previous "outline" report he says: "In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position [the salient angle at the Peach Orchard] from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our artillery could be

used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to gain the crest of the ridge." It would appear from this that General Lee mistook the few troops on the Peach Orchard ridge in the morning for our main line, and that by taking it and sweeping up the Emmitsburg road under cover of his batteries, he expected to "roll up" our lines to Cemetery Hill. That would be an "oblique order of battle," in which the attacking line, formed obliquely to its opponent, marches directly forward, constantly breaking in the *end* of his enemy's line and gaining his rear. General Longstreet was ordered to form the divisions of Hood and McLaws on Anderson's right, so as to envelop our left and drive it in. These divisions were only three miles off at day-



UNION BREASTWORKS ON LITTLE ROUND TOP—BIG ROUND TOP IN THE DISTANCE. FROM WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPHS.

light, and moved early, but there was great delay in forming them for battle, owing principally to the absence of Law's brigade, for which it would have been well to substitute Anderson's fresh division, which could have been replaced by Pettigrew's, then in reserve. There seems to have been no good reason why the attack should not have been made by 8 or 9 A. M. at the latest (but see p. 351), when the Federal Third Corps was not yet all up, nor Crawford's division, nor the Artillery Reserve, nor the Sixth Corps, and our lines were still very incomplete. This is one of the cheap criticisms after all the facts on both sides are known; but it is apt for its purpose, as it shows how great a risk Meade took in abandoning his Pipe Creek line for Gettysburg on the chances of Lee's army not yet being assembled; and also, that there was no lack of boldness and decision on Meade's part. Indeed, his course, from the hour that he took command, had been marked by these qualities.

A suggestive incident is worth recording here. In the course of my inspection of the lines that morning, while passing along Culp's Hill, I found the men hard at work intrenching, and in such fine spirits as at once to attract attention. One of them finally dropped his work, and, approaching me, inquired if the reports just received were true. On asking what he referred to, he replied that twice word had been passed along the line that General McClellan had been assigned to the command of the army, and the second time it was added that he was on the way to the field and might soon be expected. He continued, "The boys are all jubilant over it, for they know that if *he* takes command everything will go right." I have been told recently by the commander of a Fifth Corps battery that during the forced march of the preceding night the same report ran through that corps, excited great enthusiasm amongst the men, and renewed their vigor. It was probably from this corps—just arrived—that the report had spread along the line. †

On my return to headquarters from this inspection General Meade told me that General Sickles, then with him, wished me to examine a new line, as he thought that assigned to him was not a good one, especially that he could not use his artillery there. I had been as far as Round Top that morning, and had noticed the unfavorable character of the ground, and, therefore, I accompanied Sickles direct to the Peach Orchard, where he pointed out the ridges, already described, as his proposed line. They commanded all the ground behind, as well as in front of them, and together constituted a favorable position for *the enemy* to hold. This was one good reason for our taking possession of it. It would, it is true, in our hands present a salient angle, which generally exposes both its sides to enfilade fires; but here the ridges were so high that each would serve as a "traverse" for the other, and reduce that evil to a minimum. On the other hand it would so greatly lengthen

† Lieutenant O. S. Barrett, in a pamphlet sketch of the "Old Fourth Michigan Infantry" [Detroit, 1888], relates a similar occurrence in the Second Corps. He says:

"We arrived at Hanover, Pennsylvania, on the afternoon of July 1st. . . . An aide-de-camp

came riding along, saying, 'Boys, keep up good courage, McClellan is in command of the army again.' Instantly the space above was filled with the hats and caps of the gratified soldiers. . . . I knew this was untrue myself, but it served its purpose, as intended."—EDITORS.

our line—which in any case must rest on Round Top, and connect with the left of the Second Corps—as to require a larger force than the Third Corps alone to hold it, and it would be difficult to occupy and strengthen the angle if the enemy already held the wood in its front. At my instance General Sickles ordered a reconnoissance to ascertain if the wood was occupied.

About this time a cannonade was opened on Cemetery Hill, which indicated an attack there, and as I had examined the Emmitsburg Ridge, I said I

would not await the result of the reconnoissance but return to headquarters by way of Round Top, and examine that part of the proposed line. As I was leaving, General Sickles asked me if he should move forward his corps. I answered, "Not on my authority; I will report to General Meade for his instructions." I had not reached the wheat-field when a sharp rattle of musketry showed that the enemy held the wood in front of the Peach Orchard angle.

As I rode back a view from that direction showed how much farther Peach Orchard was to the front of the direct line than it appeared from the orchard itself. In fact there was a



COLONEL EDWARD E. CROSS, COMMANDING THE FIRST BRIGADE OF CALDWELL'S DIVISION, KILLED NEAR DEVIL'S DEN, JULY 2. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

third line between them, which appeared, as seen from the orchard, to be continuous with Cemetery Ridge, but was nearly six hundred yards in front of it. This is the open ground east of Plum Run already described, and which may be called the Plum Run line. Its left where it crosses the run abuts rather on Devil's Den than Round Top; it was commanded by the much higher Peach Orchard crests, and was therefore not an eligible line to occupy, although it became of importance during the battle.

As to the other two lines, the choice between them would depend on circumstances. The direct short line through the woods, and including the Round Tops, could be occupied, intrenched, and made impregnable to a front attack. But, like that of Culp's Hill, it would be a purely defensive one, from which, owing to the nature of the ground and the enemy's commanding position on the ridges at the angle, an advance in force would be impracticable. The salient line proposed by General Sickles, although much longer, afforded excellent positions for our artillery; its occupation would cramp the movements of the enemy, bring us nearer his lines, and afford us facilities for taking the offensive. It was in my judgment tactically the better line of the two, provided it were strongly occupied, for it was the only one on the field from which we could have passed from the defensive to the offensive with a prospect of decisive results. But General Meade had not, until the arrival of the Sixth Corps, a sufficient number of troops at his disposal to risk such an

extension of his lines; it would have required both the Third and the Fifth corps, and left him without any reserve. Had he known that Lee's attack would be postponed until 4 P. M., he might have occupied this line in the morning; but he did not know this, expected an attack at any moment, and, in view of the vast interests involved, adopted a defensive policy, and ordered the occupation of the *safe* line. In taking risks, it would not be for his army alone, but also for Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington. Gettysburg was not a good strategical position for us, and the circumstances under which our army was assembled limited us tactically to a strictly defensive battle. But even a strictly defensive battle gained here would be, in its results, almost as valuable as an offensive one with a brilliant victory, since it would necessarily be decisive as to both the campaign and the invasion, and its moral effect abroad and at home, North and South, would be of vast importance in a political as well as a military sense. The additional risks of an offensive battle were out of all proportion to the prospective gains. The decision then to fight a defensive rather than an offensive battle, to look rather to solid than to brilliant results, was wise.


After finishing my examination I returned to headquarters and briefly reported to General Meade that the proposed line was a good one in itself, that it offered favorable positions for artillery, but that its



WEED'S POSITION ON LITTLE ROUND TOP, LOOKING IN THE DIRECTION OF THE PEACH ORCHARD. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

relations to other lines were such that I could not advise it, and suggested that he examine it himself before ordering its occupation. He nodded assent, and I proceeded to Cemetery Hill.

The cannonade there still continued; it had been commenced by the enemy, and was accompanied by some movements of troops toward our right. As soon as I saw that it would lead to nothing serious, I returned direct to the Peach Orchard, knowing that its occupation would require large reënforcements of artillery. I was here met by Captain Randolph, the corps chief of artillery, who informed me that he had been ordered to place his batteries on the new line. Seeing Generals Meade and Sickles, not far off, in conversation, and supposing that General Meade had consented to the occupation, I sent at once to the reserve for more artillery, and authorized other general officers to draw on the same source. Here, perhaps, I may be allowed to say *en passant* that this large reserve, organized by the wise forethought of General McClellan, sometimes threatened with destruction, and once actually broken up, was often,



GENERAL G. K. WARREN AT THE SIGNAL STATION ON LITTLE ROUND TOP.
FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

as at Malvern Hill, and now at Gettysburg, an invaluable resource in the time of greatest need. When in 1864, in the Rapidan campaign, it was "got rid of," it reconstituted itself, without orders, and in a few weeks, through the necessities of the army, showing that "principles vindicate themselves."

When I arrived Birney's division was already posted on the crest, from Devil's Den to the Peach Orchard, and along the Emmitsburg road, Ward's brigade on the left, Graham's at the angle, De Trobriand's connecting them by a thin line. Humphreys's division was on Graham's right, near the Emmitsburg road, Carr's brigade in the front line, about the Smith house, Brewster's in second line. Burling's, with the exception of Sewell's 5th New Jersey Regiment, then in skirmish order at the front, was sent to reënforce Birney. Seeley's battery, at first posted on the right, was soon after sent to the left of the Smith house, and replaced on the right by Turnbull's from the Artillery Reserve. Randolph had ordered Smith's battery, 4th New York, to the rocky hill at the Devil's Den; Winslow's to the wheat-field. He had placed Clark on the crest looking south, and his own ("E," 1st Rhode Island) near the angle, facing west. The whole corps was, however, too weak to cover the ground, and it was too late for Meade to withdraw it. Sykes's Fifth Corps had already been ordered up and was momentarily expected. As soon as fire opened, which was just as he arrived on the ground, General Meade also sent for Caldwell's division from Cemetery Ridge, and a division of the Twelfth Corps from Culp's, and soon after for troops from the Sixth Corps. McGilvery's artillery brigade soon arrived from the reserve, and Bigelow's, Phillips's, Hart's, Ames's, and Thompson's batteries had been ordered into position on the crests, when the enemy opened from a long line of guns, stretching down to the crossing of the Emmitsburg pike. Smith's position at Devil's Den gave him a favorable oblique fire on a

part of this line, and as he did not reply I proceeded to the Den. Finding the acclivity steep and rocky, I dismounted and tied my horse to a tree before crossing the valley. My rank, brigadier-general, the command being that of a lieutenant-general, gave me a very small and insufficient staff, and even this had been recently cut down. The inspector of artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Warner, adjutant-general, Captain Craig, my only aide, Lieutenant Bissell, my one orderly, and even the flag-bearer necessary to indicate my presence to those seeking me, were busy conveying orders or messages, and I was alone; a not infrequent and an awkward thing for a general who had to keep up communications with every part of a battle-field and with the general-in-chief. On climbing to the summit, I found that Smith had just got his guns, one by one, over the rocks and chasms, into an excellent position. After pointing out to me the advancing lines of the enemy, he opened, and very effectively. Many guns were immediately turned on him, relieving so far the rest of the line. Telling him that he would probably lose his battery, I left to seek infantry



BRIGADIER-GENERAL STRONG VINCENT, MORTALLY WOUNDED, JULY 2, IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE ROUND TOPS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL STEPHEN H. WEED, COMMANDING THE THIRD BRIGADE OF AYRES'S DIVISION, KILLED JULY 2. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

General Weed was picked off by sharp-shooters at Devil's Den soon after getting his brigade in position on Little Round Top.—EDITORS.

supports, very doubtful if I would find my horse, for the storm of shell bursting over the place was enough to drive any animal wild. On reaching the foot of the cliff, I found myself in a plight at once ludicrous, painful, and dangerous. A herd of horned cattle had been driven into the valley between Devil's Den and Round Top, from which they could not escape. A shell had exploded in the body of one of them, tearing it to pieces; others were torn and wounded. All were *stampeded*, and were bellowing and rushing in their terror, first to one side and then to the other, to escape the shells that were bursting over them and among them. Cross I must, and in doing so I had my most trying experience of that battle-field. Luckily the poor beasts were as much frightened as I was, but their rage was subdued by



TROSTLE'S FARM, THE SCENE OF THE FIGHTING BY BIGELOW'S NINTH MASSACHUSETTS BATTERY.
FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

terror, and they were good enough to let me pass through scot-free, but "badly demoralized." However, my horse was safe, I mounted, and in the busy excitement that followed almost forgot my scare.

It was not until about 4 p. m. that Longstreet got his two divisions into position in two lines, McLaws's on the right of Anderson's division of Hill's corps, and opposite the Peach Orchard; Hood's on the extreme Confederate right and crossing the Emmitsburg road. Hood had been ordered, keeping his left on that road, to break in the end of our line, supposed to be at the orchard; but perceiving that our left was "refused" (bent back toward Devil's Den), and noticing the importance of Round Top, he suggested to Longstreet that the



TROSTLE'S HOUSE, SCENE OF THE FIGHTING OF BIGELOW'S BATTERY. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

latter be turned and attacked [see p. 322]. The reply was that General Lee's orders were to attack along the Emmitsburg road. Again Hood sent his message and received the same reply, notwithstanding which he directed Law's brigade upon Round Top, in which movement a portion of Robertson's brigade joined; the rest of the division was thrown upon Devil's Den and the ridge between it and the Peach Orchard. The first assaults were repulsed, but after hard fighting, McLaws's division being also advanced, toward 6 o'clock the angle was broken in, after a resolute defense and with great loss on both sides. In the meantime three of Anderson's brigades were advancing on Humphreys, and the latter received orders from Birney, now in command of the corps (Sickles having been severely wounded soon after 6 o'clock near the Trostle house), to throw back his left, form an oblique line in his rear, and connect with the right of Birney's division, then retiring. The junction was not effected, and Humphreys, greatly outnumbered, slowly and skillfully fell back to Cemetery Ridge, Gibbon sending two regiments and Brown's Rhode Island battery to his support. But the enemy was strong and covered the whole Second Corps front, now greatly weakened by detachments. Wilcox's, Perry's, and Wright's Confederate brigades pressed up to the ridge, outflanking Humphreys's right and left, and Wright broke through our line and seized the guns in his front, but was soon driven out, and not being supported they all fell back, about dusk, under a heavy artillery fire.

As soon as Longstreet's attack commenced, General Warren was sent by General Meade to see to the condition of the extreme left. The duty could not have been intrusted to better hands. Passing along the lines he found Little Round Top, the key of the position, unoccupied except by a signal station. The enemy at the time lay concealed, awaiting the signal for assault, when a shot fired in their direction caused a sudden movement on their part which, by the gleam of reflected sunlight from their bayonets, revealed their long lines outflanking the position. Fully comprehending the imminent danger, Warren sent to General Meade for a division.¹ The enemy was already



MONUMENT OF BIGELOW'S NINTH MASSACHUSETTS BATTERY. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1886.

¹ Before the Committee on the Conduct of the War General Warren testified that he went to Little Round Top "by General Meade's direction." In a letter dated July 13th, 1872, General Warren says:

"Just before the action began in earnest, on July 2d, I was with General Meade, near General Sickles, whose troops seemed very badly disposed on that part of the field. At my suggestion, General Meade sent me to the left to examine the condition of affairs, and I continued on till I reached Little Round Top. There were no troops on it, and it was used as a signal station. I saw that this was the key of the whole position, and that our troops in the woods in front of it could not see the ground in front of them, so that the enemy would come upon them before they would be aware of it. The

long line of woods on the west side of the Emmitsburg road (which road was along a ridge) furnished an excellent place for the enemy to form out of sight, so I requested the captain of a rifle battery just in front of Little Round Top to fire a shot into these woods. He did so, and as the shot went whistling through the air the sound of it reached the enemy's troops and caused every one to look in the direction of it. This motion revealed to me the glistening of gun-barrels and bayonets of the enemy's line of battle, already formed and far outflanking the position of any of our troops; so that the line of his advance from his right to Little Round Top was unopposed. I have been particular in telling this, as the discovery was intensely thrilling to my feelings, and almost appalling. I immediately sent a hastily written dispatch to General Meade to send a division at

detached from the latter and hurried them to the summit [see p. 298]. The passage of the six guns through the roadless woods and amongst the rocks was marvelous. Under ordinary circumstances it would have been consid-



COLONEL GEORGE L. WILLARD, COMMANDING THE THIRD BRIGADE OF HAYS'S DIVISION, KILLED ON JULY 2. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

ered an impossible feat, but the eagerness of the men to get into action with their comrades of the infantry, and the skillful driving, brought them without delay to the very summit, where they went immediately into battle. They were barely in time, for the enemy were also climbing the hill. A close and bloody hand-to-hand struggle ensued, which left both Round Tops in our possession. Weed and Hazlett were killed, and Vincent was mortally wounded — all young men of great promise. Weed had served with much distinction as an artillerist in the Peninsular, Second Bull Run, and Antietam campaigns, had become chief of artillery of his army corps, and at Chancellorsville showed

such special aptitude and fitness for large artillery commands that he was immediately promoted from captain to brigadier-general and transferred to the infantry. Hazlett was killed whilst bending over his former chief, to receive his last message. Lieutenant Rittenhouse efficiently commanded the battery during the remainder of the battle.

The enemy, however, clung to the woods and rocks at the base of Round Top, carried Devil's Den and its woods, and captured three of Smith's guns, who, however, effectively deprived the enemy of their use by carrying off all the implements.

The breaking in of the Peach Orchard angle exposed the flanks of the batteries on its crests, which retired firing, in order to cover the retreat of the infantry. Many guns of different batteries had to be abandoned because of the destruction of their




BRIGADIER-GENERAL SAMUEL K. ZOOK, COMMANDING THE THIRD BRIGADE OF CALDWELL'S DIVISION, KILLED IN THE "WHEAT-FIELD" JULY 2. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

struck, who, on hearing my few words of explanation about the position, moved at once to the hill-top. About this time First Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett of the Fifth Artillery, with his battery of rifled cannon, arrived. He comprehended the situation instantly and planted a gun on the summit of the hill. He spoke to the effect that though he could do little execution on the enemy with his guns, he could aid in giving confidence to the infantry, and that his battery was of no consequence

whatever compared with holding the position. He staid there till he was killed. I was wounded with a musket-ball while talking with Lieutenant Hazlett on the hill, but not seriously; and, seeing the position saved while the whole line to the right and front of us was yielding and melting away under the enemy's fire and advance, I left the hill to rejoin General Meade near the center of the field, where a new crisis was at hand."

EDITORS.



VIEW OF CULP'S HILL FROM THE POSITION OF THE BATTERIES NEAR THE CEMETERY GATE. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.
 1. Position of Stevens's 5th Maine Battery which enfiladed Early's division in the charge upon East Cemetery Hill. 2. Left of the line of field-works on Culp's Hill. 3. Position of the 33d Massachusetts behind the fence of a lane where the left of the Confederate charge was repulsed.—EDITORS.

horses and men; many were hauled off by hand; all the batteries lost heavily. Bigelow's 9th Massachusetts made a stand close by the Trostle house in the corner of the field through which he had retired fighting with prolonges fixed. Although already much cut up, he was directed by McGilvery to hold that point at all hazards until a line of artillery could be formed in front of the wood beyond Plum Run; that is, on what we have called the "Plum Run line." This line was formed by collecting the serviceable batteries, and fragments of batteries, that were brought off, with which, and Dow's Maine battery fresh from the reserve, the pursuit was checked. Finally some twenty-five guns formed a solid mass, which unsupported by infantry held this part of the line, aided General Humphreys's movements, and covered by its fire the abandoned guns until they could be brought off, as all were, except perhaps one. When, after accomplishing its purpose, all that was left of Bigelow's battery was withdrawn, it was closely pressed by Colonel Humphreys's 21st Mississippi, the only Confederate regiment which succeeded in crossing the run. His men had entered the battery and fought hand-to-hand with the cannoneers; one was killed whilst trying to spike a gun, and another knocked down with a handspike whilst endeavoring to drag off a prisoner. The battery went into action with 104 officers and men. Of the four battery officers one was killed,


another mortally, and a third, Captain Bigelow, severely wounded. Of 7 sergeants, 2 were killed and 4 wounded; or a total of 28 men, including 2 missing; and 65 out of 88 horses were killed or wounded. As the battery had sacrificed itself for the safety of the line, its work is specially noticed as typical of the service that artillery is not infrequently called upon to render, and did render in other instances at Gettysburg besides this one.

When Sickles was wounded General Meade directed Hancock to take command of the Third as well as his own corps, which he again turned over to Gibbon. About 7:15 p. m. the field was in a critical condition. Birney's division was now broken up; Humphreys's was slowly falling back, under cover of McGilvery's guns; Anderson's line was advancing. On its right, Barksdale's brigade, except the 21st Mississippi, was held in check only by McGilvery's artillery, to whose support Hancock now brought up Willard's brigade of the Second Corps. Placing the 39th New York in reserve, Willard with his other three regiments charged Barksdale's brigade and drove it back nearly to the Emmitsburg road, when he was himself repulsed by a heavy artillery and infantry fire, and fell back to his former position near the sources of Plum Run. In this affair Willard was killed and Barksdale mortally wounded. Meanwhile the 21st Mississippi crossed the run from the neighborhood of the Trostle house, and drove out the men of Watson's battery ("I," 5th United States), on the extreme left of McGilvery's line, but was in turn driven off by the 39th New York, led by Lieutenant Peeples of the battery, musket in hand, who thus recovered his guns, Watson being severely wounded.



EARLY'S CHARGE ON THE EVENING OF JULY 2 UPON EAST CEMETERY HILL.

Birney's division once broken, it was difficult to stem the tide of defeat. Hood's and McLaws's divisions—excepting Barksdale's brigade—compassed the Devil's Den and its woods, and as the Federal reinforcements from other corps came piecemeal, they were beaten in detail until by successive accretions they greatly outnumbered their opponents, who had all the advantages of position, when the latter in turn retired, but were not pursued. This fighting was confined almost wholly to the woods and wheat-field between the Peach Orchard and Little Round Top, and the great number of brigade and regimental commanders, as well as of inferior officers and soldiers, killed and wounded on both sides, bears testimony to its close and desperate character. General Meade was on the ground active in bringing up and putting in reinforcements, and in doing so had his horse shot under him. At the close of the day the Confederates held the base of the Round Tops, Devil's Den, its woods, and the Emmitsburg road, with skirmishers thrown out as



CONFEDERATE SKIRMISHERS AT THE FOOT OF CULP'S HILL.

far as the Trostle house; the Federals had the two Round Tops, the Plum Run line, and Cemetery Ridge. During the night the Plum Run line, except the wood on its left front (occupied by McCandless's brigade, Crawford's division, his other brigade being on Big Round Top), was abandoned; the Third Corps was massed to the left and rear of Caldwell's division, which had reoccupied its short ridge, with McGilvery's artillery on its crest. The Fifth Corps remained on and about Round Top, and a division [Ruger's] which had been detached from the Twelfth Corps returned to Culp's Hill.

When Longstreet's guns were heard, Ewell opened a cannonade, which after an hour's firing was overpowered by the Federal artillery on Cemetery Hill. Johnson's division then advanced, and found only one brigade—Greene's—of the Twelfth Corps in position, the others having been sent to the aid of Sickles at the Peach Orchard. Greene fought with skill and determination for two or three hours, and, reënforced by seven or eight hundred men of the First and Eleventh corps, succeeded in holding his own intrenchments, the enemy taking possession of the abandoned works of Geary and Ruger. This brought Johnson's troops near the Baltimore pike, but the darkness prevented their seeing or profiting by the advantage then within their reach. When Ruger's division returned from Round Top, and Geary's from Rock Creek, they found Johnson in possession of their intrenchments, and immediately prepared to drive him out at daylight.

It had been ordered that when Johnson engaged Culp's Hill, Early and Rodes should assault Cemetery Hill. Early's attack was made with great spirit, by Hoke's and Avery's brigades, Gordon's being in reserve; the hill was ascended through the wide ravine between Cemetery and Culp's hills, a line of infantry on the slopes was broken, and Wiedrich's Eleventh Corps and Ricketts's reserve batteries near the brow of the hill were overrun; but the

excellent position of Stevens's 12-pounders at the head of the ravine, which enabled him to sweep it, the arrival of Carroll's brigade sent unasked by Hancock,—a happy inspiration, as this line had been weakened to send supports both to Greene and Sickles,—and the failure of Rodes to coöperate with Early, caused the attack to miscarry. The cannoneers of the two batteries, so summarily ousted, rallied and recovered their guns by a vigorous attack—with pistols by those who had them, by others with handspikes, rammers, stones, and even fence-rails—the “Dutchmen” showing that they were in no way inferior to their “Yankee” comrades, who had been taunting them ever since Chancellorsville. After an hour's desperate fighting the enemy was driven out with heavy loss, Avery being among the killed. At the close of this second day a consultation of corps commanders was held at Meade's headquarters. I was not present, although summoned, but was informed that the vote was unanimous to hold our lines and to await an attack for at least one day before taking the offensive, and Meade so decided. [Continuation on p. 369.]

THE COUNCIL OF WAR ON THE SECOND DAY.†

BY JOHN GIBBON, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.

SOON after all firing had ceased a staff-officer from army headquarters met General Hancock and myself and summoned us both to General Meade's headquarters, where a council was to be held. We at once proceeded there, and soon after our arrival all the corps commanders were assembled in the little front room of the Liester House—Newton, who had been assigned to the command of the First Corps over Doubleday, his senior; Hancock, Second; Birney, Third; Sykes, Fifth; Sedgwick, who had arrived during the day with the Sixth, after a long march from Manchester; Howard, Eleventh; and Slocum, Twelfth, besides General Meade, General Butterfield, chief of staff; Warren, chief of engineers; A. S. Williams, Twelfth Corps, and myself, Second. It will be seen that two corps were doubly represented, the Second by Hancock and myself, and the Twelfth by Slocum and Williams. These twelve were all assembled in a little room not more than ten or twelve feet square, with a bed in one corner, a small table on one side, and a chair or two. Of course all could not sit down; some did, some lounged on the bed, and some stood up, while Warren, tired out and suffering from a wound in the neck, where a piece of shell had struck him, lay down in the corner of the room and went sound asleep, and I don't think heard any of the proceedings.

The discussion was at first very informal and in the shape of conversation, during which each one made comments on the fight and told what he knew of the condition of affairs. In the course of this discussion Newton expressed the opinion that “this was no place to fight a battle in.” General Newton was an officer of engineers (since chief-engineer of the army), and was rated by me, and I suppose most others, very highly as a soldier. The assertion, therefore, coming from such a source, rather

startled me, and I eagerly asked what his objections to the position were. The objections he stated, as I recollect them, related to some minor details of the line, of which I knew nothing except so far as my own front was concerned, and with those I was satisfied; but the prevailing impression seemed to be that the place for the battle had been in a measure selected for us. Here we are; now what is the best thing to do? It soon became evident that everybody was in favor of remaining where we were and giving battle there. General Meade himself said very little, except now and then to make some comment, but I cannot recall that he expressed any decided opinion upon any point, preferring apparently to listen to the conversation. After the discussion had lasted some time, Butterfield suggested that it would, perhaps, be well to formulate the question to be asked, and General Meade assenting he took a piece of paper, on which he had been making some memoranda, and wrote down a question; when he had done he read it off and formally proposed it to the council.

I had never been a member of a council of war before (nor have I been since) and did not feel very confident I was properly a member of this one; but I had engaged in the discussion, and found myself (Warren being asleep) the junior member in it. By the custom of war the junior member votes first, as on courts-martial; and when Butterfield read off his question, the substance of which was, “Should the army remain in its present position or take up some other?” he addressed himself first to me for an answer. To say “Stay and fight” was to ignore the objections made by General Newton, and I therefore answered somewhat in this way: “Remain here, and make such correction in our position as may be deemed necessary, but take no step which even looks like retreat.” The question was put to

† Taken by permission from the “Philadelphia Weekly Press” of July 6th, 1887, and condensed.—EDITORS.

each member and his answer taken down, and when it came to Newton, who was the first in rank, he voted in pretty much the same way as I did, and we had some playful sparring as to whether he agreed with me or I with him; the rest voted to remain.

The next question written by Butterfield was, "Should the army attack or wait the attack of the enemy?" I voted not to attack, and all the others voted substantially the same way; and on the third question, "How long shall we wait?" I voted, "Until Lee moved." The answers to this last question showed the only material variation in the opinion of the members.

When the voting was over General Meade said quietly, but decidedly, "Such then is the decision"; and certainly he said nothing which produced a doubt in my mind as to his being perfectly in accord with the members of the council.

In 1881 (eighteen years after the battle) I was shown in Philadelphia, by General Meade's son [Colonel George Meade], a paper found amongst General Meade's effects after his death. It was folded, and on the outside of one end was written, in his well-known handwriting, in ink, "Minutes of Council, July 2d, '63." On opening it, the following was found written in pencil in a handwriting [General Daniel Butterfield's] unknown to me:

Minutes of Council, July 2d, 1863.

Page 1, Questions asked:

1. Under existing circumstances is it advisable for this army to remain in its present position, or to retire to another nearer its base of supplies?
2. It being determined to remain in present position, shall the army attack or wait the attack of the enemy?
3. If we wait attack, how long?

Page 2, Replies.

- Gibbon: 1. Correct position of the army, but would not retreat. 2. In no condition to attack, in his opinion. 3. Until he moves.
- Williams: 1. Stay. 2. Wait attack. 3. One day.
- Birney: Same as General Williams.
- Sykes: " " "
- Newton: 1. Correct position of the army, but would not retreat. 2. By all means not attack. 3. If we wait it will give them a chance to cut our line.

Page 3.

- Howard: 1. Remain. 2. Wait attack until 4 P. M. tomorrow. 3. If don't attack, attack them.

‡ The words in *italics*, noted as illegible in the "Official Records," have been deciphered on a careful examination of the original document deposited by Colonel George Meade with the Penn. Hist. Society.—EDITORS.

Hancock: 1. Rectify position without moving so as to give up field. 2. Not attack unless our communications are cut. 3. Can't wait long; can't be idle.

Sedgwick: 1. Remain. [2.] and wait attack. [3.] At least one day.

Slocum: Stay and fight it out.

[On the back, or first page of the sheet]:

Slocum stay and fight it out. Newton thinks it a bad position; Hancock puzzled about practicability of retiring; thinks by holding on *inviting* † to mass forces and attack. Howard favor of not retiring. Birney don't know. Third Corps used up and not in good condition to fight. Sedgwick *doubtful whether we ought to attack.* ‡ Effective strength about 9000, 12,500, 9000, 6000, 8500, 6000, 7000. Total, 58,000.

[Endorsement:]

Minutes of Council, held Thursday, P. M., July 2d, 1863. D. B., M. G., C. of S. [Daniel Butterfield, Major-General, Chief of Staff].

The memoranda at the bottom of the paper were doubtless made while the discussion was going on, and the numbers at the foot refer probably to the effective strength of each corps. †

Several times during the sitting of the council reports were brought to General Meade, and now and then we could hear heavy firing going on over on the right of our line. I took occasion before leaving to say to General Meade that his staff-officer had regularly summoned me as a corps commander to the council, although I had some doubts about being present. He answered, pleasantly, "That is all right. I wanted you here."

Before I left the house Meade made a remark to me which surprised me a good deal, especially when I look back upon the occurrence of the next day. By a reference to the votes in council it will be seen that the majority of the members were in favor of acting on the defensive and awaiting the action of Lee. In referring to the matter, just as the council broke up, Meade said to me, "If Lee attacks to-morrow, it will be in *your front*." I asked him why he thought so, and he replied, "Because he has made attacks on both our flanks and failed, and if he concludes to try it again it will be on our center." I expressed the hope that he would, and told General Meade, with confidence, that if he did we would defeat him.

‡ A careful study of the original suggests that these notes "at the bottom" (on the back) were made *before* the questions were formulated. See p. 313.

EDITORS.

THE 20TH MAINE AT LITTLE ROUND TOP. †

BY H. S. MELCHER, 20TH MAINE REGIMENT.

THE Confederate force designated to take possession of Little Round Top appears to have been Robertson's brigade, consisting of the 1st, 4th, and 5th Texas and the 3d Arkansas; and Law's brigade, consisting of the 4th, 44th, 48th, 47th, and 15th Alabama, both of Hood's division. The former was to assault in front, while Law's brigade was to attack in the rear of the hill [see p. 318]; but Robertson, finding he could not cover the entire front with his brigade, detached the

44th, 48th, and 4th Alabama from Law's brigade about the time they arrived at the foot of Round Top in their advance and connected them with Robertson's line, then well in front of Little Round Top. This left the 47th and 15th Alabama to carry out the flanking movement alone, which they did, passing up the southern side of Round Top, and halting some ten minutes on the crest for rest. This halt proved fatal to the success of their undertaking, as it enabled our brigade (Vincent's)

† Condensed from the "Lincoln County News," Waldoboro, Maine, March 13th, 1885.—EDITORS.

to reach Little Round Top in time to resist their advance. \

Resuming their march, these two regiments passed down the north-easterly side of Round Top and advanced across the wooded depression between the hills to charge up the rear of Little Round Top and sweep off Vincent's brigade, then fiercely engaged with Robertson's Texans and the three regiments of Law's brigade that had been assigned to his command, who were trying to get possession from the front. But just here these two Alabama regiments met the 20th Maine, which was the left regiment of Vincent's brigade, and also the left of the whole Army of the Potomac, and, to conform to the crest of the hill, was bent back at about right angles with the line of the rest of the brigade. This was fortunate, for in their advance the 47th Alabama, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Bulger, struck our regiment squarely in front and opened a murderous fire on our unprotected line, as we had just got into position, and had no time to throw up breastworks. At the same time the 15th Alabama, commanded by Colonel William C. Oates, numbering 644 men and 42 officers, moved around to attack us in flank and rear. Our colonel, Chamberlain, met this movement by putting the right wing of the regiment into single rank to resist the 47th, and bent back the five left companies of the regiment at a right angle.

Our regiment numbered 358 men, but as Company B, numbering 50 men, had been sent out to "protect our flank," we had 308 men in line to resist the furious assault of these two strong regi-

\ Vincent's brigade appears to have been sent by General Sykes to occupy the position to the left, or southward, of Little Round Top, between it and Round Top, about the same time that Colonel O'Rourke with the

ments, outnumbering us more than 3 to 1. The conflict was fierce, but necessarily brief, as it was a question of only a short time when every man must fall before the superior fire of our enemy.

When 130 of our brave officers and men had been shot down where they stood, and only 178 remained,—hardly more than a strong skirmish line,—and each man had fired the 60 rounds of cartridges he carried into the fight, and the survivors were using from the cartridge-boxes of their fallen comrades, the time had come when it must be decided whether we should fall back and give up this key to the whole field of Gettysburg, or charge and try and throw off this foe. Colonel Chamberlain gave the order to "fix bayonets," and almost before he could say "charge!" the regiment leaped down the hill and closed in with the foe, whom we found behind every rock and tree. Surprised and overwhelmed, most of them threw down their arms and surrendered.

Some fought till they were slain; the others ran "like a herd of wild cattle," as Colonel Oates himself expressed it. In their flight they were met by Company B, Captain Morrill, which we supposed had been captured, but now attacked so vigorously that over one hundred of the fugitives were compelled to surrender.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bulger, commanding the 47th, was wounded, and fell into our hands, with over three hundred prisoners and all the wounded.

The 20th Maine returned with its prisoners to the original position, and staid there until ordered forward in the early evening to Round Top.

140th New York and Hazlett's battery, the advance of Weed's brigade, at the call of Warren was hastening up the northern slope of Little Round Top to seize the crest.—EDITORS.

THE 146TH NEW YORK AT LITTLE ROUND TOP.

BY JAMES G. GRINDLAY, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.



UNIFORM OF THE 146TH NEW YORK REGIMENT.

IN "The Century" for December, 1886 [see p. 298 of this volume], in the illustration, "View from the position of Hazlett's battery on Little Round Top," it is stated, "the monument marks the position of the 91st Pennsylvania of Weed's brigade." I beg to say that the location of the monument is exactly where the headquarters of the 146th New York Volunteers were established and maintained during the battle of Gettysburg. Weed's brigade com-

prised the 140th and 146th New York and the 91st and 155th Pennsylvania Volunteers, and they formed the line of battle on Little Round Top in the order as named from left to right.

The Big Rock stands upon the summit of Little Round Top, and was the headquarters of the 146th New York, Colonel Kenner Garrard, and also brigade headquarters, when Colonel Garrard succeeded General Weed in command when the latter

was killed. The 146th New York occupied the ground immediately in front of the Big Rock, and the center and colors of our regiment were opposite the rock—the 91st being on our right, as before stated; and the extreme left of the 91st Pennsylvania was at least one hundred yards to the right of the rock. I am confirmed in this statement by correspondence with brother officers, among others Major C. K. Dutton, of New York City, who writes me: "Your statement of the position of 146th is correct. One thing I do know, viz., that my company (H) was to the right of the rock, and several companies of the regiment on the right of my company before the 91st Pennsylvania came in line. Jenkins, Armstrong, and myself had our position a hundred feet to the right of the rock." The writer commanded the color company, and his memory is refreshed from the fact that at the reunion of the regiment at Rome, N. Y., August 6th last, the subject was fully discussed and steps taken to erect a monument to mark the position, also by a recent examination of the maps and photographs of the field of battle at the residence of General Sickles by a committee of our regiment.

UTICA, N. Y., Dec. 26th, 1886.

THE BREASTWORKS AT CULP'S HILL.

I. BY JESSE H. JONES, CAPTAIN, 60TH N. Y. V.

THE Second Division of the Twelfth Corps camped on the night of the first day under the shadow of Little Round Top. About 6 o'clock the next morning it was marched over from that point, which was then the extreme left of our line, and posted on Culp's Hill, its left forming a right angle with the right of General Wadsworth's division of the First Corps. Our brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General George S. Greene and comprising five New York regiments, the 60th, 78th, 102d, 137th, and 149th, was on the left of the division, and our regiment, the 60th, was on the left of the brigade. This regiment was largely composed of men accustomed to woodcraft, and they fell to work to construct log breastworks with unaccustomed heartiness. All instinctively felt that a life-and-death struggle was impending, and that every help should be used. Culp's Hill was covered with woods; so all the materials needful were at our disposal. Right and left the men felled the trees, and blocked them up into a close log fence. Piles of cordwood which lay near by were quickly appropriated. The sticks, set slanting on end against the outer face of the logs, made excellent battening. All along the rest of the line of the corps a similar defense was constructed. Fortunate regiments, which had spades and picks, strengthened their work with earth. By 10 o'clock it was finished.

At 6 o'clock in the evening General Meade, finding himself hard pressed on the left, and deeming an attack on the right wing improbable at so late an hour, called for the Twelfth Corps. Our brigade was detailed to remain and hold the lines of the corps. Word was brought from the officer in charge of our pickets that the enemy was advancing in heavy force in line of battle, and, with all possible celerity, such dispositions as the case admitted of were made. The brigade was strung out into a thin line of separate men as far along the breastworks as it would reach. The intention was to place the men an arm's-length apart, but, by the time the left of the brigade had fairly undoubled files, the enemy was too near to allow of further arrangements being made.

In a short time the woods were all flecked with the flashes from the muskets of our skirmishers. Down in the hollow there, at the foot of the slope, you could catch a glimpse now and then, by the blaze of the powder, of our brave boys as they sprang from tree to tree, and sent back defiance to

the advancing foe. With desperation they clung to each covering. For half an hour they obstructed the enemy's approach.

The men restrained their nervous fingers; the hostile guns flamed out against us not fifteen yards in front. Our men from the front were tumbling over the breastwork, and for a breathless moment those behind the breastwork waited. Then out into the night like chain-lightning leaped the zigzag line of fire. Now was the value of breastworks apparent, for, protected by these, few of our men were hit, and feeling a sense of security, we worked with corresponding energy. Without breastworks our line would have been swept away in an instant by the hailstorm of bullets and the flood of men. The enemy worked still farther around to our right, entered the breastwork beyond our line, and crumpled up and drove back, a short distance, our extreme right regiment. They advanced a little way, but were checked by the fire of a couple of small regiments borrowed for the emergency from General Wadsworth, and placed in echelon.

General Meade hardly mentioned this affair at the breastworks in his original report of the battle, and those who were there think justice has never been done in the case,☆ and that what was there achieved has never been adequately apprehended and stated by any writer.

The left of our brigade was only about eighty rods from the Baltimore turnpike, while the right was somewhat nearer. There were no supports. All the force that there was to stay the onset was that one thin line. Had the breastworks not been built, and had there been only the thin line of our unprotected brigade, that line must have been swept away like leaves before the wind, by the oncoming of so heavy a mass of troops, and the pike would have been reached by the enemy. Once on the pike, the Confederate commander would have been full in the rear of one-third of our army, firmly planted on the middle of the chord of the arc upon which that portion was posted. What the effect must have been it is not needful to describe. The least disaster would have sufficed to force us from the field.

During the night our commanders brought back the remainder of the corps, and, stumbling upon the enemy's pickets, found out what had taken place, something of which until that moment they had been entirely unaware.

☆ On the 25th of February, 1864, General Meade made the following substitution in his official report:

"The detachment of so large a portion of the Twelfth Corps, with its temporary commander, Brigadier-General A. S. Williams, left the defense of the line previously held to the remaining brigade of the Second Division, commanded by Brigadier-General Greene, who held the left of the Twelfth Corps, now become the extreme right of the army. The enemy, perceiving the withdrawal of our troops, advanced and attacked General Greene with great vigor, who, making a gallant

defense, and being soon reinforced by portions of the First and Eleventh corps, contiguous to him, succeeded in repulsing all the efforts of the enemy to dislodge him."


Also, on the same day, in reply to a letter from General Slocum on the subject, General Meade wrote in part:

"I am willing to admit that, if my attention had been called to the services of Greene's Brigade in the pointed manner it now is, I would have given it credit for this special service."

EDITORS.

II. BY GEORGE S. GREENE, BREVET-MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.

THE breastworks on Culp's Hill referred to in the foregoing article were constructed under my immediate direction. Orders were given to throw up breastworks as soon as the troops came on the line. The approximate shape of the line at first held by the entire corps and afterward by my single brigade was this:



When Meade ordered the whole of the Twelfth Corps from Culp's Hill to reinforce his left, Slocum ordered my brigade to remain and "occupy the breastworks thrown up by the corps." The rest of the corps moved off just before dusk (about 7 P. M.) I immediately extended my men to the right to comply with the order as far as possible. Ireland's regiment (the 149th N. Y.), which was on my right, occupied the intrenchments vacated by Kane's brigade, his left at *b*, and a regiment from Howard's corps was placed on Ireland's right. This regiment, without being specially attacked, was marched to the rear by its colonel, when an attack upon it was imminently probable, much to the disgust of his men, as reported. As soon as I received orders to occupy the intrenchments, I applied to Wadsworth and received two regiments, which were placed in rear of my right, behind the points *b* and *d*, but sufficiently in the rear to support any part of the line.

The movement of the 149th Regiment had hardly been made when the regiment on picket was driven in by a vigorous attack by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, which was continued with great perseverance. The enemy finally extended their left to cover Ireland's right, which had been left in the air by the desertion of the Pennsylvania regiment from Howard's corps. Ireland was forced back and rallied his regiment behind the traverse, *b d*, which had been built to protect my right, and which now served its purpose. As soon as Ireland's movement was seen—or, rather, heard, for it was dark—I brought up the reserve, which checked any further advance of the enemy on the right. Very soon after this movement, Kane, with his brigade, arrived and took post on the right of my reserve, and the enemy ceased their attacks, after about three hours' continuous fighting.


As the troops marched out, General Kane followed the First Brigade of the Second Division toward the left. When the column arrived at the Baltimore pike the First Division followed the staff-officer sent to conduct it toward the left. The Second Division marched down the pike to the rear. Kane, hearing the firing on my posi-

tion, inquired as to their destination, and, not being satisfied, took the responsibility of returning to the fight, and immediately countermarched; as he came near the position which had been occupied by the First Division, the enemy's pickets fired on him, and this being heard by me, I sent an officer to conduct Kane in by the safer route of the turnpike. He arrived about 10 o'clock P. M., just after the enemy had been repulsed on my right. His presence tended to render the enemy cautious, and they rested on their arms till morning. The First Brigade (Candy's) of the Second Division arrived at Culp's Hill about 1 A. M., long after the fighting had ceased. General Williams, who commanded the Twelfth Corps, and General Slocum, who commanded the right wing, having been advised of the enemy's position, the artillery was placed in position before daylight, and after a heavy bombardment, the infantry, by a gallant and successful charge, drove the enemy from the position they had occupied in the night in the lines of the First Division.

The attack on my front, on the morning of the 3d of July, was renewed by Johnson's division simultaneously with our attack on the enemy in our lines on our right, and was conducted with the utmost vigor. The greater part of their heavy losses were sustained within a few yards of our breastworks. His adjutant, Major Watkins Leigh persisted in riding up to the very front of our lines, pushing his men to an assault on my works, where both horse and rider were killed, pierced simultaneously with several bullets. About fifty of the men got too near to our lines to retreat, and threw down their arms, ran up close to our works, threw up their handkerchiefs or white rags, and were allowed to come unarmed into our lines. Shaler's and Canda's brigades were sent to our support and took part in the defense of our lines on the morning of July 3d. By 10 A. M. the fighting ceased, and at 1 P. M. the enemy had disappeared from our front, and our men went to Rock Creek for water.

Of the disastrous consequences to the Union army, had Lee succeeded in penetrating our lines and placing himself square across the Baltimore pike in rear of the center and right wing of the entire army, there can be no question. Fortunately it was averted by the steady and determined courage of the five New York regiments above named. The assailants were Johnson's division of Ewell's (Second) Corps, consisting of twenty-two regiments, organized into four brigades—Steuart's, Nicholls's, Jones's, and Walker's—the latter being the famous "Stonewall Brigade," first commanded by Stonewall Jackson.

To the discernment of General Slocum, who saw the danger to which the army would be exposed by the movement ordered, and who took the responsibility of modifying the orders which he had received, is due the honor of having saved the army from a great and perhaps fatal disaster.



AT CLOSE QUARTERS ON THE FIRST DAY AT GETTYSBURG.

THE STRUGGLE FOR "ROUND TOP."

BY E. M. LAW, MAJOR-GENERAL, C. S. A.

MORE has been written concerning the battle of Gettysburg than any other "passage of arms" between the Federal and Confederate troops during the civil war. The engagement of the 1st of July, brought on by accident, on the part of the Confederates at least, in which two corps of the Federal army under General Reynolds were defeated and driven through Gettysburg by portions of Hill's and Ewell's corps, has been often and fully described by the officers on both sides. Ewell's attack on the Federal right in the vicinity of Culp's Hill on the 2d of July, and Longstreet's advance upon the Federal left on the same day, so far as relates to one division of the latter's command (McLaws's), have been detailed with equal minuteness by those engaged. The magnificent charge of Pickett's division on the Federal center on the third day has been the theme of a host of writers who deemed it an honor to have stood in the lines of blue by which that charge was repelled, and those who, on the other hand, thought it no less an honor to have shared the fortunes of the torn and shattered columns of gray which only failed to accomplish impossibilities.

But concerning the operations of Lee's extreme right wing, extending to the foot of Round Top, little or nothing has been written on the Confed-

erate side. This part of the line was held by Hood's division of Longstreet's corps, and was really the key to the whole position of Gettysburg. Here some of the most stubborn fighting of that desperate battle was done, and here a determined effort of the Federal cavalry to reach the right rear of the Confederate army on the 3d of July was frustrated — an attempt which, if successful, must have resulted disastrously to that army.

The meagerness of the details of the operations referred to may be accounted for by the fact that General Longstreet personally superintended the left of his line, consisting of McLaws's division of his own corps, supported by R. H. Anderson's division of Hill's corps, and hence knew comparatively little from personal observation of the movements of Hood's division; and, also, that General Hood was wounded early in the engagement on the 2d of July, and, relinquishing the command of the division, could not report its subsequent operations. As senior brigadier, I succeeded to the command of Hood's division, and directed its movements during the engagements of the 2d and 3d of July. But owing to the active and constant movements of our army for some weeks after the battle, I was only able to obtain the reports of brigade commanders a very short time previous to being ordered to the army of General Bragg at Chickamauga. This prevented me from making a report at the time, and it was afterward neglected.

The facts stated in this paper are therefore many of them published for the first time. It remains for the impartial reader to decide whether they do not constitute an important part of the history of the most memorable battle of the war; for Gettysburg was the turning-point in the great struggle. Together with the fall of Vicksburg, which occurred simultaneously with the retreat of Lee's army toward the Potomac, it inspired the armies and people of the North with fresh courage and stimulated anew the hopes of ultimate success which were visibly flagging under an almost uninterrupted series of reverses to the Federal arms in Virginia, extending over a period of nearly two years. On the other hand, it was at Gettysburg that the right arm of the South was broken, and it must always stand out in Confederate annals as in the history of a brave and kindred people stands

"Flodden's fatal field,
Where shivered was fair Scotland's spear,
And broken was her shield."

When the fight began at Gettysburg on the 1st of July, three brigades of Hood's division were at Greenwood on the Chambersburg road and on the west side of South Mountain. My own brigade, with Bachman's battery, was at New Guilford, some miles south of Greenwood, watching our right flank. At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 2d, under orders from General Longstreet, I moved as rapidly as possible toward Gettysburg, and arrived there shortly before noon, having marched the intervening distance of twenty-four miles in that time. On my arrival I found the other brigades of Hood's division resting about a mile from the town, on the Chambersburg road. In a short time after my brigade came up, the division was moved to our right (south), traversing the angle between the Chambersburg and Emmitsburg

roads, following McLaws, who was in advance. Pickett's division had not yet come up. We moved very slowly, with frequent halts and deflections from the direct course—the latter being necessary to conceal our movements from the Federal signal station on Little Round Top.

At length, after many vexatious delays, Hood's division was pushed forward until it uncovered McLaws, and soon reached the Emmitsburg road in front of Round Top. Here our line of battle was formed at an acute angle



BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY J. HUNT, CHIEF OF
ARTILLERY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

with the road, the right being in advance of it, between the road and the mountain, and the left extending across and in rear of the road. The formation was in two lines, Law's Alabama and Robertson's Texas brigades in front, supported, at a distance of about 200 yards, by the Georgia brigades of Benning and G. T. Anderson. McLaws's division extended the line to our left, with a similar formation. The Artillery Battalion, composed of Reilly's, Latham's, Garden's, and Bachman's batteries, twenty guns in all, were disposed at advantageous points upon the ridge occupied by the line of infantry. There were no signs of Federal cavalry or troops of any kind on our right. As a precautionary

measure, however, a regiment was detached from Anderson's brigade and stationed at Kern's house, half a mile down the road toward Emmitsburg.

It was now past 4 o'clock in the afternoon and our troops were in position for the attack. The flank movement by which they came into position is referred to in the following dispatch from the Federal signal station on Little Round Top: "To General Meade—4 o'clock P. M. The only infantry of the enemy visible is on the extreme [Federal] left; it has been moving toward Emmitsburg." It will thus be seen that the movement, in spite of our precautions, was not unobserved.

The Confederate line of battle occupied a ridge, partly wooded, with a valley intervening between it and the heights held by the Federal troops in front. The position occupied by the Federal left wing in front of us was now fully disclosed to view, and it was certainly one of the most formidable it had ever been the fortune of any troops to confront. Round Top rose like a huge sentinel guarding the Federal left flank, while the spurs and ridges trending off to the north of it afforded unrivaled positions for the use of artillery. The puffs of smoke rising at intervals along the line of hills, as the Federal batteries fired upon such portions of our line as became exposed to view, clearly showed that these advantages had not been neglected. The thick woods which in great part covered the sides of Round Top and the adjacent

hills concealed from view the rugged nature of the ground, which increased fourfold the difficulties of the attack.

How far up the slope of Round Top the Federal left extended we could not tell, as the woods effectually concealed from view everything in that quarter.

In order to gain information upon this important point, I sent out a detail of six picked men as scouts, with instructions to move as rapidly as possible to the summit of Round Top, making a *détour* to their right, and "feeling" down from that point, to locate the left of the Federal line. The entire absence of Federal cavalry on our right, as well as other indications leading to the same conclusion, convinced me that the Federals, relying upon the protection of the mountain, considered their flank secure; that it was therefore their most vulnerable point. Impressed with this view, I further instructed the scouts when they reached the summit to observe carefully the state of affairs on the other side, and to send a "runner" back to me with such intelligence as they might be able to gain. They moved off at a trot. A few moments after they had started, I saw in the valley, some distance to our right, several dark figures moving across the fields from the rear of Round Top in the direction of the Emmitsburg road. These on being captured proved to be Federal soldiers, who seemed surprised at our sudden appearance in that quarter, and who, on being questioned, stated that they had surgeons' certificates and were "going to the rear." They indicated "the rear" by pointing toward Emmitsburg, and in reply to the question where they came from, they said from the "medical train behind the mountain"—referring to Round Top. They also stated that the medical and ordnance trains "around the mountain" were insecurely guarded, no attack being expected at that point; and that the other side of the mountain could be easily reached by a good farm road, along which they had just traveled, the distance being a little more than a mile. On my way to convey this information to General Hood, I met a messenger from my scouts, who had reached the crest of Round Top. He reported that there was no Federal force on the summit, and confirmed in every particular the statements of the prisoners I had just captured. If there had previously been any question in regard to the policy of a front attack, there now remained not a shadow of doubt that our true *point d'appui* was Round Top, from which the Confederate right wing could be extended toward the Taneytown and Baltimore roads, on the Federal left and rear.

I found General Hood on the ridge where his line had been formed, communicated to him the information I had obtained, and pointed out the ease with which a movement by the right flank might be made. He coincided fully in my views, but said that his orders were positive to attack in front, as soon as the left of the corps should get into position. I therefore entered a formal protest against a direct attack, on the grounds: 1. That the great natural strength of the enemy's position in our front rendered the result of a direct assault extremely uncertain. 2. That, even if successful, the victory would be purchased at too great a sacrifice of life, and our troops would be in no condition to improve it. 3. That a front attack was unnecessary,—the occupation of Round Top during the night by moving upon it from the south,

and the extension of our right wing from that point across the enemy's left and rear, being not only practicable, but easy. 4. That such a movement would compel a change of front on the part of the enemy, the abandonment of his strong position on the heights, and force him to attack us in position.

General Hood called up Captain Hamilton, of his staff, and requested me to repeat the protest to him, and the grounds on which it was made. He then directed Captain Hamilton to find General Longstreet as quickly as possible and deliver the protest, and to say to him that he (Hood) indorsed it fully. Hamilton rode off at once, but in about ten minutes returned, accompanied by a staff-officer of General Longstreet, who said to General Hood, in my hearing, "General Longstreet orders that you begin the attack at once." Hood turned to me and merely said, "You hear the order?" I at once moved my brigade to the assault. I do not know whether the protest ever reached General Lee. From the brief interval that elapsed between the time it was sent to General Longstreet and the receipt of the order to begin the attack, I am inclined to think it did not. General Longstreet has since said that he repeatedly advised against a front attack and suggested a movement by our right flank. He may have thought, after the rejection of this advice by General Lee, that it was useless to press the matter further.

Just here the battle of Gettysburg was lost to the Confederate arms. It is useless to speculate upon the turn affairs might have taken if the Confederate cavalry had been in communication with the rest of the army, and if General Stuart had kept General Lee informed, as he should have done, of the movements of the Federal army. In considering the causes of the Confederate failure on that particular field, we must take the situation just as we find it. And the situation was as follows: The advance of the two armies encountered each other on the 1st of July. An engagement ensued in which the Confederates were victorious. The Federal troops retired through Gettysburg and took position along the height east of the town—a position which, if properly defended, was practicably impregnable to a direct attack.

The whole matter then resolves itself into this: General Lee failed at Gettysburg on the 2d and 3d of July because he made his attack precisely where his enemy wanted him to make it and was most fully prepared to receive it. Even had he succeeded in driving the Federal army from its strong position by a general and simultaneous assault along the whole front (which was the only possible chance of success in that direction), he would have found his army in very much the same condition in which Pyrrhus found his, when, after driving the Romans from the field of Asculum, he exclaimed, "Another such victory, and I am undone!"

The failure of General Ewell to seize Cemetery Hill and adjacent positions, on the evening of July 1st, has been frequently assigned as one of the causes of our loss of the battle. It is very doubtful whether General Ewell could have occupied those heights had he made the attempt, for General Pleasanton has asserted very positively that, on the night of the 1st of July, "we [the Federals] had more troops in position than Lee." And General Lee qualified his instructions to General Ewell to seize the heights by the words

"if practicable." Under the circumstances, the fact that General Ewell did not seize them is very strong presumptive evidence that it was not practicable.

The two armies being face to face on the 2d of July, and setting aside all question of a retreat by either, General Lee's alternative of a direct attack was a movement by his right flank to the Federal left and rear. The first promised nothing but desperate fighting, heavy loss, and probable failure. The second certainly promised nothing worse, with the probabilities all in favor of a "fair field and a free fight," and that was all his army asked. Referring to this suggested movement upon the Federal left flank, General Pleasanton, who commanded the Federal cavalry at that time, has expressed the opinion that it was impracticable, and has stated further that he "had two divisions of cavalry, one in rear of the Federal position and one on Lee's right flank," to prevent it. If the cavalry had been there, as he states, they



THE STRUGGLE FOR DEVIL'S DEN, (LOOKING TOWARD THE CONFEDERATE LINES). FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

would not have amounted to even a single "ounce of prevention," as far as the movements of our infantry were concerned. But if there *was* a division, or even a single picket-post of cavalry, either Federal or Confederate, on our right flank, at any time on the 2d of July, it was kept most persistently out of sight, as my scouts, who were sent out in all directions, failed to find it.

Our order of attack—issued as soon as the two divisions of Longstreet's corps came into position on the line already described—was, that the movement should begin on the right, my brigade on that flank leading, the other commands taking it up successively toward the left. It was near 5 o'clock P. M. when we advanced to the attack. The artillery on both sides had been warmly engaged for about fifteen minutes, and continued to fire heavily until we became engaged with the Federal infantry, when the Confederate batteries ceased firing to avoid injury to our own troops, who were then, for the most part, concealed by the woods about the base of Round Top and the spurs to the north of it. General Hood was severely wounded in the arm by a shot from the Federal artillery as we moved into action.

Advancing rapidly across the valley which separated the opposing lines,—all the time under a heavy fire from the batteries,—our front line struck the enemy's skirmishers posted along the farther edge of the valley. Brushing

these quickly away, we soon came upon their first line of battle, running along the lower slopes of the hills known as Devil's Den, to our left of Round Top, and separated from the latter by Plum Run valley. The fighting soon became close and severe. Exposed to the artillery fire from the heights in front and on our left, as well as to the musketry of the infantry, it required all the courage and steadiness of the veterans who composed the Army of Northern Virginia — whose spirit was never higher than then — to face the storm. Not one moment was lost. With rapidly thinning ranks the gray line swept on, until the blue line in front wavered, broke, and seemed to dissolve in the woods and rocks on the mountain-side. The advance continued steadily, the center of the division moving directly upon the guns on the hill adjoining Devil's Den on the north, from which we had been suffering so severely. In order to secure my right flank, I extended it well up on the side of Round Top, and my brigade, in closing to the right, left a considerable interval between its left and the right of the Texas brigade of Robertson. Into this interval I threw Benning's Georgia brigade, which had up to that time occupied the second line. At the same time seeing a heavy Federal force on Robertson's left, and no Confederate troops having come up to extend our line in that direction, Anderson's Georgia brigade, till then also in the second line, was thrown out on that flank.

Thus disposed, the division continued to move forward, encountering, as it ascended the heights around the battery on the spur and to the right and left of it, a most determined resistance from the Federal troops, who seemed to be continually reënforced. The ground was rough and difficult, broken by rocks and boulders, which rendered an orderly advance impossible. Sometimes the Federals would hold one side of the huge boulders on the slope until the Confederates occupied the other. In some cases my men, with reckless daring, mounted to the top of the large rocks in order to get a better view and to deliver their fire with greater effect. One of these, Sergeant Barbee of the Texas brigade, having reached a rock a little in advance of the line, stood erect on the top of it, loading and firing as coolly as if unconscious of danger, while the air around him was fairly swarming with bullets. He soon fell helpless from several wounds; but he held his rock, lying upon the top of it until the litter-bearers carried him off.


In less than an hour from the time we advanced to the attack, the hill by Devil's Den opposite our center was taken, with three pieces of the artillery that had occupied it. The remaining piece was run down the opposite slope by the gunners, and escaped capture.

In the meantime my brigade, on the right, had swept over the northern slope of Round Top, cleared it of the enemy, and then, making a partial change of front to the left, advanced upon Little Round Top, which lay in rear of the spur on which the battery had been taken. This change of direction soon exposed it to a flank attack on the right by fresh troops (Vincent's brigade), rendering it necessary to retire it to the general line.

While our center and right wing were engaged as I have described, Anderson's brigade, on the left, was subjected to great annoyance and loss by

movements of the enemy upon its left flank, being frequently compelled to change the front of the regiments on that flank to repel attacks from that direction.

Up to this time I had seen nothing of McLaws's division, which was to have extended our left and to have moved to the attack at the same time. I therefore halted my line, which had become broken and disorganized by the roughness of the ground over which it had been fighting, and placing it in as advantageous a position as possible for receiving any attack that the Federals



THE "SLAUGHTER PEN" AT THE BASE AND ON THE LEFT SLOPE OF LITTLE ROUND TOP. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.

might be disposed to make, I hurried back to the ridge from which we had originally advanced. I found McLaws still in position there, his troops suffering considerably from a severe fire of artillery from the opposite hills. I was informed by General Kershaw, who held the right of this division, that although he understood the general instructions that the forward movement was to be taken up from the right, he had not yet received the order to move, from his division commander. I pointed out the position of Hood's division, and urged the necessity of immediate support on its left. General Kershaw requested me to designate the point on which his right flank should be directed, and promptly moved to the attack, the movement being taken up by the whole division.

When Hood's division first attacked, General Meade, alarmed for the safety of his left wing, and doubtless fully alive to the importance of holding so vital a point as Round Top and its adjacent spurs, commenced sending reënforcements to the threatened points. We encountered some of these in our

first advance, and others were arriving as McLaws came up on our left. In its advance this division extended from the "Peach Orchard" near the Emmitsburg road, on its left, to the "Wheat-field" north of the hill on which we had captured the Federal battery, where its right wing connected with my left. As McLaws advanced, we again moved forward on his right, and the fighting continued in "see-saw" style—first one side and then the other gaining ground or losing it, with small advantage to either, until dark.

At the close of the engagement Hood's division held the hill where the battery had been taken and the ridge to its left—our right extending across Devil's Den and well up on the north-western slope of Round Top. During the night this line was strengthened by the construction of a breastwork of the loose stones that abounded all along the positions occupied by the troops, and the light of the next morning disclosed the fact that the Federal troops in front of us had improved their time in the same way. In fact, all through the night we could hear them at work as the rocks were dropped in place on the works, and no doubt they heard us just as distinctly, while we were engaged in the same life-preserving operation.

Though the losses had been severe on both sides, comparatively few prisoners had been taken. But early in the night, in the confusion resulting from the fight over such rugged ground, and the darkness of the wooded mountain-side, men of both armies, in search of their commands, occasionally wandered into the opposing picket-lines and were captured. Many of the Federal wounded were left in our lines on the ground from which their troops had been forced back, and some of ours remained in their hands in the most advanced positions which we had reached and had been compelled to abandon. Among these latter was Colonel Powell of the 5th Texas regiment, who was shot through the body and afterward died. Powell was a stout, portly man, with a full beard, resembling, in many respects, General Longstreet, and the first impression of his captors was that they had taken that officer. Indeed, it was asserted positively by some of the prisoners we picked up during the night that Longstreet was badly wounded and a prisoner in their hands, and they obstinately refused to credit our statements to the contrary.

Early in the morning of the 3d two of my batteries, Latham's and Garden's, were sent to Colonel (afterward General) E. P. Alexander, who commanded our artillery in the center, to assist in the cannonade of the Federal position south of Cemetery Hill, preparatory to the assault of General Pickett's division at that point; and about 9 o'clock A. M. General Longstreet came over to my position on the right, and instructed me to be ready to renew the attack on our front. Under the circumstances that then existed, such an attack would have been simply madness. I have already described the difficult nature of the ground in our front. These difficulties were greatly increased by extemporized breastworks of rock all along the Federal line, which afforded good protection for their infantry, and were fully manned by a force much superior to our own. On the other hand, we had been weakened in the desperate attack of the preceding evening by losses amounting to

one-fourth of the whole force carried into action. More than two thousand officers and men of our division had been killed and wounded, among them Generals J. B. Anderson and G. T. Robertson, and about one-half of the field-officers of the various regiments. McLaws's division, on our left, had suffered nearly as severely, General Barksdale of that division being killed and General Semmes mortally wounded.

The cannonade in the center soon began, and presented one of the most magnificent battle-scenes witnessed during the war. Looking up the valley toward Gettysburg, the hills on either side were capped with crowns of flame and smoke, as 300 guns, about equally divided between the two ridges, vomited their iron hail upon each other. Dense clouds of smoke settled over the valley, through which the shells went hissing and screaming on their errand of death. Numbers of these from opposite directions exploded midway over the valley, apparently with venomous impatience, as they met each other in mid-air, lighting up the clouds with their snake-like flashes.

While this grand artillery duel was progressing, and before our infantry had moved to the attack, a new danger threatened us on the right. This was the appearance of Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, which moved up on that flank and commenced massing in the body of timber which extended from the base of Round Top westward toward Kern's house, on the Emmitsburg road. Reilly's and Bachman's batteries were ordered to change front to the right so as to bear upon this position, and at once opened fire upon the cavalry, which retired beyond the wood and out of sight. In order to protect my flank more fully, I withdrew the 1st Texas regiment of Robertson's brigade from the main line, and placed it in position midway between Round Top and the Emmitsburg road, with skirmishers extending from its left and connecting at right angles with the extreme right of the main line on the slope of the mountain. I also detached the 7th and 8th Georgia regiments of Anderson's brigade, and sent them to the support of the 9th, which had been stationed at Kern's house. About the time these dispositions were completed, Colonel Black, of the 1st South Carolina Cavalry, reported to me with about 100 men who had been gathered up from the medical trains, most of them partly disabled and only a part mounted, and with three guns of Hart's battery of horse artillery. Hart's guns were stationed on the Emmitsburg road, and the cavalry extended the right flank beyond that road. This new flanking line was formed at right angles to the main line, and crossed the Emmitsburg road near Kern's house.

One brigade of the Federal cavalry (Merritt's) moved across the road and deployed a strong line of dismounted skirmishers in front of Colonel Black's command, which was too weak to offer any effectual resistance. Hart's guns, however, were well handled, and did good service as long as the enemy remained in reach of them. To meet this flanking movement, I had to extend the 7th and 8th Georgia regiments to the right, and heavy skirmishing continued as the lines developed, with occasional efforts of the Federals to break through, until about half-past three o'clock P. M., when my two regiments were stretched out to a bare line of skirmishers.

It is not an easy task to operate against cavalry with infantry alone, on an extended line, and in an open country where the former, capable of moving much more rapidly, can choose its own points of attack and can elude the blows of its necessarily more tardy adversary. But Merritt's brigade was now dismounted and deployed as skirmishers, and I lost no time in taking



DEAD CONFEDERATE SHARP-SHOOTER IN THE DEVIL'S DEN.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

advantage of this temporary equality as to the means of locomotion. Detaching the two remaining regiments of Anderson's brigade (11th and 59th Georgia) from the main line, I moved them rapidly to our extreme right, now about a mile from Kern's house, attacked Merritt's reserve, and then, changing front to the left, struck his skirmish-line "on its end" and "doubled it up" as far as the Emmitsburg road. This re-

duced my front to manageable dimensions and left some force at my disposal to meet any concentrated attack that the cavalry might make.

I had just returned to the position occupied by our artillery, which was in the angle formed by the main and flanking lines, when Farnsworth's cavalry brigade charged the line held by the 1st Texas regiment. It was impossible to use our artillery to any advantage owing to the "close quarters" of the attacking cavalry with our own men—the leading squadrons forcing their horses up to the very muzzles of the rifles of our infantry. That portion of the cavalry which covered the front of the 1st Texas regiment was handsomely repulsed; but the 1st Vermont regiment, forming the Federal right wing, overlapped the 1st Texas on its left, and, striking the skirmish-line only, rode through it into the open valley in rear of our main line on the spurs of Round Top. When I first became satisfied, through information from the Texas skirmishers, that Farnsworth's brigade was massing in their front, the 9th Georgia regiment was ordered from Kern's house to the support of the batteries, the former position being now safe, as the other four regiments of Anderson's brigade were concentrated near that point. Hearing the firing and knowing its cause, the 9th Georgia came up at a run, just as the 1st Vermont Cavalry rode through our skirmish-line, led by General Farnsworth in person. Instead of moving directly upon our batteries, the cavalry directed its course up the valley toward Gettysburg, passing between the position of our artillery and our main line. Watching the direction they had taken, I

sent Lieutenant Wade, of my staff, rapidly across the valley in advance of them, with orders to detach the first regiment he should come to on the main line and send it down on a run to "head them off" in that direction. He was also ordered to follow the line to the extreme right and direct Colonel Oates (15th Alabama) to strengthen his flanking skirmish-line and to close up the gap on the left of the 1st Texas where the cavalry had broken in.

Farnsworth and his cavalry in the meantime were riding in gallant style, with drawn sabers and unopposed, up the valley. As they approached Snyder's house, and as I stood intently watching them, I saw a ragged Confederate battle-flag fluttering among the trees at the foot of the opposite ridge, and the men with it soon after appeared, running out into the open ground on the farther side of the valley. It was the 4th Alabama regiment, Law's brigade, which had been taken from the main line and sent down by Lieutenant Wade. The men opened fire as they ran. The course of the cavalry was abruptly checked and saddles were rapidly emptied. Recoiling from this fire, they turned to their left and rear, and directed their course up the hill toward the position occupied by our batteries. Bachman's battery promptly changed front to its left, so as to face the approaching cavalry, and, together with its infantry supports, opened a withering fire at close range. Turning again to their left, Farnsworth and the few of his men who remained in their saddles directed their course toward the point where they had originally broken in, having described by this time almost a complete circle. But the gap where they had entered was now closed, and receiving another fire from that point, they again turned to the left and took refuge in the woods near the base of Round Top. When the last turn to the left was made, about half a dozen of their number separated from the main body and escaped by "running the gauntlet" to the right of the 1st Texas regiment. Farnsworth, with his little handful of gallant followers, rode upon the skirmish-line of the 15th Alabama regiment, and, pistol in hand, called upon Lieutenant Adrian, who commanded the line, to surrender. The skirmishers in return fired upon him, killing his horse and wounding Farnsworth in several places. [See p. 393.]

General Longstreet, aware of the danger that threatened our right from the attack of Kilpatrick's division, came over to my position late in the afternoon and expressed his satisfaction at the result and the promptness and good conduct of the troops engaged. We had all day held our front line, gained the evening before, and with troops drawn from that line had repulsed General Kilpatrick on our right flank. It seemed to us on the Confederate



BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM N. PENDLETON,
C. S. A., LEE'S CHIEF OF ARTILLERY.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

right that there was at least one little spot of "silver lining" in the cloud that hung so darkly over the field of Gettysburg after the disastrous charge of Pickett.

Late in the afternoon of July 3d I was ordered to withdraw the division from the lines it had held since the evening of the 2d to the ridge near the Emmitsburg road, from which it had advanced to the attack on that day. McLaws's division, which had held the line to our left during the



MAJOR-GENERAL J. B. KERSHAW, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

day, retired first, and I ordered my brigade commanders to take up the movement from left to right. The courier who delivered the order to General Benning holding the left of the division, in designating the position to which he was to retire, pointed to the line McLaws had just abandoned. Benning, supposing that McLaws had been moved for the purpose of reënforcing our line on some other part of the field, dispatched Colonel DuBose with the 15th Georgia regiment in that direction. McCandless's Federal brigade had, in the meantime, advanced to the ground previously held by McLaws, and attacked the 15th Georgia when it attempted to take up that position. Colonel DuBose made a gallant but fruitless attempt to hold

his ground, expecting support from the other regiments of his brigade. Being attacked in front and on both flanks by McCandless's brigade, reënforced by Nevin's, he was driven back with considerable loss. He retired from one position to another, fighting as he retreated, and finally succeeded in extricating his regiment and rejoining his brigade. The loss of the 15th Georgia in this affair was very heavy, including 101 prisoners, besides the killed and wounded. In the meantime General Benning, having received a second order to retire, withdrew the remainder of his brigade without loss. The other brigades were quietly withdrawn, the Federals making no advance. We remained in our new position across the Emmitsburg road until near daylight on the 5th, when we took up our march with the rest of the army toward Fairfield Gap and the Potomac.



DEVIL'S DEN, FACING LITTLE ROUND TOP.

KERSHAW'S BRIGADE AT GETTYSBURG.


BY J. B. KERSHAW, MAJOR-GENERAL, C. S. A.

MY brigade, composed of South Carolinians,[†] constituted, with Semmes's, Wofford's, and Barksdale's brigades, the division of Major-General Lafayette McLaws, and that, with the divisions of Pickett and Hood, formed the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, known as Longstreet's.

About sunset on the 1st of July we reached the top of the range of hills overlooking Gettysburg, from which could be seen and heard the smoke and din of battle, then raging in the distance. We encamped about midnight two miles from Gettysburg, on the left of the Chambersburg pike. On the 2d we were up and ready to move at 4 A. M., in obedience to orders, but, owing, as we understood at the time, to the occupancy of the road by trains of the Second Corps, Ewell's, did not march until about sunrise. With only a slight detention from trains in the way, we reached the high grounds near Gettysburg, and moved to the right of the Third Corps, Kershaw's brigade being at the head of the column, which was halted at the end of the lane leading to the Black Horse Tavern, situated some five hundred yards to our right. We lay there awaiting orders until noon, or an hour after. This position commanded a view of the Emmitsburg road about Kern's house, and during the morning a large body of troops, with flankers out in our direction, passed over that point and joined the Federal army. At length, General McLaws ordered me to move by a flank to the rear, get under the cover of the hill, and move along the bank of Marsh Creek toward the enemy, taking care to keep out of their view. In executing this order, we passed the Black Horse Tavern and followed the road leading from that point toward the Emmitsburg pike, until the head of column reached a point where the road passed over the top of a hill, from which our movement would have been plainly visible from the Federal signal station on Little Round Top. Here we were halted by General McLaws in person, while he and General Longstreet rode forward to reconnoiter. Very soon those gentlemen returned, both manifesting considerable irritation, as I thought. General McLaws ordered me

[†] The 2d, 3d, 7th, 8th and 15th South Carolina regiments, and the 3d South Carolina Battalion.—EDITORS.

to countermarch, and in doing so we passed Hood's division, which had been following us. We moved back to the place where we had rested during the morning, and thence by a country road to Willoughby Run, then dry, and down that to the school-house beyond Pitzer's. There we turned to the left through the lane, moving directly toward Little Round Top. General Longstreet here commanded me to advance with my brigade and attack the enemy at the Peach Orchard, which lay a little to the left of my line of march, some six hundred yards from us. I was directed to turn the flank of that position, extend my line along the road we were then in beyond the Emmitsburg pike, with my left resting on that road. At the same time a



MAJOR-GENERAL E. M. LAW, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.


battery of artillery was moved alongside of the column, parallel to my line of march. At 3 P. M. the head of my column emerged from the woods, and came into the open field in front of the stone wall which extends along by Flaherty's farm, and to the east past Snyder's. Here we were in full view of the Federal position. Their main line appeared to extend from Little Round Top, where their signal flags were flying, until it was lost to sight far away to the left. An advanced line occupied the Peach Orchard, heavily supported by artillery, and extended from that point toward our left along the Emmitsburg road. The intervening ground was occupied by open fields, interspersed

and divided by stone walls. The position just here seemed almost impregnable. I immediately formed line of battle along the stone wall just mentioned, my left resting about Flaherty's house, and my right near Snyder's. This was done under cover of my skirmishers, who engaged those of the enemy near the Emmitsburg road. In the meantime I examined the position of the Federals with some care. I found them in superior force, strongly posted in the Peach Orchard, which bristled with artillery, with a main line of battle in their rear, apparently intrenched, and extending to, if not upon, Little Round Top, far beyond the point at which their left had been supposed to rest. To carry out my instructions would have been, if successful in driving the enemy from the Peach Orchard, to present my own right flank and rear to a large portion of the enemy's main line of battle. I therefore placed my command in position under the cover of the stone wall, and communicated the condition of matters to Major-General McLaws. The division was then formed on this line, Semmes's brigade two hundred yards in rear and supporting Kershaw's; Barksdale's on the left of Kershaw's, with Wofford's in Barksdale's rear supporting him. Cabell's battalion of artillery was placed along the wall to Kershaw's right, and the 15th South Carolina


regiment, Colonel de Saussure, was thrown to their right to support them on that flank.

In the meantime General Hood's division was moving in our rear to the right, to gain the enemy's left flank, and I was directed to commence the attack as soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging around toward the Peach Orchard, and at the same time establishing connection with Hood on my right, and coöperating with him. It was understood that he was to sweep down the Federal lines in a direction perpendicular to our line of battle. I was informed that Barksdale would move with me and conform to my movement; that Semmes would follow me, and Wofford follow Barksdale. These instructions I received in sundry messages from General Longstreet and General McLaws, and in part by personal communication with them. In my center-front was a stone farm-house [supposed to be Rose's], with a barn also of stone. These buildings were about five hundred yards from our position, and on a line with the crest of the Peach Orchard hill.

The Federal infantry was posted along the front of the orchard, and also on the face looking toward Rose's. Six of their batteries were in position, three at the orchard near the crest of the hill, and the others about two hundred yards in rear, extending in the direction of Little Round Top. Behind Rose's was a morass, and, on the right of that, a stone wall running parallel with our line, some two hundred yards from Rose's. Beyond the morass was a stony hill, covered with heavy timber and thick undergrowth, interspersed with boulders and large fragments of rock, extending some distance toward the Federal main line, and in the direction of Round Top, and to our left and in rear of the orchard and the batteries posted there. Beyond the stone wall last mentioned, and to the right of the stony hill, was a dense forest extending far to the right. From the morass a small stream ran into this wood and along the base of the mountain. Between the stony hill and




MAJOR-GENERAL LAFAYETTE McLAWS, C. S. A. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.



SICKLES'S POSITION AT THE PEACH ORCHARD, VIEWED FROM THE EMMITSBURG ROAD, LOOKING SOUTH.


This and the other outline sketches were made in 1885 by C. W. Reed, of Bigelow's 9th Mass. Battery.

the forest was an interval of about one hundred yards, only sparsely covered with a scrubby undergrowth, through which a narrow road led in the direction of the mountain. Looking down this road from Rose's a large wheat-field was seen. In rear of the wheat-field, and between that and the mountain, there was a heavy force of Federals, posted in line behind a stone wall. Under my instructions I determined to move upon the stony hill, so as to strike it with my center, and thus attack the orchard on its left rear. About 4 o'clock I received the order to move, at a signal from Cabell's artillery. They were to fire for some minutes, then pause, and then fire three guns in rapid succession. At this I was to move without further orders. I communicated these instructions to the commanders of each of the regiments in my command, directing them to convey them to the company officers. They were told, at the signal, to order the men to leap the wall without further orders, and to align the troops in front of it. Accordingly, at the signal, the men leaped over the wall and were promptly aligned; the word was given, and the brigade moved off at the word, with great steadiness and precision, followed by Semmes with equal promptness. General Longstreet accompanied me in this advance on foot, as far as the Emmitsburg road. All the field and staff officers were dismounted on account of the many obstacles in the way. When we were about the Emmitsburg road, I heard Barksdale's drums beat the assembly, and knew *then* that I should have no immediate support on my left, about to be squarely presented to the heavy force of infantry and artillery at and



THE "WHEAT-FIELD," LOOKING TOWARD KERSHAW'S POSITION IN FRONT OF ROSE'S HOUSE.

PEACH ORCHARD.



THE PEACH ORCHARD, VIEWED FROM LONGSTREET'S EXTREME RIGHT ON THE EMMITSBURG ROAD.

in rear of the Peach Orchard. The 2d and 8th South Carolina regiments and James's (Third) battalion constituted the left wing of the brigade, and were then moving majestically across the fields to the left of the lane leading to Rose's, with the steadiness of troops on parade. They were ordered to change direction to the left, and attack the batteries in rear of the Peach Orchard, and accordingly moved rapidly on that point. In order to aid this attack, the direction of the 3d and 7th regiments was changed to the left, so as to occupy the stony hill and wood. After passing the buildings at Rose's, the charge of the left wing was no longer visible from my position; but the movement was reported to have been magnificently conducted until the cannoneers had left their guns and the caissons were moving off, when the order was given to "*move by the right flank,*" by some unauthorized person, and was immediately obeyed by the men. The Federals returned to their guns and opened on these doomed regiments a raking fire of grape and canister, at short distance, which proved most disastrous, and for a time destroyed their usefulness. Hundreds of the bravest and best men of Carolina fell, victims of this fatal blunder. While this tragedy was being enacted, the 3d and 7th regiments were conducted rapidly to the stony hill. In consequence of the obstructions in the way, the 7th Regiment had lapped the 3d a few paces, and when they reached the cover of the stony hill I halted the line at the edge of the wood for a moment, and ordered the 7th to move by the right flank to uncover the 3d Regiment, which was promptly done. It was, no

CONFEDERATES MOVING
ABOUT DEVIL'S DEN.

PEACH ORCHARD.

POSITION OF CLARK'S, PHILLIPS'S
AND BIGELOW'S BATTERIES.SICKLES'S ANGLE AT THE PEACH ORCHARD, AS SEEN FROM THE ROAD LEADING FROM THE
WHEAT-FIELD TO THE PEACH ORCHARD.

doubt, this movement, observed by some one from the left, that led to the terrible mistake which cost so dearly.

The moment the line was rectified the 7th and 3d regiments advanced into the wood and occupied the stony hill, the left of the 3d Regiment swinging around and attacking the batteries to the left of that position, which, for the reasons already stated, had resumed their fire. Very soon a heavy column moved in two lines of battle across the wheat-field to attack my position in such manner as to take the 7th Regiment in flank on the right. The right wing of this regiment was then thrown back to meet this attack, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bland. I then hurried in person to General Semmes, then 150 yards in my right rear, to bring him up to meet the attack on my right, and also to bring forward my right regiment, the 15th, commanded by Colonel W. G. de Saussure, which, separated from the brigade by the artillery at the time of the advance, was cut off by Semmes's brigade. In the act of leading his regiment, this gallant and accomplished commander of the 15th had just fallen when I reached it. He fell some paces in front of the line, with sword drawn, leading the advance.

General Semmes promptly responded to my call, and put his brigade in motion toward the right, preparatory to moving to the front. While his troops were moving he fell, mortally wounded. Returning to the 7th Regiment, I reached it just as the advancing column of Federals had arrived at a point some two hundred yards off, whence they poured into us a volley from their whole line, and advanced to the charge. They were handsomely received and entertained by this veteran regiment, which long kept them at bay in its front. One regiment of Semmes's brigade came at a double-quick as far as the ravine in our rear, and checked the advance of the Federals in their front. There was still an interval of a hundred yards, or thereabout, between this regiment and the right of the 7th, and into this the enemy was forcing his way, causing my right to swing back more and more; still fighting, at a distance not exceeding thirty paces, until the two wings of the regiment were nearly doubled on each other.†

About this time, the fire of the battery on my left having ceased, I sent for the 2d South Carolina regiment to come to the right. Before I could hear anything of them the enemy had swung around and lapped my whole line at close quarters, and the fighting was general and desperate all along the line, and so continued for some time. These men were brave veterans who had fought from Bull Run to Gettysburg, and knew the strength of their position, and so held it as long as it was tenable. The 7th Regiment finally gave way, and I directed Colonel Aiken to re-form it at the stone wall about Rose's. I passed to the 3d Regiment, then hotly engaged on the crest of the hill, and gradually swung back its right as the enemy made progress around that flank. Semmes's advanced regiment had given way. One of his regiments had mingled with the 3d, and amid rocks and trees, within a few feet of each other, these brave men, Confederates and Federals, maintained a desperate

† The Union force engaged in this movement consisted of De Trobriand's brigade (Birney's division) of the Third Corps.—EDITORS.

conflict. The enemy could make no progress in front, but slowly extended around my right. Separated from view of my left, of which I could hear nothing, all my staff being with that wing, the position of the 15th Regiment being wholly unknown, the 7th having retreated, and nothing being heard of the other troops of the division, I feared the brave men around me would be surrounded by the large force of the enemy constantly increasing in numbers and all the while gradually enveloping us. In order to avoid such a catastrophe, I ordered a retreat to the buildings at Rose's. On emerging from the wood as I followed the retreat, I saw Wofford riding at the head of his fine brigade, then coming in, his left being in the Peach Orchard, which was then clear of the enemy. His movement was such as to strike the stony hill on the left, and thus turn the flank of the troops that had driven us from that position. On his approach the enemy retreated across the wheat-field, where, with the regiments of my left wing, Wofford attacked with great effect, driving the Federals upon and near to Little Round Top. I now ascertained that Barksdale had advanced upon the Peach Orchard after I had become engaged; that he had cleared that position with the assistance of my 8th South Carolina regiment, driving all before him, and, having advanced far beyond that point, until enveloped by superior forces, had fallen mortally wounded, and been left in the Federals' hands. He had passed too far to my left to afford me any relief except in silencing the batteries that had so cruelly punished my left. When Barksdale passed to the left, the regiments of my left wing moved up into the wood on the left of the stony hill, and maintained that position against heavy odds, until the advance of Wofford's brigade.

When the enemy fell back from the stony hill on General Wofford's advance, the 15th South Carolina and a portion of Semmes's brigade followed them and joined Wofford in his attack upon the retreating column. I rallied the remainder of my brigade and Semmes's at Rose's, with the assistance of Colonel Sorrel of Longstreet's staff, and advanced with them to the support of Wofford, taking position at the stone wall overlooking the forest to the right of Rose's house, some two hundred yards in front. Finding that Wofford's men were coming out, I retained them at that point to check any attempt of the enemy to follow. It was now near nightfall, and the operations of the day were over. That night we occupied the ground over which we had fought, with my left at the Peach Orchard, on the hill, and gathered the dead and wounded—a long list of brave and efficient officers and men. Captain Cunningham's company of the 2d Regiment was reported to have gone into action with forty men, of whom but four remained unhurt to bury their fallen comrades. My losses exceeded 600 men killed and wounded,—about one-half the force engaged.

A glance at the map [see pp. 299, 308] showing the positions occupied by the troops on the 2d of July, will reveal the remarkable fact that the stony hill and wood occupied by this brigade and part of Semmes's was assailed or defended by the Federal brigades of De Trobriand, Sweitzer, Tilton, and Zook, of the divisions of Birney, Barnes, and Caldwell, and of the Second, Third, and Fifth corps. Nowhere have I found any more forcible evidence

of the nature and magnitude of this struggle by McLaws's and Hood's divisions than is contained in General Meade's report. He says:


"About 3 P. M. I rode out to the extreme left. . . . Having found Major-General Sickles, I was explaining to him that he was too far in the advance, and discussing with him the propriety of withdrawing, when the enemy opened upon him with several batteries, in his front and flank, and immediately brought forward columns of infantry and made a vigorous assault. The Third Corps sustained the shock most heroically. Troops from the Second Corps were immediately sent by Major-General Hancock to cover the right flank of the Third Corps, and soon after the assault commenced the Fifth Corps most fortunately arrived and took position on the left of the Third, Major-General Sykes, commanding, immediately sending a force to occupy Round Top Ridge, where a most furious contest was maintained, the enemy making desperate but unsuccessful efforts to secure it. Notwithstanding the stubborn resistance of the Third Corps under Major-General Birney (Major-General Sickles having been wounded early in the action), superiority in numbers of corps of the enemy enabling him to outflank its advance position, General Birney was compelled to fall back and re-form behind the line originally designed to be held.

"In the meantime, perceiving the great exertions of the enemy, the Sixth Corps, Major-General Sedgwick, and part of the First Corps to the command of which I had assigned Major-General Newton, particularly Lockwood's Maryland Brigade, with detachments from the Second Corps, were all brought up at different periods, and succeeded, together with a gallant resistance of the Fifth Corps, in checking and finally repulsing the assault of the enemy, who retired in confusion and disorder about sunset, and ceased any further efforts on our extreme left."↓

These mighty shocks of contending armies were sustained, on our part, by two divisions of infantry numbering, with the artillery, not more than 10,000, or at the highest estimate 13,000 men.

Kershaw's brigade remained unemployed during the 3d of July, in the position it held the evening before, along the stony hill and wood. It will be evident to the reader that the causes of the failure of the operations here described to achieve greater results, may be reduced to one, to wit: the want of simultaneous movement and coöperation between the troops employed. A careful examination of all that has been written of that eventful series of battles will show that this was the cause of all the failures. Every attack was magnificent and successful, but failed in the end for the want of coöperation between corps, divisions, brigades, and, in some instances, regiments of the same brigade. The want of coöperation, or, as the Comte de Paris terms it, the want of "coördination," caused the loss of Gettysburg to the Confederates. It will be seen, too, that there was no loss of time on the part of McLaws's division, from the day it left Culpeper to that of its arrival at Gettysburg. If any ensued after that, it was due to circumstances wholly unknown to the writer. Certainly, the loss of time, if any, would not have lost the fight, if there had been perfect coöperation of all the troops. But, except to vindicate the truth, it is vain to inquire into the causes of our failure.

↓ In a supplementary report, General Meade amended this paragraph so as to include the First Division of the Twelfth Corps. Lockwood's brigade belonged to the Twelfth Corps, unattached.—EDITORS.



THE LAST CONFEDERATE GUN AT GETTYSBURG—ON LONGSTREET'S RIGHT, OPPOSITE ROUND TOP.

LEE'S RIGHT WING AT GETTYSBURG.

BY JAMES LONGSTREET, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. S. A.

GETTYSBURG lies partly between Seminary Ridge on the west and Cemetery Ridge on the south-east, a distance of about fourteen hundred yards dividing the crests of the two ridges. As General Lee rode to the summit of Seminary Ridge and looked down upon the town he saw the Federals in full retreat and concentrating on the rock-ribbed hill that served as a burying-ground for the city. He sent orders to Ewell to follow up the success if he found it practicable and to occupy the hill on which the enemy was concentrating. As the order was not positive, but left discretion with General Ewell, the latter thought it better to give his troops a little rest and wait for more definite instructions. I was following Hill's Corps as fast as possible, and as soon as I got possession of the road went rapidly forward to join General Lee. I found him on the summit of Seminary Ridge watching the enemy concentrate on the opposite hill. He pointed out their position to me. I took my glasses and made as careful a survey as I could from that point. After five or ten minutes I turned to General Lee and said:

"If we could have chosen a point to meet our plans of operation, I do not think we could have found a better one than that upon which they are now concentrating. All we have to do is to throw our army around by their left, and we shall interpose between the Federal army and Washington. We can get a strong position and wait, and if they fail to attack us we shall have everything in condition to move back to-morrow night in the direction of Washington, selecting beforehand a good position into which we can place our troops to receive battle next day. Finding our object is Washington or that army, the Federals will be sure to attack us. When they attack, we shall beat them, as we proposed to do before we left Fredericksburg, and the probabilities are that the fruits of our success will be great."

"No," said General Lee; "the enemy is there, and I am going to attack him there."

I suggested that such a move as I proposed would give us control of the roads leading to Washington and Baltimore, and reminded General Lee of



LUTHERAN CHURCH ON CHAMBERSBURG STREET,
GETTYSBURG, USED AS A HOSPITAL.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

our original plans. If we had fallen behind Meade and had insisted on staying between him and Washington, he would have been compelled to attack and would have been badly beaten. General Lee answered, "No; they are there in position, and I am going to whip them or they are going to whip me." I saw he was in no frame of mind to listen to further argument at that time, so I did not push the matter, but determined to renew the subject the next morning. It was then about 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

On the morning of the 2d I joined General Lee and again proposed the move to Meade's left and rear. He was still unwilling to consider the proposition, but soon left me and rode off to see General Ewell and to examine the ground on our left with a view to making the attack at that point.

After making the examination and talking to General Ewell, he determined to make the attack by the right, and, returning to where I was, announced his intention of so doing. His engineer officers had been along the line far enough to find a road by which the troops could move and be concealed from the Federal signal stations.

About 11 o'clock on the morning of the 2d he ordered the march, and put it under the conduct of his engineer officers, so as to be assured that the troops would move by the best route and encounter the least delay in reaching the position designated by him for the attack on the Federal left, at the same time concealing the movements then under orders from view of the Federals.

McLaws's division was in advance, with Hood following. After marching some distance there was a delay in front, and I rode forward to ascertain the cause, when it was reported to me that part of the road just in advance of us was in plain view of the Federal signal station on Round Top. To avoid that point the direction of the troops was changed. Again I found there was some delay, and ordering Hood's division, then in the rear, to move on and double with the division in front, so as to save as much time as possible, I went forward again to see the cause of the delay. It seemed there was doubt again about the men being concealed, when I stated that I could see the signal station, and there was no reason why they could not see us. It seemed to me useless, therefore, to delay the troops any longer with the idea of concealing the movement, and the two divisions advanced. As the line was deployed I rode along from left to right, examining the Federal position and putting my troops in the best position we could find. General Lee at the

same time gave orders for the attack to be made by my right — following up the direction of the Emmitsburg road toward the Cemetery Ridge, holding Hood's left as well as could be toward the Emmitsburg road, McLaws to follow the movements of Hood, attacking at the Peach Orchard the Federal Third Corps, with a part of R. H. Anderson's division following the movements of McLaws to guard his left flank. As soon as the troops were in position, and we could find the points against which we should march and give the guiding points, the advance was ordered — at half-past 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The attack was made in splendid style by both divisions, and the Federal line was broken by the first impact. They retired, many of them, in the direction of Round Top behind bowlders and fences, which gave them shelter, and where they received reënforcements.

This was an unequal battle. General Lee's orders had been that when my advance was made, the Second Corps (Ewell), on his left, should move and make a simultaneous attack; that the Third Corps (Hill) should watch closely and engage so as to prevent heavy massing in front of me. Ewell made no move

at all until about 8 o'clock at night, after the heat of the battle was over, his line having been broken by a call for one of his brigades to go elsewhere. Hill made no move whatever, save of the brigades of his right division that were covering our left.

When the battle of the 2d was over, General Lee pronounced it a success, as we were in possession of ground from which we had driven the Federals and had taken several field-pieces. The conflict had been fierce and bloody, and my troops had driven back heavy columns and had encountered a force three or four times their number,¹ but we had accomplished little toward victorious results. Our success of the first day had led us into



BRIGADIER-GENERAL PAUL SEMMES, C. S. A.,
MORTALLY WOUNDED, JULY 2.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.




BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM BARKSDALE, C. S. A.,
WOUNDED JULY 2, DIED JULY 3.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

¹ General Meade's report shows that all of the Third and parts of the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth corps were engaged in the second day's fight. — EDITORS.

battle on the 2d, and the battle on the 2d was to lead us into the terrible and hopeless slaughter on the 3d.

On the night of the 2d I sent to our extreme right to make a little reconnoissance in that direction, thinking General Lee might yet conclude to move around the Federal left. The morning of the 3d broke clear and indicated a day on which operations would not be interrupted by the elements. The Confederate forces still occupied Seminary Ridge, while the Federals occupied the range stretching from Round Top to Cemetery Hill and around Culp's Hill. The position of the Federals was quite strong, and the battle of

the 2d had concentrated them so that I considered an attack from the front more hazardous than the battle on the 2d had been. The Federals were concentrated, while our troops were stretched out in a long, broken—



DEAD IN THE "WHEAT-FIELD" GATHERED FOR BURIAL. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.

and thus a weak—line. However, General Lee hoped to break through the Federal line and drive them off. I was disappointed when he came to me on the morning of the 3d and directed that I should renew the attack against Cemetery Hill, probably the strongest point of the Federal line. For that purpose he had already ordered up Pickett's division, which had been left at Chambersburg to guard our supply trains. In the meantime the Federals had placed batteries on Round Top, in position to make a raking fire against troops attacking the Federal front. Meade knew that if the battle was renewed it would be virtually over the same ground as my battle of the 2d. I stated to General Lee that I had been examining the ground over to the right, and was much inclined to think the best thing was to move to the Federal left.

"No," he said; "I am going to take them where they are on Cemetery Hill. I want you to take Pickett's division and make the attack. I will reënforce

you by two divisions [Heth's under Pettigrew and Pender's under Trimble] of the Third Corps."

"That will give me fifteen thousand men," I replied. "I have been a soldier, I may say, from the ranks up to the position I now hold. I have been in pretty much all kinds of skirmishes, from those of two or three soldiers up to those of an army corps, and I think I can safely say there never was a body of fifteen thousand men who could make that attack successfully."

The general seemed a little impatient at my remarks, so I said nothing more. As he showed no indication of changing his plan, I went to work at once to arrange my troops for the attack. Pickett was put in position and received directions for the line of his advance as indicated by General Lee. The divisions of the Third Corps were arranged along his left with orders to take up the line of march, as Pickett passed before them, in short echelon. We were to open with our batteries, and Pickett was to move out as soon as we silenced the Federal batteries. The artillery combat was to begin with the rapid discharge of two field-pieces as our signal. As soon as the orders were communicated along the line, I sent Colonel E. P. Alexander (who was commanding a battalion of artillery and who had been an engineer officer) to select carefully a point from which he could observe the effect of our batteries. When he could discover the enemy's batteries silenced or crippled, he should give notice to General Pickett, who was ordered, upon receipt of that notice, to move forward to the attack. When I took Pickett to the crest of Seminary Ridge and explained where his troops should be sheltered, and pointed out the direction General Lee wished him to take and the point of the Federal line where the assault was to be made, he seemed to appreciate the severity of the contest upon which he was about to enter, but was quite hopeful of success. Upon receipt of notice, he was to march over the crest of the hill down the gentle slope and up the rise opposite the Federal stronghold. The distance was about fourteen hundred yards, and for most of the way the Federal batteries would have a raking fire from Round Top, while the sharp-shooters, artillery, and infantry would subject the assaulting column to a terrible and destructive fire. With my knowledge of the situation, I could see the desperate and hopeless nature of the charge and the cruel slaughter it would cause. My heart was heavy when I left Pickett. I rode once or twice along the ground between Pickett and the Federals, examining the positions and studying the matter over in all its phases so far as we could anticipate.

About 1 o'clock everything was in readiness. The signal guns broke the prevailing stillness, and immediately 150 Confederate cannon burst into a deafening roar, which was answered by a thunder almost as great from the Federal side. The great artillery combat proceeded. The destruction was, of course, not great; but the thunder on Seminary Ridge, and the echo from the Federal side, showed that both commanders were ready. The armies seemed like mighty wild beasts growling at each other and preparing for a death struggle. For an hour or two the fire was continued, and met such steady response on the part of the Federals, that it seemed less effective than

